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Conflict over management of natural resources may intensify as population growth, 
development, and climate change stress natural systems.  In this dissertation, the role of 
policy networks implementing Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) is examined.  As 
explored here, policy networks are groups that come together to develop and implement 
terms of HCPs.  HCPs are necessary for private landowners to receive Incidental Take 
Permits (ITPs) from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) if approved development 
activities may result in take of threatened or endangered species.  ITPs may last up to 100 
years or more and be issued to individual or multiple landowners to accomplish 
development and habitat conservation goals within a region.   
Theoretical factors in the implementation and policy network literatures relevant 
to successful implementation of environmental agreements are reviewed and used to 
examine HCP implementation.  Phase I uses the USFWS Environmental Conservation 
Online System (ECOS) database to identify characteristics of policy networks formed to 
implement HCPs within the State of California, and how those networks changed since 
the creation of HCPs in 1982 by amendment of the 1973 Endangered Species Act.  Phase 
II presents a single, complex, multiple-party HCP case selected from Phase I to examine 
the policy network formed, the role of actors in this network, and network successes and 
implementation barriers.   
This research builds upon the implementation literature by demonstrating that 
implementation occurs in stages, not all of which are sequential, and that how 




It builds upon the policy network literature by demonstrating ways that 
participation by non-agency actors can enhance implementation; complex problems may 
better achieve conflicting goals by creating organizational structures made up of local, 
state, federal and non-governmental entities to better manage changing political, 
financial, and social conditions; if participants believe the transaction costs of 
maintaining a network outweigh the benefits, ongoing support may decline; what one 
perceives as success largely depends upon their role (or lack of a role) within the policy 
network; and conflict management processes perceived as fair and equitable significantly 
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Thoughtful policy for management of natural resources continues to become more 
critical as these collective goods are affected by stressors like economic development and 
climate change.  This dissertation examines the implementation of Habitat Conservation 
Plans (HCPs) issued by the US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) for the protection of 
threatened and endangered species.  HCPs are necessary in order to receive an incidental 
take permit (ITP) allowing a private landowner to initiate approved activities for 
development and other purposes when endangered or threatened species are at risk.  This 
dissertation begins by exploring policy issues relevant to HCPs.  Theoretical factors in 
the literature relevant to the role of policy networks in successful implementation of 
environmental agreements are reviewed. These factors are then used to more closely 
examine HCP implementation.   
This research seeks to identify general characteristics of HCPs related to the 
networks of actors that come together to create legally binding commitments with the 
USFWS for conservation of species habitat.  The first phase of this research uses the 
USFWS Environmental Conservation Online System (ECOS) database to identify 
general characteristics about the policy networks that form to implement HCPs.  This is 
intended to build upon data generated in the evaluation of the USFWS Habitat 
Conservation Program (Callihan, Kleiman, and Tirnauer, 2009), albeit on a smaller scale.  
The second phase of this research presents a single HCP case study based on its 
associated documentation, journal articles, websites and other published materials to 
answer questions related to the policy network formed, the role the actors in this network 
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play in implementation progress, and to identify network successes as well as barriers to 
HCP success.  Follow-up interviews with HCP participants and stakeholders are 
conducted to clarify and better understand these issues.  
Relevance and Contribution 
According to authors like Vig and Kraft, elevated political conflict over 
environmental protection underscores the important role government plays in devising 
solutions to environmental problems associated with collective goods.  Fulfilling this 
responsibility often requires planning and coordination efforts among multiple levels of 
government, various stakeholders, and citizens, and involves significant investment of 
both time and money on the part of all participants (Kraft and Vig, 2006).   
Various participatory techniques have been used in recent years to develop natural 
resource management policy in general, and strategies to resolve local environmental 
issues specifically.  Many multi-party agreements have been created either through 
extensive negotiation processes like environmental conflict resolution, or through more 
collaborative processes to develop natural resource management policy in hopes of 
reaching better solutions than litigation may offer.  Weber notes that the promise of 
collaboration is a pragmatic attempt by participants to come up with improved efficiency 
of government at lower transaction costs (1998).  Many policy processes are often 
considered a success once agreements are negotiated.  However, less is known about the 
success rate of these agreements as parties move forward with their implementation 
(Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Bingham, 2003; National Research Council, 2008; and 
Thomson, Perry, and Miller, 2008). 
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History of the Endangered Species Act and the Evolution of Habitat Conservation Plans 
The protection and recovery of endangered species is a particularly contentious 
area of environmental policy.  The Endangered Species Act (ESA) was passed in l973 to 
provide a means to protect threatened and endangered species and to conserve the 
ecosystems species depend on (US Fish and Wildlife Service, 1973).  Hailed as a victory 
by environmentalists, the ESA distressed private landowners because protecting species 
also means protecting habitat (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Peterson, Allison, Peterson, 
Peterson, and Lopez, 2004).  The 1982 amendment to the ESA allows the development of 
HCPs to encourage landowners to engage in proactive conservation practices, and 
minimize and mitigate the effects of permitted actions in conjunction with the issuance of 
ITPs.  These permits grant relief from sanction to landowners who accidentally “take” an 
endangered or threatened species while conducting otherwise lawful activities (Beierle 
and Cayford, 2002; US Fish and Wildlife Service, 2008a).  HCPs outline ways of 
maintaining, enhancing, and protecting habitat to protect species and may include 
provisions for permanently protecting land, restoring habitat, relocating plants or animals 
to another area, and must be approved by the USFWS prior to an ITP being issued (US 
Fish and Wildlife Service, 2008b).  Permits may be issued for shorter terms, like 5 years, 
or many years, in some cases, 30- or 50-years or more (US Fish and Wildlife Service, 
2009).  The controversial “No Surprises” policy announced in 1994 provides regulatory 
assurances to the holder of an ITP that no additional land use restrictions or financial 
compensation will be required of the permit holder as long as they are acting in good 
faith to implement an HCP (US Fish and Wildlife Service, 1998; US Fish and Wildlife 
Service, 2008a).  The USFWS, however, can revoke incidental take permits if 
4 
 
landowners violate conditions of the permit (Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, 
2009).  The Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and 
Incidental Take Permitting effective in 2000 addresses the USFWS General Five Point 
Policy clarifying permit duration, public participation, adaptive management, monitoring 
provisions, and biological goals (National Archives and Records Administration, 2000).   
According to Hoffman and Bazerman, HCPs are a mechanism to encourage 
creative solutions that balance conservation and economic imperatives, to break the mold 
of coercive command and control regulation, to form creative public-private partnerships, 
enhance long-term regulatory predictability and species protection, improve conservation 
science and technology, and avoid perverse incentives to conceal or destroy evidence of 
listed species on private lands (Hoffman and Bazerman, 2005).  Habitat conservation 
planning can be a lengthy and complex process depending on whether a plan addresses 
mitigation activities for a single or for multiple species, whether there is a single permit 
applicant or multiple applicants, and the range of differing stakeholder interests involved.  
Table 1.1 provides information on processing times found by Callihan, Kleiman, and 
Tirnauer (Callihan et al., 2009).  Categorical Exclusions (CE) to the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance process are required for plans determined 
to be low-effect, Environmental Assessments (EA) briefly determine the significance of 
plan impacts and whether an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is necessary, and 
ElS’s are necessary for plans with significant environmental impact where a detailed 
analysis of the impacts of all alternative actions are considered (Callihan et al., 2009).  
Callihan, et al., determined the HCP process is inefficient for several reasons including 
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their observation that it is not well defined and there are no mechanisms to resolve 
differences between permittees and the USFWS.   
Policy Networks as a Tool for Implementation 
This dissertation theorizes that policy networks may help in filling this void 
between planning and implementation, and seeks to better articulate reasons why this 
may be so.  Implementation of HCPs takes place over the life of the related permits 
issued for specific plans.  Because permit life may extend up to 100 years or more, for 














Total Time for HCP 
Development and ITP 
Approval (from when 
assistance was initiated 
until permit issued) - 
pre- and post-2006* 
20.9 months 17.1 months 54.9 months 
FWS Suggested 
Approval Time (per 
FWS 2000 HCP 
Handbook) 
Up to 3 months 4-6 months Up to 12 months 
FWS Approval Time 
(from when completed 
package was received by 
the Regional Office until 
permit was awarded) - 
post-2006* 
3.3 months 22 months 12.7Months 
*In 2006, USFWS field offices received delegation to approve low-
effect/Categorical Exclusion ITPs. 
 
Common critiques of planning for HCPs are the tension between private property 
rights and public good associated with land management for conservation purposes, 
questions about whether the HCP approach protects species by adequately incorporating 
science, and whether the public is appropriately involved in the planning process.  
Inherent in the property rights question is the question of whether HCPs are truly 
voluntary.  If the alternative is foregoing use of private property, an argument can be 
made that the process is more closely related to coercive command and control.   
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HCP Implementation Issues 
Thomas notes that we should not assume that any HCP is fully implemented.  He 
refers specifically to one study on implementation done in 1999.  The focus of that study 
was on the adequacy of science included in HCPs.  As a result, the USFWS modified 
their plan preparation guidance to formally include adaptive management as a plan 
element (Thomas, 2001). Subsequent dissertation work by Smith investigates HCP 
landowner compliance and progress within the parameters of the “No Surprises” policy.  
Smith finds what she calls “second generation HCPs,” those completed after the “No 
Surprises” policy was put into effect, are not adequately implementing adaptive 
management strategies.  She states that the policy constrains learning and that political 
accommodation of the policy may be sacrificing protection of species and habitat (Smith, 
2005).   Thomas speculates HCPs may be partially implemented based on the threats of 
revoked permits and legal action by environmental interests, and economic incentives 
introduced by the “No Surprises” policy.  The USFWS requires permittees to identify 
funding availability, and in some cases, enter into implementation agreements with 
multiple parties to establish accountability before issuing permits.  In the Coachella 
Valley Multiple Species HCP as an example, even after many years of good-faith efforts, 
the plan is still not completely implemented (Thomas, 2001).  He states that there are too 
few empirical studies of HCP implementation to make broad claims about the extent to 
which HCPs are translated into action (Thomas, 2003).    
Research into the implementation of HCPs is important because of the increasing 
number of species being negatively affected by a variety of factors including degradation 
or elimination of habitat for various reasons including economic development and 
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potential impacts of climate change.  Costs associated with implementing individual 
plans are often millions of dollars and are paid for by both public and private entities.  In 
fiscal year 2013, Federal and state endangered species expenditures for that year alone 
exceeded $1.2 billion in Federal costs and over $50 million in states costs excluding land 
acquisitions.  Land acquisition costs for 2013 are estimated to be $399 million in Federal 
costs and $25 million for states (US Fish and Wildlife Service, 2013).  What is not 
quantified is how much is spent by private landowners, non-governmental organizations 
and others involved in habitat conservation efforts. 
According to Vig and Kraft, HCP planning has had some success in protecting 
biological diversity, yet only a few species have fully recovered (Kraft & Vig, 2006).  
Some argue that the measure of success for HCPs should be the number of extinctions 
prevented (personal communication, Alexander Smith, June 30, 2015).  The USFWS 
website identifies 1,570 listed domestic threatened and endangered plant and animal 
species, 704 species with critical habitat designations, 696 approved HCPs resulting in 
822 approved and active incidental take permits, and 1,155 active recovery plans (US 
Fish and Wildlife Service, 2015b; US Fish and Wildlife Service, a; US Fish and Wildlife 
Service, b).  However, even with all of the multi-party efforts to date, 29 species are 
considered recovered, and 10 are extinct (US Fish and Wildlife Service, 2015a).  Clearly, 
work remains for implementation of HCPs and species recovery. 
Research Questions 
HCPs provide for partnerships between the USFWS and non-Federal parties to 
conserve the ecosystems upon which listed and threatened species depend, ultimately 
contributing to their recovery (US Fish and Wildlife Service, April 2011).  The broader 
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question for any policy strategy is whether or not required actions lead to desired 
outcomes.  Because there are so many variables that factor into that question for HCPs, 
this proposal seeks to lay the groundwork for larger policy examination by first asking 
“What factors play a role in successful HCP implementation?”  Recognizing there are 
several perspectives in the literature related to that question, the next question asks “How 
is success defined and measured in the HCP implementation process by the USFWS and 
by permittees?” Another question asks “How might the presence of various policy actors 
and the roles they play in a network that comes together to implement a multi-party HCP 
affect the likelihood of successful implementation?”  From a broader perspective, “Why 
does success matter?  Does policy network success relate to more successful HCP 
implementation?”   
This dissertation provides background information to assist in an overall analysis 
of the factors that may be associated with successful implementation of HCPs and the 
role of policy networks in implementing these agreements.  Implementation in this study 
is defined as the process following approval of an HCP by the USFWS through 
expiration of the ITPs issued as part of that plan.  Because the costs associated with 
formulation and implementation of HCPs can be high for both public and private entities, 
a better understanding of the elements that contribute to successful HCPs will allow for 
improved plan development and execution with the potential for greater benefits and 
reduced costs.  Understanding network-related barriers to implementation will allow 




Chapter 2 begins this process of discovery by exploring literature related to 
implementation of negotiated agreements, environmental planning in particular.  It 
follows the process by taking a brief detour through the nature of relationships between 
Federal agencies and others in the environmental protection realm, and then it picks up 
by identifying concepts in the policy network literature relevant to the actors 
implementing HCPs. 
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology through the two phases of this 
dissertation.  Phase I explores the USFWS ECOS database and develops some trends 
related to how changes in HCP policy development affected the utilization rate of HCPs, 
the nature of the implementation included in each generation of HCP, and general 
findings with respect to how that affected the frequency of HCPs associated with multiple 
permittees for multiple land uses.  Following that is a discussion about how this data was 
used to identify a case for further study. 
Phase II describes key elements of the case study selected for further examination 
of implementation progress and details about how the study was conducted.  The Western 
Riverside Multiple Species Habitat Conservation Plan in California was selected for this 
effort. 
Chapter 4 discusses the findings from each of the two phases of research 
described above and what the implications of those findings may suggest. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the overall dissertation findings, describes implications for 
policy makers and practitioners, and suggests additional research that may be helpful in 
further understanding how networks of individuals within various policy networks and 
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governance infrastructure come together to meet both the needs of individuals and the 






Several theoretical factors are suggested by the literature relevant to successful 
implementation of negotiated environmental agreements like HCPs.  Since these 
agreements often depend on the long-term cooperation of multiple actors, policy network 
theory, without an in-depth network analysis, is used as a framework for seeking insight 
into these factors.  Implementation studies, policy network theory, and other examples of 
environmentally-based network research literature are reviewed to identify specific 
factors for investigation.  Interviews with both USFWS personnel and other participants 
in the HCP process are conducted to supplement the literature as well as to clarify 
questions related to the USFWS data and case study documents discussed below. 
Implementation Literature 
Numerous authors have approached the study of implementation of public policy.  
One assessment that touches on many of the key ideas seen in more recent literature is the 
conceptual framework laid out by Sabatier and Mazmanian in 1980.  They define 
implementation as “the carrying out of a basic policy decision” that identifies a problem 
to be addressed, the objectives to be pursued, and may structure the implementation 
process in a variety of ways, often by statute (P. Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980).  The 
basis of their framework analyzes the manageability of the problem to be solved, and 
statutory and non-statutory variables that may affect subsequent implementation. They 
also recognize that various stages of the implementation process exist.  
For a problem to be managed, Sabatier and Mazmanian assume that there is some 
theory and technology available to improve the situation.  The ability to use that 
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technology is impacted by the diversity of the group whose behavior is targeted, the 
target group percentage of the overall population, and the extent of the behavioral 
changes required.  From there, they make the assumption that implementing policy 
objectives is enhanced when a statute 1) has the capacity to structure implementation via 
institutions, 2) provides legal and financial resources, 3) is looked upon favorably by 
agency officials, and 4) includes opportunities for participation by non-agency actors.  
Elements considered as enhancing the likelihood of success include things like clear 
precision and ranking of statutory objectives, and the extent of hierarchical integration 
within and among implementing institutions based on the number of veto/clearance 
points.  They state that a direct route to a statutory objective is preferred over a complex 
program administered by numerous semi-autonomous bureaucracies.  From a non-
statutory perspective, they say implementation of any program seeking to change 
behavior needs periodic infusions of political support to weather continuous socio-
economic and technical changes (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980).  
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) are well-known for their extensive study on the 
implementation of the Oakland Project in California in the late 1960’s, and identify 
factors deemed important in implementing and evaluating policies that may be useful 
when implementing HCPs.  Similar to Sabatier and Mazmanian, they note the necessity 
for objectives and resources as elements for implementation of any policy.  In most 
policies of interest, they find that objectives are multiple, vague, and conflicting.  They 
conclude that if the objectives are not unique, neither are the modes of implementation.  
Similar thinking applies to constraints.  “We can discover and then incorporate them into 
our plans only as the implementation process unfolds” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984).  
14 
 
Pressman & Wildavsky state that policy content shapes implementation by defining the 
arena in which the process takes place, identifying the role of principal actors, 
determining the range of permissible tools for action, and by supplying resources 
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). 
Pressman and Wildavsky state that policy implementers cannot foresee all of the 
difficulties of implementation because there are always unknowns in the implementation 
process (1984).  They also note the effects of both vertical and horizontal decision 
making structures.  Pressman and Wildavsky refer to Williams who divides the “long 
federal governance process from Congress to local service project operators” into three 
domains:  the big picture decision domain; the administrative and support domain ranging 
from middle-federal to local administrative levels; and the operators domain in which 
social service delivery organizations are dealing directly with project participants.  The 
greater the distance from the top of the decision domain to the bottom of the operators’ 
domain, the more opportunities exist for unanticipated consequences to occur (Pressman 
& Wildavsky, 1984).  Pressman and Wildavsky also refer to Mayntz’ analysis of 
environmental policy in Germany which found that the policy structure of environmental 
protection consists of a high degree of horizontal differentiation that causes coordination 
problems.  This horizontal structure increases the number of decision points, decreases 
the possibilities for consensus, and causes unexpected shortcomings in environmental 
protection (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984).  One conclusion Pressman and Wildavsky 
draw is that instead of mandating certain outcomes, public policy may leave outcomes to 
be determined by bargaining among the immediately affected parties (1984). 
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Pressman and Wildavsky ultimately conclude that implementation is a dynamic 
process where policies are designed in advance so they are less likely to fail, and at the 
same time, the process provides mechanisms to cope after things break down.  
Combining these two conditions to allow mutual adaptation between programs and 
experience is a compromise, but promises better results than either alone (1984).  The 
evolution of USFWS guidance on developing HCPs reflects both of these conditions. 
Bardach (1977) suggests that the implementation problem is really a control 
problem.  One person’s problem asserting control is another person’s problem escaping 
it.  When analyzing implementation, he suggests that we cannot be neutral in our 
analysis; we must choose a point of view to analyze and ask whose problem we want to 
solve.  He suggests choosing two subgroups in a sponsoring coalition:  the idealistic 
group and the other interested in selfish or non-programmatic benefits.  Standards of 
success for implementation should be defined from sponsors’ points of view and the 
sponsors must be participants in the process of program or policy modification.  “The 
scholarly observer must be able to note their actions and reactions” (Bardach, 1977).  The 
case study that follows focuses on the USFWS as the idealistic coalition, and the network 
of permittees as the coalition seeking non-programmatic benefits. 
Beierle and Cayford (2002) examine policy implementation based on public 
participation and note that one of the assumptions for use of public involvement is that it 
leads to more effective and timely implementation of plans later.  Their implementation 
study focuses on an extensive review of more than 200 cases of public participation in 
environmental decision making since the 1970s.   Their findings may be useful in 
considering implementation of HCPs since the cases they studied involve public 
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participation and resources to resolve environmental issues, often involve the 
participation of private landowners, and have either an identifiable lead agency or one for 
which the output would be immediately relevant.  Their study focuses on the social value 
of public participation and what makes some processes successful and others not.  They 
identify success as the extent to which public participation efforts achieve social goals.  
The social goals they focus on include incorporating public values into decisions, 
improving the substantive quality of decisions, resolving conflict among competing 
interests, building trust in institutions, and educating and informing the public (Beierle & 
Cayford, 2002).  They evaluate each case they study by considering its unique context, 
process, and results attributes.  They scored likelihood of implementation of a particular 
case as low (stalled or unlikely), medium (moderately likely), or high (completed or very 
likely).  Their findings suggest that the record of implementation looks good at one level 
with 70% of the cases receiving high scores, 15% medium scores, and 15% low scores.  
However, it worsens as the stage of implementation moves from Stage 3, changes in law, 
regulation and policy, to Stage 4, actions taken on the ground.  By Stage 4, cases 
receiving high scores dropped to 49%, medium scores dropped to 30%, and 21% received 
low scores (p. 57).  Beierle and Cayford conclude that successful implementation 
depends on a host of political, social, and legal influences, and is largely due to the 
process of participation, rather than its context, for the success or failure of public 
participation.  They note that implementation activities reported may or may not be 
reported accurately due to authors often referring to the likelihood of implementation as 
opposed to actual implementation.  They also speculate that authors may report success 
on easy problems but not mention difficult problems.  When Beierle and Cayford attempt 
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to take author bias into account, their findings cast serious doubt on a connection between 
good public participation and good implementation.  With respect to methodology for 
future research, they suggest that broad trends drawn from meta-analytical approaches 
such as theirs should be tested and refined by evaluating carefully chosen case studies 
(Beierle & Cayford, 2002). 
As touched on in the previous paragraph, Beierle and Cayford identify five stages 
of implementation:  output from a public process such as recommendations or an 
agreement; a decision or commitment on the part of a lead agency; changes in law, 
regulation, or policy; actions taken on the ground; and finally, changes in environmental 
quality.  They note, however, that many cases they reviewed do not reflect changes in 
environmental quality due to impacts being too far in the future to determine at the time 
of analysis.  This may well be the case for longer-term HCPs.  One of the differences 
between HCPs and other environmental policies is that HCPs tend to focus on 
minimizing and mitigating the effects of proposed activities rather than by focusing 
directly on improving ecosystems.  In this context, success may result from no change in 
habitat, or from a reduced rate of decline in environmental quality.  As part of their study, 
Beierle and Cayford identify five forces that influence the stages of implementation of 
environmental plans.  The first is disagreements among participants and lead agencies 
after agreement on initial plans that may lead to court actions or abandoned efforts.  The 
second involves parties or issues excluded from initial planning that later must be dealt 
with as part of project implementation.  The third is political intervention where 
politicians bring power to bear on what might normally be handled administratively.  The 
fourth force affecting implementation they discuss is changing circumstances making 
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continued implementation undesirable.  So much time may pass between a decision and 
its implementation that actions previously agreed upon may no longer make sense.  The 
fifth force they discuss is the regulatory program itself, where public participation is no 
substitute for regulatory power, political will, and money in implementation (Beierle & 
Cayford, 2002).  This conceptual model will aid in contextualizing the case selected for 
study in Phase II.  
 Brodgen (2003) developed an implementation checklist for evaluating outcomes 
of environmental agreements that might be helpful in considering HCP implementation.  
To improve the certainty of implementation, he suggests one should recognize the time 
required to accomplish goals and objectives, ask whether the management approach is 
feasible over the long-term, ask whether it is supported by political stakeholders who 
guarantee resources and support necessary for implementation, determine whether the 
agreement provides enough flexibility for local managers to manage, ask whether other 
members of the public can participate easily and effectively, note whether the agreement 
recognizes and addresses how stakeholders may change over time, ask whether the 
agreement is operationally and economically practical, and assure signatories to the 
agreement have the legal and decision-making authority necessary to implement 
provisions (2003).   HCP Implementing Agreements, which are encouraged by the 
USFWS and in some cases are required for ITP issuance, are intended to assure these 
questions are considered and addressed during HCP development.  Each of these 
elements is examined and discussed in the following Phase II case study. 
Scheberle (2004) explores the idea of implementation of environmental policy 
from a federalist perspective between Federal and state governments.  Her first premise is 
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that intergovernmental implementation of environmental programs needs a national base 
level of protection.  Within that framework of Federal oversight, however, opportunities 
for collaborative working relationships at other levels exist.  Her second premise is that 
implementation of environmental policy is a game of high stakes politics that can best be 
understood by examining national and state level political forces, statutory and regulatory 
language, court decisions, and the nature of the group targeted for behavioral change.  
She states that the cast of characters and the strategies they employ to implement 
environmental policy are equally important, especially those “implementation energizers” 
within a group who continue to fight for effective and efficient environmental programs.  
Similar to Pressman and Wildavsky, she acknowledges that implementation may change 
based on refocusing events requiring new strategies.  She argues that intergovernmental 
cooperation can be an integral part of the context of policy implementation.  She 
discusses several ways Federal-state interactions are defined, but notes that at least as 
important is the nature of relationships between Federal and state personnel in policy 
implementation (Scheberle, 2004).  An analogy she uses describes a cross-country trip 
where four passengers are given a road atlas, a credit card, and 7 days to travel from 
Maine to California.  She notes that it is unlikely all groups of people given this scenario 
would chose to travel by the same mode of transportation, take the same route, stay at the 
same motels, or arrive in California at the same time.  This example also clearly shows 
how each subsequent decision along the way can affect the travel experience (Scheberle, 
2004).  It is a simple and useful example to conceptualize the idea of implementation as a 
journey.  Anyone that has ever been on a family vacation as opposed to a trip with friends 
or on a business trip with others can immediately appreciate the various scenarios 
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travelers might find themselves in.  It also highlights that the relationship between the 
travelers may have a significant impact on the perceptions of how successfully the trip 
was completed. 
Scheberle states that the role orientations of Federal actors can dramatically affect 
working relationships and implementation patterns.  She seeks to identify conditions that 
facilitate working relationships that “pull together,” note which relationships “come 
apart,” and determine whether it is possible to predict when relationships are more likely 
to be positive between individuals working together.  She develops a typology of working 
relationships based on mutual trust and the extent of involvement by oversight personnel 
shown in Table 2.1 (Scheberle, 2004).   
Table 2.1. Scheberle’s Typology of Federal and State Working Relationships (Reprinted 
from Scheberle, 2004) 
 
 Low Involvement High Involvement 
High Trust Cooperative but 
autonomous 
Pulling together and 
synergistic 
Low Trust Coming apart with 
avoidance 
Coming apart and 
contentious 
 
When both characteristics are high, the strongest kind of working relationship 
results where participants are “pulling together.” The result is synergistic for both 
participants and results in mutual trust between officials in multiple levels of government.  
She argues this type of relationship is possible when participants share a commitment to 
policy objectives and a common recognition of the nature of the problem to be solved.  
Interactions include knowledge sharing, seeking advice and input, avoiding knee-jerk 
reactions to participant behaviors, and acknowledging positive activities that result in 
21 
 
increased mutual trust.  Because each actor must please different constituents and 
stakeholders, she states that “bliss is unlikely.”  However, concerted efforts between 
Federal and state actors can achieve programmatic success (Scheberle, 2004).  She 
concludes that actors must work harder to get the kind of relationship they want.  She 
describes the above as intrinsic factors affecting implementation.  As other authors have 
described above, Scheberle also identifies extrinsic factors affecting implementation of 
environmental policy including legal relationships, human and fiscal resources, and a 
political, social, and economic arena for program implementation (Scheberle, 2004).   
Scheberle’s work can be seen as a bridge between implementation theory and 
policy network theory, and while she specifically discusses Federal-state relationships, it 
seems reasonable to consider these ideas when exploring implementation of HCPs as 
plans approved by the USFWS at the Federal level, and relying on implementation by 
private landowners, states, local governments, tribes, non-governmental organizations, 
and other stakeholders.  Her typology is utilized within the context of the Phase II case 
study to discern whether the nature of the relationships between key players results in the 
desired outcomes.  The presence of implementation energizers and refocusing events are 
also addressed. 
Policy Network Theory Literature 
The nature of HCPs suggests that most planning and implementation will be 
accomplished by a variety of participants in addition to the single or multiple ITP 
applicants.  USFWS is required to approve both the plans and issue the permits.  A host 
of other public and private entities, interest groups, and stakeholders may participate as 
well.  Since the nature of the actors, their resources, and their interests is expected to 
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profoundly influence the implementation of HCPs, policy network theory seems an 
appropriate lens through which to view plan implementation progress.  This section 
reviews various aspects of the literature which may help to understand the processes 
associated with group interaction through policy networks and better articulate how these 
formal and informal institutions are formed in the implementation of natural resource 
management plans. 
Individuals within policy networks are “not well specified” according to Adam 
and Kriesi (2007).  They state that policy subsystems or networks consist of a large 
number of actors dealing with specific policy issues.  Political processes in these 
networks are characterized by the interactions of public and private actors dependent on 
each other for resources to achieve their goals.  The distribution of capabilities over the 
set of actors in collective action is significant.  Adam and Kriesi (2007) also refer to a 
large number of authors who use the term “policy networks” in very different ways, some 
of which we explore in more detail below. 
Common-pool resource theory demonstrates that different institutional 
arrangements powerfully affect the policy decision making process, and that policy or 
institutional change is an incremental process (Schlager, 2007).   Ostrom proposes a 
framework for analyzing institutional choice viewed from the perspective of individuals 
making choices about future operational rules to manage those resources (1990).  
Problem solving is constrained and guided by norms of behavior that affect the way 
alternatives are perceived and weighed and that limit opportunistic behavior.  Schlager 
quotes Ostrom as saying that preferences may become more complete over time as 
individuals gain a better understanding of their situation based on the context of the 
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situation and the information available.   Since uncertainty can be high about the structure 
and dynamics of the common-pool resource as well as the actions of users in relation to 
the resource and each other, appropriators spend a lot of time learning by trial and error  
(Schlager, 2007).  The management of natural resources through implementation of HCPs 
certainly fits within these findings, both with respect to the groups of individual actors 
that join together to form management institutions as well as the trial and error aspects of 
implementation.  Agreed upon rules and behavioral norms are often institutionalized 
within HCPs, particularly those with Implementation Agreements. 
Berry et al. attempt to sort out the “Babylonian conceptual chaos” of three 
network approaches to policy (Adam & Kriesi, 2007) in greater historical detail.  Berry, 
Brower, Choi, Goa, Jang, Kwon, and Word identify and compare (1) social network 
analysis, (2) public management networks, and (3) policy change and the impact of 
networks on policy outcomes in their work exploring the traditions of network research 
(Berry et al., 2004).  Note that they collectively refer to the ideas in item (3) as policy 
networks.  That terminology is used throughout the remainder of this document. 
Within social network analysis, Berry et al. identify sociometric studies rooted in 
Gestalt psychology, the Manchester anthropologists, and the Harvard structuralists.  The 
authors note that what these traditions have in common is the idea that network 
configurations demonstrate individuals, their relationships to each other, and their effect 
on group relations (Berry et al., 2004).  Social network analysis seeks answers about the 
intentions of participants and how socialization and social context provide norms, ideas, 
and structures that facilitate and constrain individual behaviors, while shaping the ways 
behaviors are received by the environment.   With respect to principal research questions, 
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social network analysis extensively explores reciprocal relationships between structure 
and behavior and the dynamics within a network as well as links between micro and 
macro consequences of network structure (Berry et al., 2004).   
From the public management tradition, Berry et al. focus on public management 
network structures that have grown primarily out of research in intergovernmental 
relations.  This methodology is seen as a way to examine horizontal and vertical 
relationships to deliver intergovernmental programs.  Most of the work in this tradition is 
based on field work and in-depth case studies to understand whether networks exist, how 
people function in networks as managers, and the impact of network management on 
decision making, policy outputs and outcomes, and democratic values of governance 
(Berry et al., 2004).  In public management networks, the authors state that the focus is 
on whether network management helps implement programs and policy more effectively 
and how managers’ actions affect individual networks and their performance (Berry et 
al., 2004). 
From the political science tradition, Berry et al. examine networks with respect to 
policy change and the impact of networks on policy outcomes.  They group these ideas 
together and call them policy networks.  These include the topics of policy innovation, 
policy change and agenda setting, and neo-institutional economic theory to assess how 
networks affect collective action and policy outcomes.  Local, regional and national 
networks play an important role in policy diffusion and innovation where individuals are 
embedded in sets of social relationships and institutional structures that affect behavior 
(Berry et al., 2004).  Policy change and agenda setting investigates how interest group 
and community power plays a role in issue networks affected by groups who influence 
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policy by functional areas.  The focus is on the interaction of actors sharing policy beliefs 
as advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem (Sabatier, 2007).  Policy networks in 
this context have communications networks among association and interest group 
members, policy specialists, and elected officials and staff with specific policy interests 
who actively influence policy processes and are considered rational satisficers (Sabatier, 
2007).  Research in the policy network realm most often seeks to answer how policy 
actors achieve desired policies, and how actors’ network roles influence policy outcomes, 
typically through the use of case studies although empirical examples follow this 
discussion as well. 
As noted above, the policy network tradition includes neo-institutional economic 
theory with a basis in Ostrom’s institutional choice and North and Williamson’s 
transaction-cost frameworks.  Williamson states that understanding transaction costs is 
central to understanding how individuals interact to find the most economical governance 
structure for transactions, especially those involving uncertainty where continued 
relationships are valued.  He defines the governance structure as the institutional matrix 
within which the integrity of a transaction is decided (Williamson, 1979).  North states 
that transaction cost theory is built on the assumptions of a costly environment, of 
subjective models on the part of actors to explain their environment, and of imperfect 
enforcement of agreements.  He notes that actors in a political market often have an 
imperfect understanding of the issues affecting them, and the high costs of transacting 
prevents achievement of efficient solutions.  He defines transaction costs as the costs of 
measuring and enforcing agreements.  Groups come together and create rules for 
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interacting in ways that reduce transaction costs and uncertainty in exchange for reduced 
institutional efficiencies (North, 1990). 
Berry et al. note that current research efforts seek to expand the policy network 
approach from the adoption level to include collaborative behavior.  They refer to the 
work of Scholz, Lubell, Schneider, and others who empirically assess network forms of 
organizations on collective action problems.  Their work assumes there are always 
collective action constraints for organizations to achieve cooperative relationships in 
managing local common resources.  There is also an assumption that networks can 
stimulate collaboration and cooperation through information and reputation effects that 
encourage the development of common perspectives on environmental policy issues and 
norms of cooperation and trust.  Berry et al. state that multi-actor partnerships emerge 
through interagency cooperation, intergovernmental program management structures, 
complex contracting arrays, and public and private partnerships.  Local networks are 
public goods undersupplied because of the cost of creation and maintenance.  The flow of 
benefits to individual network participants and the policy community is constrained by 
the costs of developing and maintaining contracts.  As supported by Williamson and 
North, partnerships are most likely to emerge when potential benefits are high and 
transaction costs are relatively low (Berry et al., 2004). 
The examples that follow are based on the works of Lubell, Sabatier, Weible, and 
others associated with collective action in various environmental management efforts.  
Most of the literature exploring how HCP partnership networks form is based on 
individual case studies.  It seems useful to examine other sorts of natural resource 
management partnerships for additional insight when seeking a more empirical approach 
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to the study of HCPs.  In general, each of the following examples relates to natural 
resource collective action where the actors are dependent upon continued relationships 
with each other to resolve issues.  Other similarities between HCPs and the examples that 
follow are that each involves private property rights vs. common benefit, participation in 
the processes is voluntary, the technical issues may be uncertain, and the impacts of 
policy decisions accumulate and become more visible over time. 
Examples of Environmentally-based Network Research 
Several empirical studies suggest factors that may be relevant to networks 
implementing HCPs.  For environmental interests, partnerships address problems such as 
habitat destruction and nonpoint source pollution.  For economic interests, partnerships 
allow the development of flexible policy tools to address environmental impacts in a 
cost-effective manner while reducing the threat of more stringent regulatory policies 
(Lubell, Schneider, Scholz, & Mete, 2002).  Lubell et al. (2002) echo the work of 
Ostrom, Williamson, North and others viewing partnerships as political contracts 
developed by actors seeking to minimize the first-order collective action problems of 
free-riding associated with use of local common-pool resources.  They suggest that, 
regardless of the benefits, partnerships will only emerge if they can overcome the second-
order collective-action problems inherent in institutional supply, that is, if they can create 
new rules with incentives to organize (Ostrom, 1990).   
One of the research efforts that may be helpful in understanding how networks 
form to create HCPs is the work of Lubell et al. who identify how watershed partnerships 
form to deal with collective action issues at the ecosystem scale (2002).  They refer to 
Kenney et al. who define a watershed partnership as  
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A primarily self-directed and locally focused collection of private and 
intergovernmental representatives organized to address water-related issues at a 
watershed level, operating outside traditional governmental processes or forums, 
and reliant on collaborative mechanisms of group interaction characterized by 
open debate, creativity in problem and solution definition, consensus decision 
making, and voluntary action (Kenney, McAllister, Caile, & Peckham, 2000).  
The theoretical advantages of partnerships are similar to successful common-pool 
resource management institutions analyzed by Ostrom.   
Lubell et al.’s study examines the emergence of watershed partnerships over a 12-
year period by evaluating both the number of partnerships in a watershed, and the number 
of activities of each partnership across all partnerships in a watershed.  They identify 
factors affecting benefits and transaction costs based on Ostrom’s institutional analysis 
and development framework.  They define watersheds as the action arena.  Within that 
arena, the action situation and characteristics of actors jointly determine the benefit and 
transaction costs of partnership development.  The action situation includes the nature 
and distribution of resources, existing institutional arrangements, and action-outcome 
links.  Actors are defined in terms of the resources they bring, their preferences, their 
knowledge and their information-processing capabilities.  Collective outcomes are a 
result of actors making decisions within the structure of the action situation that 
determines the payoffs for various strategies (Lubell et al., 2002).  The authors identify 
factors like problem severity, institutional opportunities, and political incentives (by 
sector) as features of watersheds affecting benefits.  Problem severity relates to issues 
like potential damage to water quality from agricultural and urban runoff, increasing 
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population density, etc.  Institutional opportunities available determine a relative gain or 
loss in benefits over the status quo and may include things like innovative state 
environmental programs.  They also look at the impacts of the presence or absence of 
political incentives to the agricultural, mining, and farming communities.  Transaction 
costs are affected by the size of the watershed, institutional support, and actor 
characteristics like income, education, race, and whether or not actors are area natives 
(Lubell et al., 2002).   
Lubell et al.’s findings suggest that all the components of problem severity tested 
contribute to the development of partnerships.  Within the institutional opportunities 
category, the number of partnerships tends to increase with the level of infrastructure 
debt, and decrease with the level of water quality enforcement, although questions exist 
about the relationship between enforcement and the number of partnerships based on the 
details of their analysis.  The receipt of federal and state funding significantly increases 
the number of partnerships, although receipt of local funding does not.  Support provided 
by prior partnerships significantly enhances the number of partnerships and their level of 
activity.  With respect to political incentives, the opposition of dominant agricultural 
interests decreases the rate of partnership incidence.  With respect to actors, an increase 
in per capita income had the highest increase in creation of partnerships.  An increase in 
blacks and Hispanics decreases the partnership incidence rate (Lubell et al., 2002). 
Lubell et al. conclude that partnerships do increase in response to environmental 
problems in watersheds and the corresponding weakness of existing institutions to 
manage those problems.  Partnerships do not emerge automatically in response to 
potential benefits, but will increase in homogeneous watersheds with human, social, and 
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financial capital necessary to overcome the transaction costs of building a new institution.  
They state that there are both advantages and disadvantages inherent in cooperative 
institutions, and watershed partnerships are not a magic bullet for solving all 
environmental problems.  Partnerships are more likely to emerge in watersheds with 
dispersed pollution problems difficult to solve through command and control policies, 
especially if the overall agricultural community does not resist new environmental 
policies.  The authors suggest, however, that if cooperation doesn’t produce positive 
outcomes and clear benefits for all major participants, partnerships may have a short life 
(Lubell et al., 2002).  The findings from this study suggest that problem severity, 
institutional support, and actor characteristic variables may play a significant role in 
successful implementation of HCPs. 
In another study, Lubell and Fulton analyze the role of local policy networks for 
implementation of agricultural watershed management by adopting environmental best 
management practices (BMPs).  They define policy networks as interconnected actors in 
a policy subsystem that communicate information about policy through some social 
connection.  They state that successful implementation of natural resource management 
requires widespread cooperation.  This study focuses on a case study of the Sacramento 
Valley Water Quality Coalition (Coalition).  The Coalition consists of 10 sub-watershed 
groups in charge of on-the-ground implementation of BMPs.  BMP adoption (in this case, 
installation of vegetative filter strips to control irrigation and stormwater runoff into 
waterways by orchard growers) is a challenging problem in cooperation.  Individual 
producers cannot make a large difference in overall water quality and nonpoint source 
pollution is costly to monitor, so there are incentives to free ride on the BMP efforts of 
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others. The authors investigate the link between BMP implementation and policy 
networks because BMPs are an important part of watershed management programs, and 
these programs are an important example of collaborative policy designed to encourage 
cooperation among multiple stakeholders (Lubell & Fulton, 2007). 
The Coalition was formed after a change in California water quality policy.  
Under the new plan, agricultural producers either had to join water management 
coalitions to monitor water quality and implement quality improvement plans, or obtain 
an individual permit from the local Regional Board responsible for implementing the 
states’ water quality program.  The subwatershed groups are headquartered within local 
organizations, they collaborate with many other local stakeholders, and the structure of 
partnerships is different in each subwatershed.  The regional groups coordinate among 
the subwatershed groups (Lubell & Fulton, 2007).  
Lubell and Fulton distributed surveys to orchard growers in seven counties asking 
about crop information, groups growers belonged to, annual sales revenue, demographic 
data and asked specific questions related to BMPs.  The dependent variable in this study 
is the number of specific practices a grower uses within each of three categories.  
Independent variables include the number of policy network contacts (the number of 
contacts made by producers regarding water quality issues to agricultural and non-profit 
agencies), and the number of water quality management activities in which the grower 
participated.  There was also an awareness variable for each category.  With respect to 




Lubell and Fulton’s findings suggest that policy networks play an integral role in 
implementation of BMPs and without the active cooperation of local policy networks, 
policies would fail especially if they rely on voluntary compliance.  They state that even 
in cases where regulators have strong punishments for non-compliance, supportive policy 
networks will reduce costs of monitoring and enforcement.  The key lesson is that the 
decisions of public managers at the state and federal levels can directly affect the strength 
of local policy networks.  As an example, a reduction in investments in local networks in 
the face of budget cuts has direct effects on the effective implementation of policies like 
agricultural watershed management which depends on the interactions between agency 
officials, non-profit organizations, and farmers or other business interests.  They close by 
stating that local policy networks are crucial to the social process of implementation of 
any type of policy attempting to solve collective action problems through widespread 
change at the individual level, although the function of networks may be different for 
large-scale and small-scale programs (Lubell & Fulton, 2007).  The relevance of this 
study to the proposed examination of HCP cases suggests that networks as an 
institutional structure contribute to the diffusion of innovative practices, build social 
capital by developing relationships among actors, and create cultural acceptance of new 
behaviors and norms. 
Perceived effectiveness of a particular policy action is another variable tested by 
several authors that may be important in considering HCP policy networks.  A study by 
Lubell that merits discussion here is an attempt to explain actor perceptions of the 
effectiveness of public policies targeting common-pool resource dilemmas in coastal 
watersheds.  Using a combination of the institutional rational choice approach in 
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conjunction with the advocacy coalition framework, he shows how policy beliefs related 
to the benefits and transaction costs of collective action affect beliefs about policy 
effectiveness.  He defines perceived effectiveness as a belief on the part of individual 
actors that public policies are achieving their set goals.  He also defines effectiveness as 
benefits outweighing transaction costs of rational actors (Lubell, 2003).  Lubell surveyed 
respondents from the Environmental Protection Agency’s National Estuary Program 
(NEP) and non-NEP program estuaries and their stakeholders where NEP programs are 
an example of a collaborative institution.  His dependent variable is perceived 
effectiveness.  Similar to his previous work, independent variables include problem 
characteristics (severity, dispersion, and scientific knowledge), institutional processes 
(conflict resolution, external decisions, procedural fairness, business domination, expert 
domination), beliefs about others (trust, number of allies, entrepreneurs), policy-core 
beliefs (conservatism, environmentalism, inclusiveness), institutional factors (NEP 
estuary, government actor) and various interactions between these variables (Lubell, 
2003).   
Lubell finds that the effects of policy-core beliefs and institutional structure on 
perceived effectiveness are interdependent.  Specifically, governance institutions, or the 
collective-choice rules used by actors, have a favorable effect on perceived policy 
effectiveness among political actors whose policy-core beliefs are congruent with the 
structure of the institution (Lubell, 2003).  He also demonstrates that stakeholder beliefs 
in the adequacy of scientific knowledge about estuary problems are also associated with 
beliefs about policy effectiveness (Lubell, 2003).  Other findings include that NEP 
stakeholders who believe estuary problems are spatially dispersed are more likely to think 
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policies are effective, while the opposite is true for non-NEP estuary stakeholders.  He 
suggests this difference may reflect the comparative advantage of collaborative 
institutions for reducing the transaction costs of contracting for complex problems facing 
ecosystems.  Institutions that successfully resolve conflict improve beliefs about 
effectiveness, as do stakeholders who believe their interests are fairly represented and 
trust in other stakeholders (Lubell, 2003). 
In a similar vein, Weible and Sabatier compare adversarial and collaborative 
policy subsystems belief convergence regarding water quality problems and agreement 
with policy proposals, and the relative use of empirical vs. normative beliefs in 
supporting policy proposals.  They use the term policy participants to describe actors who 
directly or indirectly attempt to influence subsystem affairs, in this case water quality 
within the Lake Tahoe Basin.  They include participants from local, state, and federal 
governments, interest group leaders, scientists, consultants, citizens, and the media.  They 
assume actors are generally self-interested, boundedly rational, and likely to use 
preexisting beliefs to simplify their view of the world.  They also state actors beliefs are 
embedded in a 3-level belief system:  deep core beliefs (e.g., the welfare of present vs. 
future generations); both empirical and normative policy core beliefs (e.g., seriousness of 
water quality degradation, and the relative priority of environmental quality vs. economic 
development, respectively); and secondary beliefs (e.g., preference to restrict 
development in urbanized areas.)  Weible and Sabatier characterize adversarial policy 
subsystems as competitive coalitions with polarized beliefs and minimal cross-coalition 
coordination, fragmented governmental authority, extensive venue shopping, and policy 
designs with clear winners and losers.  They describe collaborative systems as 
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cooperative coalitions with some level of belief convergence and cross-coalition 
coordination, shared access to decision making authority, the use of consensus-based 
institutions and win-win policy designs (Weible & Sabatier, 2009). 
Weible and Sabatier were able to test the same policy subsystem by questionnaire 
over two different time periods.  The initial period was more adversarial, the latter period 
more collaborative.  They examined nine variables across the three belief categories.  
Like Lubell and others, they find that beliefs converge between coalitions; however, 
coalitions still remain distinct in their beliefs.  The authors conclude that collaborative 
policy subsystems can help mitigate but not eliminate disagreements between coalitions.  
They did not find any support that actors will rely more on empirical beliefs and less on 
normative beliefs in collaborative policy subsystems.  While consensus-based procedures 
may lead to more agreement on the issues, actors still stick to their value-based policy 
positions.  They also found that environmental conflicts arise more from value 
differences than scientific or technical deficiencies so there may be a limit to how much 
science can be used in consensus-based institutional decision making (Weible & Sabatier, 
2009). 
Gruber (2010) describes community-based natural resource management 
(CBNRM) as an increasingly popular emerging international resource management 
model that promises to address both social justice and environmental protection.  This 
model is being developed in response to many cited cases of dissatisfaction with more 
traditional systems of sanctions and top-down decrees.  He states that CBNRM initiatives 
support the idea of participatory democracy and of building networks and linkages among 
different constituency groups, interdisciplinary groups, levels of governments, and 
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economic sectors.   Critics of CBNRM say the implementation of CBNRM often falls 
short of the concept.  Gruber refers to a 2006 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
evaluation of CBNRM that concluded there are three necessary conditions in these efforts 
that are not always met:  recognition of social values, market values, and nonmarket 
values.  Specifically, nonmarket values include the ability of local people to capture 
payments for environmental services received by others.  Gruber conducted an analysis 
and synthesis of 47 papers found searching on the terms community-based, natural 
resources, environmental, conservation, and management.  The 47 cases selected were 
considered effective in using CBNRM.  Gruber performed an analysis of characteristics 
attributed to CBNRM in case studies selected from around the world.  This effort resulted 
in identifying 12 key principles commonly found in CBNRM and quantifying the relative 
emphasis of these principles’ contributions to success by both researchers and 
practitioners who participated in the study (Gruber, 2010). 
For use in this dissertation effort, the CBNRM principles Gruber identified with a 
combined total average of 49% or greater based on the rankings of both researchers and 
practitioners were initially chosen for consideration.  Of the 12 Gruber identified, the 
ones selected for further investigation in the case study effort in Phase II are 1) social 
capital and collaborative partnerships, 2) adaptive leadership and co-management, 3) 
participatory decision making, 4) devolution and empowerment, and 5) resources and 
equity.  Gruber describes key characteristics associated with each principle and suggests 
they provide a basis for developing specific indicators for monitoring progress toward 
stated organizational goals and objectives.  He follows up by stating that the principals 
and their characteristics may be helpful in identifying “what to do” but fall short of 
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explaining “how to” accomplish goals (Gruber, 2010).  That being said, the five 
principals noted above and the associated characteristics described by Gruber appear to 
be a useful way to describe various network arrangements and are consequently factored 
into the case study analysis in Phase II. 
The Use of Science and Other Expert Information 
Weible and Sabatier’s findings bring up another aspect of HCPs that is often 
debated:  the use of scientific information in their development and implementation.  One 
of the primary criticisms of habitat conservation has been the uncertainty associated with 
the biology of one species or another and how that may affect the likelihood of success of 
any habitat policy strategy.  The burgeoning field of adaptive management literature 
reflects this discussion.  This dissertation does not attempt to focus on the results of 
adaptive management and its effects on implementation; however, it seems important to 
note how the availability and use of scientific information may affect the policy network 
aspects of HCP implementation.   
Thomas (2001) refers to an HCP study related to the availability of science 
performed in 1999 by Kareiva et al.  They review approved HCPs to evaluate the extent 
to which scientific data and methods are used in developing and justifying them.  They 
are concerned that even if HCPs meet the legal requirement of using the best available 
science, they are scientifically inadequate if the data are insufficient to support actions 
outlined in the plans (Kareiva, Andelman, Elderd, Groom, Hoekstra, Hood, Lamoreaux, 
Lebuhn, McCullough, Regetz, Savage, Ruckelshaus, Skelly, Zamudio, NCEAS Working 
Group, 1999).  Two-hundred eight HCPs were evaluated to gain basic descriptive 
information about plans.  They then conducted a more comprehensive analysis of 43 
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plans, generating a detailed profile of each plan and documenting the use of scientific 
data and tools.  They find that, in many cases, crucial, yet basic, information on species is 
unavailable for preparers of HCPs so questions remain about the status of species, 
estimated take under HCPs, and the impact of that take on the species.  Progressive 
analyses needed to assess take, impact, mitigation, and monitoring are poorly done or 
lacking altogether.  Shorter-duration plans have better estimates of the amount of take, 
but longer-duration plans have better analysis of the status of species and mitigation 
measures imposed.  Three recommendations from their work suggest that (1) greater 
attention be paid to explicit scientific standards for HCPs, (2) that HCPs with potentially 
large impact include an explicit summary of available data on covered species, an 
acknowledgement of risks, and planning flexibility based on monitoring results, and (3) 
that information about listed species be maintained in accessible, centralized locations.  
They also suggest permits be withheld until sufficient information is obtained, and that a 
scientific advisory committee with peer review be part of the planning (Kareiva et al., 
1999).  As a result of this study, USFWS issued addendums to the HCP Handbook to 
establish measurable biological goals and objectives, incorporate adaptive management 
when there are significant biological data gaps or uncertainty, develop better monitoring 
strategies, increase public participation in the HCP process and associated NEPA work, 
and provide guidance on factors to consider in establishing the duration of ITPs.  
However, the USFWS disagrees with Kareiva et al.’s conclusion that the USFWS lacks 
adequate scientific data and analysis to support many of the approved HCPs.  USFWS 
believes that the 233 HCPs in place at the time of review are based on sound science.  “If 
we lack critical information regarding the biological needs of a species proposed to be 
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covered under an HCP, we will not approve the plan until such information is obtained or 
an acceptable adaptive management clause is added to the HCP”  (US Fish and Wildlife 
Service, 2008d). 
Weible explores the implications of expert-based information like biological 
science on policy subsystems.  He reviews the different uses of expert information in the 
multiple streams theory, punctuated equilibrium theory, the social construction theory, 
and the advocacy coalition framework.  He defines three uses of expert-based 
information; learning, political, and instrumental.  The learning use he describes results 
from the accumulation of information over time that results in slowly changing belief 
systems of actors seen in each of the theories and the framework noted above.  The 
political use of expert-based information is primarily to legitimize previously made 
policy decisions.  And the instrumental use of expert-based information is what is 
typically assumed using a rational, ideal approach to problem solving where a problem is 
identified, research is conducted, and a policy decision follows the research findings 
(Weible, 2008).     
Weible argues that the way information is used depends on the characteristics of a 
network utilizing that information.  He frames his discussion of knowledge use within 
three policy subsystem types:  unitary subsystems, collaborative subsystems, and 
adversarial policy subsystems.    He suggests that the coordination within each of these 
subsystems varies depending on whether the coordination patterns occur between 
coalitions or within coalitions.  Unitary and adversarial subsystems are based on 
coordination patterns among allies within coalitions.  Cross-coalition communication 
patterns and interactions, or those through a broker connecting opposing coalitions, are 
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more often seen in collaborative policy networks (Weible, 2008).  He also states that 
decision making authority can be fragmented as a result of 1) the degree of centralization 
within a subsystem and 2) the degree of interdependence with other policy subsystems.  
For example, as decentralization increases within a policy subsystem, authority may shift 
from federal government agencies toward state and local governments, and may reverse 
if centralization occurs.  The extent to which that helps or hurts a coalition depends on 
whether the authority rests with agencies sympathetic to their objectives, or whether it is 
divided with other agencies whose objectives run counter to a given coalition’s 
objectives.  The implication from this according to Weible is that as some coalitions gain, 
others lose.  Coalitions also pay attention to policy subsystems that overlap.  Events in 
one subsystem may allow a coalition to secure political gains.  The gains in one 
subsystem may be transferred to an overlapping subsystem (Weible, 2008).  This pattern 
may be seen within the context of HCPs.  While collaborative subsystems come together 
to negotiate terms of an HCP, during the course of implementation, the process may 
become more unitary or even adversarial depending on how implementation unfolds. 
HCP’s are often described as a negotiated output from multiple interest groups 
identifying agreement on land and natural resource management decisions.  This suggests 
an instrumental use of species-specific scientific information.  In reality, there is a great 
deal of uncertainty at times about specific conditions or actions that may improve habitat 
management and the resulting effects on species.   
Key questions remain then about who chooses to participate in HCP networks and 
why.  Maybe even more significant is how individual actors participate in HCP networks.  
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Chapter 3 will build upon consistent themes noted above in both the implementation and 







The methodological approach used for this research effort involves a mixed 
methods analysis.  Per Yin (2009), mixed methods research requires each method share 
the same research questions to collect complementary data, and to conduct counterpart 
analyses.  This can allow investigators to address more complicated questions and collect 
a richer and stronger array of data than by using any single method.  The unit of analysis 
for this effort is individual HCPs.  The first phase of this analysis utilizes descriptive 
variables on HCPs in secondary data collected by the USFWS.  The second phase 
consists of a case study of a single, complex HCP selected based on criteria derived from 
the first phase analysis.   
The research questions once again are:  what factors contribute to successful HCP 
implementation; how is success defined and measured and does that matter in the HCP 
implementation process; how does the presence of various policy actors and the roles 
they play affect implementation; and what are barriers to implementation?  Beyond HCPs 
specifically, is there something that can be learned from the case study here that adds 
value to other environmental management efforts?   
None of these questions can be answered without specific information about 
individual HCPs and the actors, resources, and institutional arrangements identified 
within each.  Collecting the type of in-depth information needed from multiple HCPs 
may take years and is well beyond the scope of this effort.  Instead, this dissertation 




on policy-network related characteristics that are known, gathers specific information 
related to one complex HCP for further study to address the research questions. 
Phase I Data and Methods 
  The most comprehensive source of information about individual HCPs is 
collected and managed by the USFWS.  Phase I of this study is an exploration of 
descriptive variables in this secondary data provided by the USFWS.  The ECOS 
database provides access to species related information from the USFWS and other 
governmental data sources.  It includes information on Habitat Conservation Plans, Safe 
Harbor Plans, Candidate Conservation Agreements, and Candidate Conservation 
Agreements with Assurances.  The data for the HCPs is categorized by the USFWS 
region within which each plan is permitted.  The database may be accessed online at 
http://ecos.fws.gov/ecos/home.action  and provides a variety of reports on threatened and 
endangered species targeted by these plans.  Geospatial data related to fisheries and 
critical habitat is also available.   
With respect to HCPs, the dataset includes information on individual plans and 
related ITPs, and makes it publicly available.  Reports may be run online.  However, 
based on the format of the online reports, it is very difficult to do any type of analysis 
with multiple individual HCP records.  At the beginning of this research effort, the 
USFWS was contacted about availability of this information in other formats.  They 
subsequently provided an Excel spreadsheet of publically available information on all the 
permitted HCPs in the United States at that time.  This information is necessary in order 
to identify specific plans that may be appropriate for a policy network case study.  




ongoing or expired, and is considered complex from a policy network perspective as 
discussed further below.  The USFWS ECOS data includes information like HCP name, 
permit number(s), permit and expiration dates, type of NEPA process required for each 
ITP, general location and acreage managed, the types of threatened, endangered, and non-
listed species whose habitat is being protected, and the types of permit applicant(s), 
intended land use(s), and duration for each individual HCP.  
HCP records in the USFWS ECOS database are used here to generate historical 
trends of HCP use in one region and are a starting point for quantitative analysis of the 
types of permittees implementing HCPs, and the complexity of these plans to enable 
selection of the case study in Phase II.   
  The ECOS data received from the USFWS is the population of all current and 
expired HCPs with ITPs as of May 10, 2011.  USFWS considers HCPs fully 
implemented once the permits have expired. According to an interview with the USFWS 
National Coordinator for HCPs, the ECOS data represent the most complete record of 
HCPs the USFWS has readily accessible (Personal communication, Cole, April 26, 
2011). 
Many records in the ECOS database have less than complete information.  Some 
of this missing information is available from independent sources publicly available 
online.  Many of the larger, more complex HCPs have their own websites.  Data in the 
fields of interest in the State of California data set are generally complete in the fields of 
interest so it wasn’t necessary to fill in missing information.  That may not be the case for 
data from other parts of the country.   A report by Callihan et al. (2009) under contract to 




incomplete, the database does not include records for applicants who later withdrew their 
ITP applications, and performance data are not tracked.  Since this study focuses on 
implementation of permitted HCPs, absence of withdrawn applications is not expected to 
be a significant source of bias.  The absence of performance data tracking within the 
ECOS system requires that information regarding progress of individual plans be 
obtained from other sources as is done in the Phase II case study. 
A preliminary review of the nationwide ECOS data suggests the plans are often 
clustered together in various regions, especially along both the east and west coasts of the 
US.  As an example, currently there are significantly more HCPs in Regions 8 (California 
and Nevada), and Region 3 (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and the Puerto Rico and the 
Virgin Islands) than in any of the other regions.  More than half of all the HCPs in the 
country are currently found in Region 3.  
While it is more likely that the development of plans is associated with particular 
habitat for vulnerable species in these areas, it is possible that HCPs may be more 
frequently considered as a management strategy within a state or USFWS region by 
participants already familiar with HCP development and implementation processes.   Is 
the frequency of HCPs in an area due to the number of threatened and endangered species 
present in a region (and a follow-on question asks why more species may be threatened 
or endangered in one region over another), or is it due to HCPs being a favored 
environmental management strategy by state and local governments and other actors 
within a region?  Future research may seek to distinguish the reasons why HCPs are more 




Before comparing and contrasting characteristics of HCPs, it is important to 
understand how the USFWS rules regarding plan formulation have changed over time.  
The first generation HCPs were prepared between 1982, when HCPs were added to the 
ESA, and 1994.  Second generation plans include those created following enactment of 
the “No Surprises” policy between 1994 and 2001 which provides assurances to ITP 
holders that no additional land use restrictions or financial compensation are required 
after issuance of a permit, even if circumstances indicate a need for additional mitigation.  
Third generation plans are those created  after 2001 and are based on USFWS’ Five Point 
Policy guidance which includes adaptive management strategies, biological goals and 
objectives, guidelines for permit duration, public participation, and greater monitoring of 
plan details to encompass compliance, effects and effectiveness considerations (National 
Archives and Records Administration, 2000).  The USFWS Guidance for HCP 
preparation changed as a result of the program changes within each generation.  In order 
to better compare the characteristics of one HCP with another, it is important to know 
under which set of USFWS guidance each was prepared.  Identifying which generation 
each HCP belongs to as noted above assists in that apples-to-apples comparison.  Note 
that for purposes of this analysis, while the Five Point Policy was published in the 
Federal Register in mid-2000, based on the average length of time to permit HCPs as 
reported by Callihan, et al., it is assumed that permitted HCP’s likely did not include the 
elements described in the Five Point Policy until after 2001. 
In order to more closely examine the records in a manageable way for this 
research and choose a case study for Phase II, various descriptive statistics were 




examination of the Phase II records in several ways.  The most significant step was to 
identify under which generation of HCP guidance each HCP was prepared.  Changes in 
network-related characteristics and complexity are then compared within each of the 
three generations noted above.  The specifics of these comparisons are discussed in more 
detail below, and the findings of each are discussed in Chapter 4.  For purposes of this 
research, complex HCPs are third generation plans which include multiple permittees, 
multiple land uses, multiple species, and require an EIS to fulfill the NEPA requirements. 
The steps described below enabled selection of a Phase II case from amongst 
these complex plans with a duration lasting 30 years or longer where policy networks 
may be effective in improving the likelihood of plan implementation. 
Originally, the Phase II case study was to be selected from USFWS Region 2, the 
Southwest Region, including the states of Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and Oklahoma, 
based on proximity to the researcher and access to data.  However, after a preliminary 
evaluation of the ECOS data in Phase I of this research for Region 2, it was determined 
that the number of multi-party, multi-species, multi-land use HCPs in this region is 
extremely limited.  Instead, USFWS Region 8, adjacent to Region 2, was selected 
including the states of Nevada and California.  California has implemented its own 
Natural Community Conservation Program (NCCP) to work in conjunction with HCPs.  
Nevada does not have a similar program.  Due to the variety of HCPs available for 
consideration in California, and the desire to minimize potential sources of bias and 
threats to validity due to variations in state law, geographical differences in HCPs, and 
differing socio-economic and political environments, the ECOS data was utilized to 




however, is that it may have an effect on the analysis of policy network relationships 
since the same individuals may be involved on the part of the USFWS on multiple HCPs 
within a state and region.  Strategies for implementation may be largely influenced by a 
few USFWS employees across multiple plans so it may be difficult to discern whether 
success is more affected by how the plan is implemented, or by specific elements 
included in individual plans, without closely examining multiple plans.   However, the 
same concern exists in all the USFWS regions.  Future research may be needed to 
examine this question more closely as well. 
As noted above, changes in the variables within the ECOS database are examined 
by generation to discern possible network-related trends over time in the State of 
California.  For example, is there a trend in increasing or decreasing numbers of HCPs as 
USFWS guidance evolved?  Do individual third generation plans tend to have more 
permittees than first generation plans?  The types of descriptive information gathered by 
generation include the number of agreements with single vs. multiple permittees and the 
most common types of permit applicants.  When considering species, the number of 
agreements addressing single vs. multiple species habitat is considered.  Multiple land 
uses may affect the complexity of an HCP so the number of HCPs with single vs. 
multiple land uses is also examined, as well as whether shifts are noted in the types of 
land use utilizing HCPs over time.  The type of NEPA assessment required for plan 
formulation is considered an indicator of complexity and is also examined.  Individual 
plans may require an EIS or an EA or a CE.  An EIS is considered the most complex and 




There is a question of whether different types of land uses are more likely to rely 
on HCPs.  Callihan et al. discuss three basic types of HCPs:  those granted to individuals 
for non-commercial purposes, those granted to companies to cover development or 
business activities, and area-wide HCPS to mitigate development affecting one or more 
species (Callihan et al., 2009).  Instead of categorizing the ECOS data as they did, this 
research effort quantifies land uses by directly identifying combinations of multiple uses 
by the land use descriptors utilized by USFWS in the ECOS database. 
One additional descriptive statistical measure examined is the duration of HCPs.  
This may be considered an additional element of complexity if the duration extends over 
multiple generations.  Varying ecological impacts may result from proposed HCP 
activities, and the nature or scope of the permitted activity accounts for variations in 
duration.  Duration also helps to describe the context within which a particular HCP is 
being implemented.  In general, very long plan durations make it even more important to 
clearly outline program objectives, provide for long-term political and financial support, 
and accommodate changes in leadership over time.  In addition, traditional program 
evaluation techniques may not be adequate to determine the effectiveness of HCPs with 
respect to endangered species management over a long period of time. 
Preliminary Data Inspection and Preparation 
In reviewing the ECOS data for all the regions, it is clear that entries to the 
database are made by multiple USFWS employees in each region.  As previously noted, 
the fields for some plans are filled in thoroughly.  Other entries include information in 
only a few fields like the general description, permit number(s), species, and duration.  




inconsistent entry of information, significant further inspection and cleanup of the data 
was necessary.  
The first step taken in the Phase I analysis was to do a search on all records of 
HCPs in the ECOS database (provided in Excel format provided by USFWS) in USFWS 
Region 2 and import those records into SPSS software for analysis.  All of the data 
cleansing, validating, and standardizing steps described below were taken for the Region 
2 data.  After that data were analyzed and it was determined that the Region 2 cases 
would not provide sufficient multi-party HCPs for consideration as a case study for 
policy networks, the same steps were taken for the Region 8 data which was later 
narrowed to only those in California. 
There are approximately 1100 records in the ECOS dataset provided by USFWS 
in Excel format.  There are 177 records for the State of California.  Initial visual 
inspection of the data showed that in some cases, multiple permits were issued for several 
HCPs so that there are actually fewer plans than the number of records suggests.  Some 
entries include multiple amendments and their associated permits in a single record.  In 
other cases, HCP amendments and additional permits were listed as separate entries into 
the database. The California data set was reviewed record by record to determine which 
permit was the initial permit issued for an HCP, and which permits amended an existing 
plan.  An additional variable was created in the data set to track these records (Amended 
Permit = either 0 or 1 where those coded with a 0 were identified as initial permits for an 
HCP, and those coded 1 were identified as amended permits) to ultimately identify the 




method, it was determined that, of the 177 permits issued in the State of California, 164 
of these were different HCPs. 
 All of the California records are included in the quantitative analysis discussed in 
Chapter 4.  Sufficient data were available in the fields associated with the issuance of the 
permits: date the ITP was issued, the NEPA type, whether a plan was for single or 
multiple threatened and endangered species, whether a permit was issued to single or 
multiple permittees and their types, and whether a plan was for a single or multiple land 
use and the specific land use types.  Because several of the fields were text fields with 
entries coded in different ways, several additional variables were created and coded to 
represent the presence or absence of certain conditions to allow analysis.  For example, a 
NEPA Code variable was added where 0 represents the text string “No Information”, 1 
represents a Categorical Exclusion, 2 represents an Environmental Assessment, 3 
represents an Environmental Impact Statement, and 4 indicates the field was left blank.  
Similar variables were created to identify single vs. multiple permittees, single vs. 
multiple species, and single vs. multiple land uses.  To identify the generation of an HCP, 
a field was added titled Generation of Permit.  Based on the date of the initial permit, 
each record was coded to reflect First Generation (<=1994), Second Generation 
(1995<x<=2001), or Third Generation (>2001).  This particular variable was used to 
select the appropriate records for all of the following analyses.  Because of changes in the 
contents of HCPs by generation, only Third Generation records are considered when 
identifying the case study for Phase II of this effort.  Specific findings for the Phase I 




While the information identified and analyzed in Phase I is useful in both an 
historical context and with respect to certain characteristics of current HCPs, there are 
also limitations to the methodology of Phase I.  First, with the exception of complexity as 
its been described and utilized herein, looking at the broad range of variables in the 
ECOS database does not assist in identifying the context in which HCPs are being 
developed and implemented. There are no variables related to socio-economic and 
political conditions in locations with approved HCPs.  Second, there is also no progress 
tracking of individual HCPs, and therefore, without individual case studies, it is not 
possible to identify which stage of implementation a particular plan is in at any given 
time, nor is there a way to make any assessment of success for any plans, or to identify 
barriers that may be slowing or preventing implementation, all of which are necessary to 
evaluate results/implementation attributes discussed below.  The Phase II analysis 
attempts to fill in some of this information for the selected case study.  Figure 4.11 
contains a schematic identifying the specific ECOS variables used and how that data was 
used to select the Phase II case for further study. 
Phase II Data and Methods 
Since each HCP is unique, Phase II seeks to more directly identify how policy 
networks play a role in successful HCP implementation, are barriers to success, or aid in 
understanding the types of roles played by various policy actors.  As discussed above, a 
single case involving a complex plan is selected for a more in-depth review. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, complexity and problem severity may profoundly 
affect implementation of negotiated agreements like HCPs.  A corollary to that idea is 




implement those plans.  The works of Pressman and Wildavsky, Beierle and Cayford, 
several of Lubell’s works and other authors discussed above suggest this may indeed be 
the case, although inclusion of broad networks of actors does not, by itself, insure 
success.  In fact, it may complicate issues and increase transaction costs as discussed by 
several authors including Ostrom, North, and Williamson. 
Based on the theoretical considerations discussed in Chapter 2, the matrix shown 
in Table B-1 in Appendix B was developed to address the research questions by 
organizing multiple variables into the three categories of context, process, and 
results/implementation attributes based on Beierle and Cayford’s conceptual model 
(2002).   
While the attributes are based on Beierle and Cayford’s conceptual model, the 
individual characteristics in each category are somewhat broader and based largely on the 
work of authors discussed in Chapter 2.  Each is included because it is considered likely 
to affect plan implementation and accomplishment.  Note that the nature of relationships 
between participants on an HCP appears to be embedded in all three attributes.  That said, 
it is hoped that by examining the nature of relationships and other characteristics 
described within the attributes noted, we may be able to better discern nuances about the 
role these characteristics play in successful plan implementation.  
The context attributes help to characterize the background within which the HCP 
case study operates.  With respect to relationships, for example, prior events may 
significantly affect the nature of current relationships and the willingness for individuals 
to continue to work together in an adversarial or collaborative way.  The success of prior 




the HCP process as being a likely way to achieve their goals as opposed to being a quick 
trip to another dead end effort.  Using Scheberle’s analogy, if the participants in a process 
are the same folks who previously experienced a negative cross-country trip, they may be 
less inclined to get back into a car, plane, or train to experience another trip with the same 
individuals or agencies. 
The process attributes are variables discussed in the literature that may be helpful 
in implementing environmental resource management plans like HCPs.  Authors 
generally agree that sufficient resources and agreed upon goals are necessary to increase 
the likelihood of success.   The nature of deliberation among parties in a policy network 
may greatly affect the relationships among participants and either encourage a 
collaborative effort, or increase the likelihood of an adversarial process.  Both types of 
processes may ultimately achieve success or failure, but the transaction costs of 
participation may vary significantly.  Previously noted authors also identify the ability to 
manage change and appropriately incorporate strategies for adaptation into an 
implementation process as factors that may significantly affect successful process 
outcomes.  Using the trip analogy, if you are traveling by car and have a flat tire, whether 
or not you thought ahead to have an inflated spare tire, a jack, and the knowledge to 
change a tire may determine whether you have a short-15 minute break in the road trip, or 
a much more frustrating lengthy wait by the side of the road before you can get moving 
again. 
The results/implementation attributes examine implementation progress and 
success.  Are targeted goals being achieved?  Is achievement of these goals occurring at 




analogy, did you reach your destination within the timeframes and under the conditions 
you had hoped? 
Each of these attributes is examined and evaluated in the case study.  Methods 
used in the Phase II analyses are discussed below and findings from the Phase II case 
study are discussed in Chapter 4.  
George and Bennett suggest that single case designs can be very useful in theory 
development and testing (2005).  In this case, the objective is to test the validity of 
generalizations described in the literature by identifying the factors in Table B-1 in 
Appendix B believed to be important to successful implementation of environmental 
resource plans like HCPs, and seeing if the reality of the selected case not only confirms 
their importance, but may offer some explanation as to why they may be important.  Yin 
also notes that single case studies are an appropriate design under several circumstances. 
The primary justification for use of a single case study for this research based on Yin’s 
five rationales is to explore an extreme or unique case (2009). 
The case study described looks farther into how success is defined and measured 
in the HCP implementation process by the USFWS and by permittees in the selected 
HCP.  Within the case study analysis, the various policy actors and the roles they play in 
a network that comes together to implement this multi-party HCP are reviewed for 
factors affecting the likelihood of successful implementation.  An attempt is made to 
identify what success looks like to various participants, and identify barriers to 
implementation of HCPs, particularly those associated with policy networks.  The case 
study also makes note of lessons that can be learned that may add value when considering 




While it may be desirable to randomly select an HCP for evaluation from the total 
population, purposive sampling is instead used here based on the findings of Phase I.  
The case is examined with respect to contextual, process, and results/implementation 
attributes shown in Table B-1.   The Phase I portion of the study assisted in selecting a 
complex case for further evaluation in Phase II. 
To aid in selection of the case study for Phase II, the following steps were taken.  
The first step was to identify HCPs with ITPs issued after 2001.  Of the 164 HCPs in 
California, 73 were issued since 2001.  The next step was to identify plans with multiple 
applicants that all become permittees after issuance of the ITP.  Of the 73 third generation 
plans in California, 8 HCPs have multiple permittees.  The third step in case selection 
was to further reduce the number of cases by identifying which, of those remaining, 
involved management of multiple land uses.  Of the 8 HCPS with multiple permittees, 7 
HCPs involve multiple land uses.  The next step involved identifying which of these 7 
HCPs remaining involved multiple threatened or endangered species.  This step reduced 
the number of California case studies under consideration from 7 to 5.  Of the 5 HCPs 
remaining, three were permitted for 75 years, 1 was permitted for 50 years, and the last 
was permitted for 30 years.  None of these permits are expired. 
Since the duration of a multi-party agreement is considered a complicating factor 
in the literature, it was determined to choose a final case for study from the 3 HCPs 
remaining with a 75 year agreement.  Additional investigation was done on all three 
HCPs permitted to see that sufficient information was available from sources other than 
the ECOS database to be able to conclude a case study.  All three of these have been case 




Species Habitat Conservation Plan (WRMSHCP) was selected for three reasons in 
particular.  The WRMSHCP has been in place the longest of the three and was permitted 
in June of 2004.  This is important since both the formal and informal policy networks 
associated with implementing this HCP have had approximately ten years to form.  In 
addition, the HCP and all supporting documents are publically available and easily 
accessible.  Another dissertation was completed in June 2012 examining the role of social 
capital in the negotiation phase of this HCP.  This seemed relevant and helpful 
background information related to context attributes associated with historical 
relationships amongst the parties to support the current research effort examining the 
implementation of the HCP.   
The Phase I analysis demonstrates that none of the permits associated with 
complex HCPs in California has expired yet.  While this may be considered a limitation, 
it also assures a plan is selected that meets current USFWS planning requirements which 
improves the likelihood that findings here may be applicable to HCPs yet to be permitted.  
The type of documentation analyzed for this plan includes the formally approved HCP, 
the Implementation Agreement, Annual Reports, individual permits, and professional 
journal articles.   
To insure ethical concerns are minimized, two steps are taken.  The first is to 
draw from existing documents publicly available.  The second step affects case selection.  
The case was intentionally selected from plans where the researcher’s agency is not a 
participant in order to eliminate a potential source of author bias.    
To assist in triangulating findings from multiple sources, interviews were 




the literature by Bardach and discussed below, interviews were conducted with 
individuals representing formal policy network members described in the HCP 
Implementation Agreement like the USFWS and other environmental entities focused on 
habitat preservation, and with those seeking the developmental benefits of HCPs 
including permittees, all of whom are local and regional governments.  In addition, 
entities responsible for management and oversight of HCP lands were interviewed to 
assess their views on the likelihood of success of HCP activities.  Interviews asking the 
same questions were also conducted with members of the informal policy network 
associated with this HCP including members of the development community and private 
landowners.  Transcripts from interviews previously conducted by others with various 
stakeholders of this HCP are also considered to identify network-related common issues 
of concern (Jimeno, 2012b).  Interview questions focused on the research questions 
seeking information about the likelihood of implementation success, barriers to 
implementation, nature of the relationships and communication amongst network 
members, and with others outside the HCP implementation network.  Questions are open-
ended and attempt to discern information relevant to the factors in Table B-1 in Appendix 
B to confirm the investigator’s understanding of events and relationships suggested by 
the documentation, or that may not be evident by review of the HCP-related 
documentation.  Interview questions used are included in Appendix C.  Interviews were 
conducted in accordance with Arizona State University’s Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) processes and procedures following IRB approval of the interview protocol.  See 




Evaluation of a single case often precludes generalization of results to all HCPs, 
but is expected to result in a better understanding of some of the policy network factors 
affecting HCP implementation.  Review of the documentation and follow-up interviews 
with participants in the HCP case studied assist in better understanding implementation 
issues from both USFWS and permittee perspectives.  As recommended by Bardach, 
success measures are considered from the USFWS perspective as the idealistic group, 
and permittees’ perspective as the group seeking selfish or non-programmatic benefits.  
In addition, the interviews conducted and related transcripts reviewed provide perspective 
on what constitutes success of the HCP by other than USFWS and permittees 
perspectives.  Use of the information in this way may mitigate potential researcher bias 
on what constitutes implementation success of natural resource agreements.  It may also 
reflect what network members of other HPCs consider as successful implementation.   
The WRMSHCP policy network contains members beyond those representing the 
USFWS or the permittees.  These other network members are broadly acknowledged and 
their roles are identified formally where appropriate in the HCP’s Implementing 
Agreement and informally through various HCP activities.  Their perspectives on HCP 
success are included in the findings discussed in Chapter 4.  Scheberle’s typology of 
relationships and extrinsic/intrinsic factors is used to offer thoughts on network 
participants relationships discussed.  In particular, the presence of implementation 
energizers within the policy network is also addressed. 
Per George and Bennett, it is imperative that congruence testing and process 
tracing methods be used to improve validity of theory testing in single case studies 




example, the literature suggests that having specific goals and objectives beyond 
biological goals improves the likelihood of successful implementation for USFWS and 
permittees.  Similar statements can be made with respect to accessibility for participation, 
sufficient authority, quality of deliberation and communication, and plans to manage 







Phase I Findings 
One of the first analyses of the ECOS data from the State of California examines 
the number of HCPs and their frequency by generation.  As noted previously, first 
generation plans are those with ITPs issued prior to 1994.  The second generation 
includes HCPs with ITPs issued between 1994 and 2001.  Third generation plans include 
those HCPs with ITPs issued after 2001.  An important thing to keep in mind viewing 
these findings is that each generation, as of the date of the ECOS data received in 2011, is 
a different length of time.  The first generation lasted approximately 12 years, the second 
approximately 7 years, and the third is approaching 14 years.  Some thought was given to 
comparing generations on a proportional basis based on the time frames in each 
generation.  This wasn’t pursued, however, since it may introduce or obscure trends that 
may be visible below.  The raw numbers and percentages below will continue to change 
over time as the number of HCPs approved in the third generation continues to grow. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, of the 164 HCPs permitted to date in California based on 
the USFWS 2011 data set analyzed, only 18 HCPs, or 11% were issued in the First 
Generation prior to the No Surprises Policy being enacted.  In the Second Generation, 74 
HCPs or 45.1% of the total plans were put into place between 1994 and 2001.  Seventy 
two HCPS, or 43.9% of the total plans issued in California have been put in place since 
2001.  From a policy perspective, this suggests that the assurances put in place for ITP 
holders by the No Surprises Policy appear to have encouraged others to consider HCPs as 




plans developed is approximately the same as the number of plans put into place during 
the second generation.  However, that occurred over a 14 year period as opposed to the 7 
year period of second generation plans.  Additional research is necessary to identify the 






Figure 4.1 Percentages of Habitat Conservation Plans by Generation in the State of 
California 
The next analysis seeks to determine whether changes in the USFWS HCP 
policies between the generations encouraged single vs. multiple applicants for ITPs.  





Table 4.1  
 
Single vs. Multiple Applicants for HCPs by Generation in California 
 
 
First Generation Second Generation Third Generation 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Individual 
Applicant 
14 77.8 66 89.2 64 88.9 
Multiple 
Applicants 
4 22.2 8 10.8 8 11.1 
Total  18 100 74 100 72 100 
 
The total number of HCPs approximately quadrupled between the first generation 
and the second.  However, on a percentage basis, the number of multiple applicant plans 
dropped by about half from 22.2% to 10.8%.   The number of multi-applicant plans 
remained approximately the same at 11.1% from the second to the third generation in 
California.  One conclusion that may be drawn is that the No Surprises policy and the 
certainty it provides may have made HCPs a more desirable alternative for individual 
applicants.  As shown below, the number of permits issued to individual applicants; i.e., 
corporations, continued to rise in the second and third generations.  While the works of 
Lubell (2003), and Lubell et al. (2002) suggest that more complexity increases the 
number of partnerships formed in an attempt to reduce transaction costs necessary to 
resolve an issue, the inverse may be true as well.  Fewer partnerships may be required for 





Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 below show the relative proportions of the different 
permit applicant types by generation.   Percentages for the top three applicant types for 
each generation are shown in each figure and summarized in Table 4.2.  All of the detail 
related to applicant types and other results discussed here are included in the Phase I 
Details in Appendix A. 
The top three most frequent applicant types in each generation are listed in each 
figure and summarized in Table 4.2.  Single corporations are the most prevalent HCP 
holders in California in all three generations.  Single and multiple local governments and 
private individuals are the second and third most frequent holders of HCP ITPs in all 
three generations.  The percentages in Table 4.2 across the three generations support the 
idea that HCPs for private landowners increased after issuance of the No Surprises 
policy.  The first generation is the only time when multiple-applicant HCP’s are one of 
the most frequent applicant types.  Another observation is that no private individuals 

























Table 4.3 shows the findings related to single vs. multiple listed species by 
generation.  The most surprising observation here is that the relative percentage of single 
listed species HCPs has remained stable over the three generations of plans, and it is 
higher than the percentage of HCPs addressing multiple listed species concerns. 
The next area investigated is land use by generation of HCP seeking to understand 
if changes in USFWS HCP policy to date encourage applicants to apply more frequently 
in California if multiple land uses are involved.  Table 4.4 below suggests that in every 
generation, a single land use HCP is clearly the most common type and appears to 
increase with each generation.  The first generation land use appears to have a larger 
percentage of multiple land uses by HCP than the second or third generations.  
Considering the findings related to type of applicant, this observation is consistent with 
North and Williamson’s findings that groups will not form unless they reduce the 
transaction costs associated with individual problem resolution (North, 1990 and 
Williamson, 1979).  The No Surprises Policy and the uncertainty it eliminated may have 






Table 4.2  
 
Top Three Applicant Types by Generation of HCP in California 
 
 First Generation Second Generation Third Generation 
 Type Frequency Percent Type Frequency Percent Type Frequency Percent 
Most 
Frequent 




2 or more 
local 
jurisdictions 
3 16.7 1 local 
jurisdiction 








2 11.1 Private 
individual 










Table 4.3  
 
Single vs. Multiple Listed Species by Generation in California 
 
 First Generation Second Generation Third Generation 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
No Listed 
Species 
1 5.6   1 1.4 
Single Listed 
Species 




7 38.9 31 41.9 30 41.7 






Single vs. Multiple Land Uses by Generation in California 
 
 First Generation Second Generation Third Generation 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Single 
Land Use 
10 55.6 56 75.7 59 81.9 
Multiple 
Land Uses 
7 38.9 18 24.3 13 18.1 
Unknown 
Land Uses 
1 5.6     














In the first generation of HCPs in California, the most common land use is for 
residential construction.  The next most frequent land uses are business/commercial 
construction combined with residential construction, business/commercial construction 
combined with residential construction and utility/infrastructure, other uses undefined by 
USFWS, and recreational activities combined with residential construction.  Clearly 







Figure 4.6.  Most Common Second Generation HCP Land Use Combinations in 
California ITPs 
 
Residential construction is still the largest land use within the second generation 
of HCPs in California.  This is followed up by mining or other extraction, and other uses 






Figure 4.7.  Most Common Third Generation HCP Land Use Combinations in California 
ITPs 
Like the first two generations of HCPs, residential land use is still the most 
prevalent use of HCPs in California followed by business/commercial construction.  
Utility/infrastructure use is the third most common land use in HCPs approved since 
2001.  The shift to business/commercial construction over mining may be the result of 
multiple factors some of which may include 1) some aspect of the Five-Point Policy’s 
requirements making HCPs less desirable for mining purposes, 2) increased growth in 
southern California since 2001 necessitating commercial development, or 3) perhaps the 
duration of the mining HCPs extended into 2001 or beyond.  Additional research into that 




The next variable examined is the type of NEPA analysis required for individual 
HCPs by generation.  As shown in Table 4.5, there is a marked increase in categorical 
exclusions in California HCPs in the third generation after the Five Point Policy guidance 
release.  With the advent of adaptive management at that point in time, an increase in 
either environmental impact statements or environmental assessments might be expected.  
It doesn’t appear, however, that an increase in more complex technical aspects of ITPs is 
a driver for more HCPs in the third generation.  The increase in ITPs for residential 
construction in the third generation suggests that, for smaller parcels of land, CE’s may 
be more appropriate.  Fewer ITPs for those HCPs requiring an EIS may indicate an 
additional layer of complexity for those types of plans.  Future research may help to 
explain these observations.  Level of NEPA analysis is used to assist in the case study 







Most Frequent Types of NEPA Analysis for HCPs in California by Generation 
 
 First Generation Second Generation Third Generation 




3 16.7 6 8.1 8 11.1 
Environmental 
Assessment 
15 83.3 54 73 21 29.2 
Categorical 
Exclusion 
0 0 14 18.9 43 59.7 
Total  18 100 74 100 72 100 
 
The next variable examined is the duration of HCPs.  Figure 4.8, Figure 4.9, and 





















The most frequent duration for the first generation is 30 years followed by both 2-
year HCPs and 20-year HCPs.  In the second generation following implementation of the 
No Surprises policy, both 30-year and 50-year durations are the most frequent followed 
by 10-year HCPs.  In the third generation of HCPs, the most common length of HCP is 5 
years followed by HCPs with 3-year durations.  This may be a result of the increase in 
residential development by private landowners.  Both 10- and 50-year durations are the 
next most common durations.  These durations may be associated with the type of land 
uses in each generation.   It may be of interest in future research to test for correlations 
between duration and identified land use or similar factors.   Because of the policy 
network issues associated with long-term HCP durations, the duration of the case study 
selected in Phase II is greater than 30 years.  This minimum was chosen to target those 
HCPs whose individual leadership is most likely to change over the life of the ITP. 
This assessment demonstrates trends in the uses of HCPs for various land use 
purposes in the State of California since inception of ITPs as a means to manage 
endangered species habitat.  HCPs are a tool used by different types of applicants to 
allow development.  The findings raise as many questions as they answer.  Delving 
deeper into these questions, however, requires specific details that are not available 
within the ECOS database.  Individual case studies are one way to gather additional 
information and explore the details behind why individuals or groups of individuals form 




Phase II Case Selection 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the case was selected from among the HCPs in the 
State of California.  Figure 4.11 graphically describes the selection process.  The output 































  Figure 4.11 – Schematic of Case Selection Logic 
 Of the three remaining HCPs meeting the selection criteria, the WRMSHCP has 
the most permittees.  In addition, a previous dissertation was completed examining the 
role of social capital and collaborative negotiation during the development of that 
USFWS ECOS Database for US-
Current and Expired HCP Permits  
 (May 2011) 
(N = 1156 Permits in Approx. 1000 
Plans)  
 
USFWS ECOS Database for CA  
(N= 177 Permits in 164 Plans) 
 
3rd Generation HCPs  
(N=72)  
 
HCPs with Multiple 
Applicants 
 (N=8)  
 
 Of these, select cases with 
Multiple Land Uses  
(N=7)  
 
 Of these, select cases with 
Multiple Endangered Species 
(N=5) 
Of these, select cases with 
NEPA Type = 3 (EIS) (N=5)  
 
 Of the remaining 5, select cases with Duration > 30 
years (N=3)  
 
• Coachella Valley Multi-Species HCP 
• Orange County Southern Subregion NCCP/HCP 
• Western Riverside MSHCP  







particular HCP.  The previous dissertation seemed like an excellent source of information 
when combined with other sources to assist in determining levels of pre-existing conflict 
between permittees and other participants identified as a context attribute in Table B-1 in 
Appendix B.  These two conditions suggested the WRMSHCP is appropriate to use as a 
case study for this research effort.  One interesting observation is that all three of the final 
HCPs under consideration are permitted and monitored by the same USFWS office in 
Carlsbad, California.  It is not exactly known what effect this may have on 
implementation of each of these plans.  It does go to the point earlier, however, that 
certain geographic areas may be more likely than others to utilize HCPs as a tool for 
managing both human development and species management tension.  The remainder of 
Chapter 4 examines the WRMSHCP case. 
Phase II Findings 
Western Riverside Multiple Species Habitat Conservation Plan Overview 
The WRMSHCP was developed as a cooperative effort involving the USFWS, 
California Department of Fish and Game (renamed the California Department of Fish and 
Wildlife (CDFW) in 2012), local governmental agencies, property owners, development 
interests, farming interests, environmental interest groups and other members of the 
public (Western Riverside County, 2004c, Section 20, p. 4).  The plan was permitted in 
2004 for a length of 75 years to identify and conserve high quality habitats and the 
species that depend on them while integrating and providing for future land use, 
transportation, and wildlife conservation to residents of western Riverside County in 
California (USFWS, 2011).  Per the WRMSHCP documents, this HCP is one of several 




goal of maintaining biological and ecological diversity within a rapidly urbanizing region 
(Western Riverside County, 2004a, Section 1.1).  
The WRMSHCP is a necessary component of the Riverside County Integrated 
Plan (RCIP) because threatened and endangered plant and animal species, and their 
habitat are present throughout the WRMSHCP area where public and private projects 
associated with future growth and land development are planned.  The RCIP includes 1) a 
comprehensive revision of the County’s General Plan to establish future land use and 
housing needs; 2) the Community and Environmental Transportation Acceptability 
Process (CETAP) overseen by the Riverside County Transportation Commission (RCTC) 
to identify and provide for future transportation and communication corridors to relieve 
traffic congestion; and 3) the WRMSHCP (Western Riverside County, 2004c, Section 
2.0, pp. 2-3). 
The WRMSHCP protects 146 species and their associated vegetation 
communities (Abe, Dionne, Drennen, Felix, Golla, Graham, Guard, McMichael, Miller, 
Paramo, Pfaff, Ragsdale, Reinig, Ross, Sandoval, Sherrock, Talluto, 2014).  The Plan 
Area includes approximately 1.26 million acres (1,966 square miles) in Riverside County.  
See Figure 4.12 below.  The original plan includes all unincorporated Riverside County 
land west of the crest of the San Jacinto Mountains to the Orange County line, as well as 
the jurisdictional areas of the cities of Temecula, Murrieta, Lake Elsinore, Canyon Lake, 
Norco, Corona, Riverside, Moreno Valley, Banning, Beaumont, Calimesa, Perris, Hemet, 
and San Jacinto.  In addition, the County of Riverside and the RCTC are permittees.  The 
cities of Eastvale, Jurupa Valley, Menifee, and Wildomar were added as permittees 




the following bioregions: Santa Ana Mountains, Riverside Lowlands, San Jacinto 
Foothills, San Jacinto Mountains, Agua Tibia Mountains, Desert Transition, and San 
Bernardino Mountains (Western Riverside County, 2004a, Section 1.1). 
The Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority (RCA) was created upon 







Figure 4.12  Map of WRMSHCP Plan Area from Volume 1, Section 1 of Western Riverside MSHCP (http://www.wrc-




Per the WRMSHCP, the strategy for managing the Conservation Area requires a 
balanced approach allocating responsibility for assembly of habitat and long-term 
management to Riverside County, state, and federal governments, the cities permitted, 
and the private and public entities engaged in construction activities that potentially 
impact the species covered under the WRMSHCP.  Figure 4.13 is a summary of the 
existing public and quasi-public lands forming the core of the reserve system.  The white 
areas outlined in blue comprise the Criteria Areas where the RCA seeks to acquire the 
remaining 153,000 acres during the first 25 years of the permit.  This 153,000 acres will 
be acquired from within the 300,000 acre Criteria Area (Western Riverside County 
Regional Conservation Authority, 2013a, p. 3).  The dark green areas in Figure 4.13 are 
those acquired as of September 17, 2014 (Western Riverside County Regional 
Conservation Authority, 2014).     
Under the permits associated with the WRMSHCP, local projects, both public and 
private, have an obligation to mitigate their impacts on species.  To encourage 
conservation on privately owned lands, the WRMSHCP's implementation strategy relies 
heavily on incentives to provide compensation to property owners who convey their 
property to the WRMSHCP Conservation Area.  These incentives are in lieu of, or in 
addition to, monetary payment in exchange for the conveyance of a property interest, and 
may include waiver and/or reduction of certain development fees, monetary 
compensation for entering into an option agreement, fast track processing, density 
bonuses, clustering, density transfers, and property reassessment and tax credits if 
feasible (Western Riverside County, California 2004a, Section 8.4.1).  Where incentives 




(Western Riverside County, California 2004a, Section 1.1).  The Wildlife Agencies 
(USFWS and CDFW) issue a permit for “take” of Federal and State endangered species 
associated only with approved projects (Western Riverside County, 2004a, Section 1.1). 







Figure 4.13 Western Riverside Multi-Species Habitat Conservation Summary Map as of September 17, 2014   
Note:  The light green areas are the 347,000 acres of existing public or quasi-public lands that form the core of the 
reserve system. The white areas outlined in blue are the cells that comprise the Criteria Area, the land from which 
Riverside Conservation Authority (RCA) will acquire the remaining 153,000 acres over the next 25 years to meet the 
goal.  The dark green areas are the lands RCA has acquired to date, 48,254 acres or 31%. (Western Riverside County 




The WRMSHCP is also part of California’s NCCP.  Like the HCPs, the NCCP is 
a cooperative effort between public and private partners to protect habitats and species 
while allowing compatible and appropriate economic activity (California Department of 
Fish and Wildlife, 2014).  The primary objective of the NCCP is to conserve natural 
communities at the ecosystem level while accommodating compatible land uses.  Both 
the CDFW and the USFWS provide support, direction, and guidance to NCCP 
participants.   
NCCP objectives are broader than the California and Federal Endangered Species 
Acts and are designed to identify and protect individual species that have already 
declined significantly in number.  NCCP agreements signed in conjunction with the 
NCCP plans require coordination with federal wildlife agencies, USFWS and National 
Marine Fisheries Service, on actions associated with the federal ESA, including USFWS 
HCPs.  The WRMSHCP NCCP permit notes that the plan serves as an HCP under the 
federal ESA, and as an NCCP under the CDFW Code.  Both the USFWS and the CDFW 
can authorize take of Federal and State listed species and other species of concern, 
respectively, within plan areas (California Department of Fish and Wildlife, 2015). 
Review of Proposed Factors to Consider in Successful HCP Implementation 
This section explores the various factors identified in Table B-1 in Appendix B 
specific to the WRMSHCP.  Findings associated with each of these factors are based 
upon published documentation and responses to interviews conducted with various 
participants and stakeholders of the WRMSHCP.  The respondents’ views broadly 
represent perspectives of the USFWS and the CDFW as Wildlife Agencies, and Riverside 




and stakeholders as Other Respondents.  Part of their agreeing to be interviewed included 
the commitment that individual identities would not be shared as part of this effort.   
Random names have been assigned to specific quotes reflecting individual informants’ 
perspectives. 
As described in Chapter 2, Bardach suggests that to better understand 
implementation, at least two points of view should be analyzed:  the idealistic group and 
the group interested in selfish or non-programmatic benefits.  While this language can be 
interpreted in multiple ways, for this analysis, the Wildlife Agencies are considered the 
idealistic group since both the federal HCP requirements and the state NCCP 
requirements are the drivers behind creation of HCP and similar NCCP policy.  
Narrowly, the permittees may be considered the group most interested in non-
programmatic benefits.  However, other parties to the WRMSHCP including developers, 
private landowners, environmental groups, the scientific community, and other 
stakeholders broadly fit into this category and are included here as well. 
Respondents were all asked the same questions.  Individual responses and follow-
up questions and answers varied widely.  Accordingly, while each respondent addressed 
each broad category of question as noted in Appendix C, not all respondents provided the 
same level of detail for the information requested.  Responses here are broken down into 
two categories:  those provided by Wildlife Agencies, and those provided by Other 
Respondents for the reasons described above.  Please note that, except for the distinction 
between Wildlife Agencies and Other Respondents, the narrative based on the interviews 
is organized by concept and not by a particular respondent.  Note also that this is not an 




respondent feedback to the questions posed specific to the particular attributes being 
investigated. 
Context Attributes 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, context attributes are the characteristics of an HCP that 
describe the background within which the case study HCP operates (Beierle and Cayford, 
2002). 
Problem Complexity 
 The Phase II case study selection process assures that the WRMSHCP meets the 
definition of complexity as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.  These factors include an HCP 
that manages multiple permittees, multiple threatened and endangered species, multiple 
land uses, and has a duration lasting longer than 30 years. 
Pre-existing Conflict between Permittees and/or Participants Affecting Levels of 
Social Capital 
 Section 1.2.1 of the WRMSHCP document gives historical background on the 
difficulties associated with developing the plan (Western Riverside County, 2004a, pp. 1-
4).  From a technical standpoint, it states that development in Southern California 
generally occurred in the coastal areas, while the inland valleys and hillsides of Riverside 
and San Bernardino counties remained largely rural, agricultural, and relatively 
undeveloped until recently (pre-2000).   As development increased, so did the conflict 
between landowners and state and federal regulatory processes responsible for protecting 
threatened and endangered species and their habitats.  These conflicts threatened the 
ability of local jurisdictions to plan for economic development and a high quality of life.  




experienced costly delays in both public and private development prior to the 
WRMSHCP.  Piecemeal project-by-project efforts resulted in disconnected habitats not 
conducive to efficient and effective species management.   
The burden of mitigating the effects of this urbanization now falls upon the 
County, cities, and landowners who hold the remaining intact vegetation communities 
(Western Riverside County, 2004a, Section 1.2.1).  This mitigation disparity is described 
as conflict between the “haves and have-nots” (personal communication, Mackenzie, 
2014); between cities and other local entities which built out before others and therefore 
have no remaining open land to contribute toward the land acquisition goals of the 
WRMSHCP.  This contributes to the appearance that the process of collectively 
managing lands as part of the WRMSHCP effort is not a fair process.  Communities that 
develop first benefit at the expense of those who choose to develop later at significantly 
higher costs.  One unintended consequence of this appears to be that individual 
landowners in areas that develop later may be forced to sell their properties at lower 
values only after lengthy regulatory delays. 
 Section 1.2.3 of the WRMSHCP speaks to the history of using HCPs as a 
planning tool in Riverside County (Western Riverside County, 2004a).  An HCP was 
developed to manage habitat for the fringe-toed lizard in Coachella Valley in 1985.  
Some of the participants of the WRMSHCP still remember the years of debate and legal 
wrangling associated with the listing of the Stephens kangaroo rat (SKR) in areas of 
Riverside County.  The species was listed as endangered in 1988.  A temporary HCP was 
put into place until a more permanent HCP was established in 1996 (Riverside County 




Jimeno discusses the role these previous HCPs played on development of the 
WRMSHCP.  She states that “One of the most challenging obstacles facing those who 
sought to establish the Western Riverside Multiple Species Habitat Conservation Plan 
(WR MSHCP) was the bad blood created during the execution of the county’s SKR 
HCP” (Jimeno, 2012, p. 76).  She states that Riverside County first created the Riverside 
County Habitat Conservation Agency (RCHCA) that approved the interim SKR HCP.  
One of RCHCA’s first actions was to establish a strict prohibition against take of the 
species which resulted in two significant impacts.  The first was that it generated almost 
unanimous agreement that the HCP was not in the landowners’ interests since they were 
effectively prohibited from doing any development of their property until a long-term 
plan was established.  It took 8 years to put a long-term plan in place.  The second was a 
high level of uncertainty for landowners in the broader study area who did not know 
whether or not their land would be subject to restricted use (Jimeno, 2012, p. 77).   In her 
dissertation, Jimeno describes impacts to individual landowners who attempted to 
comply, but found that limitations imposed during this interim period would not allow 
some land owners to farm acreage previously farmed.  She states they were subject to 
expensive Environmental Impact Reviews each time land was disturbed.  Other 
landowners tried to sell their property during this time frame, but lost offers from 
developers because they were unable to obtain permits from USFWS allowing 
development.  Lawsuits were filed against the USFWS, the CDFW, and the RCHCA 
claiming that inclusion of their property within the SKR HCP had essentially been a land 
taking for public purpose without just compensation.  Other landowners were affected by 




brush abatement to reduce fire risks.   Many believed this requirement was at cross 
purposes with other local requirements to keep land clear for fire abatement purposes.   
Based on interview responses associated with this effort, differing opinions remain today 
about the effectiveness of other means of brush abatement that were allowed by USFWS 
but either may not have been used by landowners, or that may not have been as effective, 
to manage fuels. Subsequent fires and the resulting damages led to federal Senate 
hearings and other public profiling in the media both locally and nationally (Jimeno, 
2012).     
All of this controversy influenced the development of the WRMSHCP.  Many of 
the same participants were involved in both planning processes.  Conflict over who could 
participate in the SKR HCP led to the adoption of pre-negotiation procedural agreements 
to avoid similar scenarios during negotiation of the WRMSHCP.  Contention over who 
would bear the cost of species protection in the SKR HCP, and the realization that 
sufficient financial resources were not available as needed during a recession in the 
1990s, led to significant delays in land acquisition for the SKR.  There was hope that 
lessons learned from the SKR HCP implementation would be applied as the WRMSHCP 
developed (Jimeno, 2012).   
Jimeno refers to recollections of Former Riverside County Supervisor Tom 
Mullen who was involved in both HCP processes when she states that county officials 
knew that key stakeholder participation would be required during negotiation of the 
WRMSHCP.  As a result, the county formed a Preparation Committee made up of state, 
county, city, and wildlife officials, and an Advisory Committee made up of various 




notes that some disagreed with Mullen’s depiction of the Advisory Committee as broadly 
inclusive.  She relays stories of participants who stated that many smaller landowners 
were not represented and were unaware of the plan throughout most of the negotiation 
phase.    She discusses examples of those who were explicitly denied from participating.  
She states that “. . . acceptance as a legitimate stakeholder within the Advisory 
Committee meant embracing the notion of willingness to compromise” (Jimeno, 2012, p. 
90).  In at least one instance, the perception that an individual was not willing to 
compromise eliminated them from further participation in plan negotiation. 
Jimeno documents a number of issues that arose during the WRMSHCP 
negotiating process in addition to stakeholder access.  These included determining how 
decisions would be made and communicated to the Steering Committee overseeing the 
WRMSHCP process, the primary goals of the plan, how the land acquisition would be 
funded, and difficulty in understanding USFWS criteria, a perceived lack of cooperation 
from the agency, and concerns over scientific adequacy.  One significant change in the 
WRMSHCP from previous HCPs was to develop flexible reserve boundaries as opposed 
to fixed boundaries.  Lessons from other plans suggest that if firm boundaries are 
identified, the result can be rapid land devaluation and economic loss that can irreparably 
damage families and businesses (Jimeno, 2012).  Instead, as depicted in Figure 4.13, 
criteria cells were developed for the WRMSHCP identifying desirable property that 
would limit development until either those properties were acquired and/or put under 
long term conservation easements, or determined not to be necessary for plan 
implementation.  There was extensive debate over development of a land negotiation and 




Acquisition Negotiation Strategy (HANS) to aid permittees in negotiating the regulatory 
process to transfer property to the plan reserve.  The basic assumption behind this 
strategy is that landowners should be fairly compensated for their land, and provides for 
both developer fees and developer incentives previously mentioned.  Jimeno concludes 
that leadership of the WRMSHCP Steering Committee understood the need to gain 
political consensus from the Advisory Committee on the various elements of the plan 
early on in order to ultimately be successful.   
The comments below summarize respondents’ responses when asked to comment 
on the nature of the relationship between USFWS and permittees prior to issuance of the 
WRMSHCP ITP, and how that may have affected trust levels during implementation of 
the WRMSHCP.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Wildlife Agencies – 
 
The Wildlife Agency respondents concurred that the relationships going into the 
development of the WRMSHCP were difficult between Riverside County and the 
USFWS because of the SKR HCP in the 1990s.  “At that time, HCPs were new and what 
may look like mistakes now were primarily due to lack of experience.  Relationships 
were very contentious.  The SKR HCP included hard, long, bloody, really, really bloody, 
you know riotous public meetings” (personal communication, Dylan, 2014).  Shortly 
after these events, the gnatcatcher was listed.  There were reports of owners with large 
tracts of coastal sage scrub land destroying plants on their property to avoid potential 
ESA issues.  The gnatcatcher listing was closely followed up by listing of the Quino 




management is not a viable long-term strategy for dealing with economic conflict and 
avoiding extirpation of species. 
Wildlife Agency respondents also referred to Tom Mullen and his vision of 
dealing with multiple species at the same time.  Along with the vision, he brought the 
support of other County supervisors.  “He was the man who brought it across the finish 
line with respect to creation of the MSHCP” (personal communication, Dylan, 2014).  
“The County also brought the cities to the table; however, the cities did not participate in 
any meaningful way during the WRMSHCP negotiation and development phase” 
(personal communication, Dylan, 2014).   
The permit is in its 10th year of implementation.  Relationships have been 
evolving and changing during that time.  Today, many of the cities only 
remember the frustrations associated with implementation and feel the plan has 
been imposed on them, even though their city councils adopted implementation 
ordinances when the plan was initially permitted.  There has been almost no 
contact between some of the permittees and the Wildlife Agencies, while other 
permittees have been in contact almost daily.  There’s a definite wariness of the 
process with the City permittees that may be associated with the high turnover of 
staff and heavy reliance on consultants.  Riverside County raised sales taxes to 
generate funds for both transportation projects and to support the WRMSHCP.  
The result was a ‘shotgun wedding’ for some of the cities who otherwise would 
likely not have participated (personal communication with Dylan, 2014). 
There is as much trust between the Wildlife Agencies and the Riverside 




WRMSHCP as there has ever been, although there are still differences of opinion 
between the agencies on how best to implement the plan.  There’s an 
acknowledgement that the RCA is subject to actions of elected officials which 
may, in turn, affect their actions.  There is a very good relationship between the 
Wildlife Agencies themselves; they communicate frequently and understand that 
they must maintain a good relationship because it’s a difficult plan and they have 
to be willing to compromise.  There were difficulties early on during 
implementation working with USFWS staff that was “more rule-based, black and 
white, no gray in between, which is impossible on this plan” (personal 
communication, Morgan, 2014). 
Other Respondents – 
Some of those charged with implementation responsibility agree that there used to 
be constant friction in interpreting the plan.   
As new staff arrives at RCA, the Wildlife Agencies, the cities, or the 
County, new cycles of interpretation occur.   Day-long meetings monthly with the 
Wildlife Agencies have significantly improved working relationships.   You have 
to have a good relationship.  Participants have learned there are advantages to 
bringing forward controversial projects early and encouraging appropriate 
jurisdictions to do the same (personal communication, Harper, 2014).   
“Implementing the agreement is like a marriage, it takes work” (personal 
communication, Mackenzie, 2014).   
 Relationships with the permittees during the negotiation phase of the WRMSHP 




“’We’re in cahoots with the USFWS,’ but the cities do not uniformly consider 
themselves voluntary participants in the plan regardless of what the plan says.  Instead, 
they are used to gather development fees for the RCA” (personal communication, Gerry, 
2014).   
Roles of the RCA are discussed in more detail below.  In general, the cities work 
through the RCA rather than directly with the Wildlife Agencies.  At least some cities 
have not had a great working relationship with the USFWS (personal communication, 
Gerry, 2014).  Others suggest that the plan works well when the cities and other 
permittees take authority, not when they default land use decisions to the Wildlife 
Agencies (personal communication, Shelby, 2014).   
We believed during negotiation of the WRMSHCP that the RCA would be 
the arbitrator for everyone with the USFWS as a way to deal with USFWS’ 
perceived heavy-handedness.  The idea behind the plan was that USFWS would 
get more by working through the plan, and permittees would be able to move 
forward.  Instead, USFWS are just bullies and are a roadblock.  There was a belief 
that the RCA would be the neutral party between USFWS and landowners to deal 
with that roadblock, but it isn’t happening.  There’s a sense that USFWS isn’t 
playing fair, that they are inflexible, and are not acting in good faith.  It’s a bad 
marriage with USFWS (personal communication, Mackenzie, 2014).  
 Some respondents can see how the plan could be implemented fairly as intended.  
However, at least one respondent’s perspective acknowledges differing viewpoints 




There’s no real structure or forum for formal regular meetings with landowners or 
environmentalists and the Wildlife Agencies.  Local permittees are supposed to be the 
decision makers, but they often relinquish that authority to the RCA (personal 
communication, Shelby, 2014). 
Capacity of Participants to Navigate Regulatory, Political, Social, Economic, and 
Technical Issues 
 Several respondents addressed the question of participants’ capacity to navigate 
through the WRMSHCP land acquisition process. 
Wildlife Agencies – 
 
With respect to the capacity of participants, the high staff turnover at the 
city level creates a big need for learning.  The Wildlife Agencies would like to 
have better outreach so that the cities would feel more comfortable calling and 
asking questions.  Once people get the wrong approach in their mind, they don’t 
change it unless you have the time to call them up or meet with them and talk 
about it.  The time to build those personal relationships is lacking (personal 
communication, Morgan, 2014). 
Other Respondents – 
With respect to the capabilities of participants, a comment was made that 
permittees play a large role in implementation since they make up much of the RCA 
Board of Directors.  However, “Board representatives are a revolving door and don’t 
always get the meat and potatoes of what they’re supposed to be doing” (personal 




Context Attributes Findings 
 Comparing the responses of the Wildlife Agencies to the Other Respondents here 
leads to a several observations.  First and foremost is that both parties share concerns in 
multiple areas.  Both parties vividly remember the conflict leading up to the decision to 
pursue this multiple species HCP and in negotiating the terms of the WRMSHCP.  The 
negative recollections associated with these events continue to affect how both formal 
and informal parties to the plan make decisions today.  It appears that the previous 
adversarial relationships associated with the SKR HCP directly led to decisions to create 
a more collaborative process to manage multiple species in the region.  This suggests that 
learning occurred between the parties in the network and they opted to move into a more 
collaborative sphere for development of the WRMSHCP (Weible, 2008).   
Both Wildlife Agencies and others acknowledge that the relationships amongst 
the parties continue to evolve, largely due to changes in personnel associated with elected 
officials at the county and local government levels.  Both groups recognize that rigid 
approaches to problem solving do not work.  Some flexibility in thinking is required.  
Along these lines, both parties refer to the WRMSHCP as a marriage, shot-gun or not.  
The relationships are difficult and take continued work to manage.  The importance of 
outreach activities associated with the plan is noted. 
The Wildlife Agencies identified Tom Mullen as someone who played a 
leadership role, not only in moving forward with the previous SKR HCP, but especially 
in the negotiation of the WRMSHCP.  The Wildlife Agencies also commented on 




Other Respondents refer to ongoing negative relationships with the USFWS using 
words like “unfair” and “inflexible.”  They observed that the plan works better when the 
permittees exercise their authority within the terms of the Implementing Agreement.  
This comment suggests that the transaction costs for permittees may be too high resulting 
in lack of participation by some of the permittees (Lubell et al., 2002; North, 1990; and 
Williamson, 1979).  
The Other Respondents specifically mention that there does not appear to be a 
formal venue or forum for landowners and environmentalists to participate in 
WRMSHCP decisions.  As noted by Pressman and Wildavsky, creation of an appropriate 
venue for participation is a fundamental key to implementation success (1984).   
The Other Respondents also acknowledge the helpful role that informal players 
like the landowners and environmentalists play in implementing the plan (Lubell and 
Fulton, 2007; Sabatier, 2007). 
Process Attributes 
 Process attributes are factors that appear to be helpful and/or necessary to 
implement natural resource management plans like HCPs (Beierle and Cayford, 2002). 
Presence of Specific goals/objectives other than Biological 
The overall goal of the WRMSHCP is based on the RCIP Vision Statement and 
supporting policy directives.  The plan is to enhance and maintain biological diversity 
and ecosystem processes while allowing future economic growth.  Those goals are 
explicit and easy to understand.  Based on an analysis described within WRMSHCP 
Section 3.0, it was determined that the plan will result in a Conservation Area in excess 




Public Lands, and approximately 153,000 acres of Additional Reserve Lands (reserve) to 
be acquired (Western Riverside County, 2004a, Section 1.3). 
  There are 3 primary goals of the plan.  The Biological Goal is to conserve covered 
species and their habitats in the WRMSHCP Plan Area.  The Economic Goal is to 
improve future economic development in the County by providing an efficient, 
streamlined regulatory process through which development can proceed in an efficient 
way, describing where development should and should not occur.  The Social goal is to 
provide for permanent open space, community edges, and recreational opportunities 
which contribute to maintaining the community character of Western Riverside County 
(Western Riverside County, 2004a, Section 1.3). 
Neither the Wildlife Agencies nor Other Respondents had any specific comments 
with respect to this factor during the interviews.  This may be because the goals are 
clearly stated in the WRMSHCP and there is nothing found in this investigation to 
suggest the goals have changed.  Insights related to this factor may be gleaned, however, 
through the discussion regarding the motivation of the participants below. 
Identify Type of Actors Participating in addition to Permittees and Wildlife 
Agencies 
 Based on documentation including the WRMSHCP, related meeting minutes, 
RCA and permittee resolutions, RCA bylaws, and discussion with respondents, the 
primary actors playing a role in implementation are developer groups and individual 
developers, environmental groups, agricultural groups, other public and private 
landowners, and citizens in addition to the permittees and Wildlife Agencies of the 




Wildlife Agencies – 
The Endangered Habitat League (EHL) is a critical partner because, if a 
permittee is not implementing a permit correctly, the EHL may be willing to sue 
them.  They’re committed to conservation planning, have the ear of people who 
don’t want to listen to the agencies, and are compromise-oriented.  Dan Silver of 
the EHL plays a very important role.  He represents multiple environmental 
groups, and is a practical, get-it-done guy.  Sometimes just hearing him out 
reminds us of the importance of being straightforward and practical (personal 
communication, Morgan, 2014). 
Individual developers play a role.  Some sat on the Steering Committee to 
support development of the WRMSHCP.  Consultants participate in the 
implementation in various ways.   Ed Sauls’ is one in particular.  He used to be a 
member of the Building Industry Association.  His niche has been solving listed 
species problems, negotiating, and he thinks outside the box.  Like most 
consultants, he never forgets his clients’ needs (personal communication, Dylan, 
2014). 
“Biological consultants are still needed but to a much lesser degree in 
implementation to write necessary California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) 
documents” (personal communication, Morgan, 2014). 
“Friends of the San Jacinto Valley, the local Audubon chapter, and The Nature 
Conservancy all participate by reviewing projects, advocating for species, and threatening 




There are other constituencies who are invested in conservation that are 
frustrated with the Wildlife Agencies for not taking a line that is appropriate from 
a conservation or natural resource perspective, but that is not mandated or 
necessary under the WRMSHCP.  However the plan states that the conservation 
coming out of these hooked up squares (in the criteria areas) was enough.  Absent 
the WRMSHCP, the voices of these groups may be heard differently (personal 
communication, Dylan, 2014).   
Other Respondents – 
Tom Mullen is an actor who’s played a major role in MSHCP 
implementation activities.  He’s kind of like the father of our MSHCP.  He’s a 
gentleman, a gracious guy.  Tom is a bright guy and the RCA uses him often as a 
consultant.  Referring to Mullen, one respondent stated that they are on opposite 
sides of things a lot, but he has integrity and I can deal with anybody as long as I 
can disagree with you with integrity.  Mullen is a player on the political scale at 
that level where, no matter who is on the Board of Supervisors, they have to deal 
with him (personal communication, Mackenzie, 2014). 
“Developers and landowners, and to some extent, the larger environmental 
community play a role in MSHCP implementation activities.  But developers and 
landowners are not formally organized.  They are generally independent.  They will 
coalesce, however, when RCA pulls crap” (personal communication, Shelby, 2014).   
There has been friction with some developers and others because they are 
one of many specialized interest groups working through the WRMSHCP 




however, they’ve played no active role in implementation.  The Building Industry 
Association is a big player as a significant portion of development within 
Riverside County is housing.  The Building Industry Association carries most of 
the burden of financing the WRMSHCP through development fees.  They are also 
big proponents of the plan.  The plan provides certainty in the process.     
Coordinating with the Corps of Engineers was a problem at the start of 
implementation since they did not fully understand the plans provisions for 
Section 7 consultation.  RCA tried to do a special management plan for 404 
permits, but there was not support for the 401 process, the State portion of the 
permitting process, due to issues with the Regional Water Quality Boards.  The 
rules are not consistent between the Regional Water Quality Boards.  The State 
believes in on-site mitigation vs. the Corps of Engineers approach that looks at 
regional or watershed mitigation.  It took a few years, but now the plan is 
recognized by the Corps of Engineers through an abbreviated ESA Section 7 
process which recognizes the compliance with the WRMSHCP (personal 
comments, Harper, 2014). 
“An RCA biologist does a great job with public outreach and is willing to work 
either on his own, or with the Wildlife Agencies, to answer permittee questions” 
(personal communication, Gerry, 2014).   
The Nature Conservancy doesn’t bring much money, but they do 
contribute to help defray costs for things like land appraisals and are very helpful, 




The EHL has been very helpful on specific projects (personal communication, 
Harper, 2014). 
Accessibility for Actors other than Permittees to Participate (Open vs. Invitation 
only, etc.) 
The Implementing Agreement describes various groups and their roles created to 
support the WRMSHCP.  Participation is largely through this Cooperative Organization 
Structure (Structure) (Western Riverside County, 2004c, Section 11.2).  This is discussed 
in more detail below.  However, the Structure does not identify ways for individuals or 
entities not described to participate in the process. 
The USFWS Five-Point Policy (Policy) (National Archives and Records 
Administration, 2000) states that, in USFWS experience, the more public participation 
that occurs in the development phase of a plan, the more likely it will be accepted by the 
public.  However, inclusion of interested parties in the development of an HCP is 
ultimately the decision of the applicant.   The ESA and its implementing regulations 
require only a public comment period after the plan is submitted and published in the 
Federal Register (p. 35246).  The Policy goes on to state that “Although the development 
of an HCP is the applicant’s responsibility, the Services will encourage applicants for 
most large-scale, regional HCP efforts to provide extensive opportunities for public 
involvement during the planning and implementation process” (p. 35256).  So while the 
USFWS encourages public participation during plan implementation, the decision on 
whether and how to accomplish that lies with permittees. 
NCCP agreements identify public participation process requirements.  For 




species coverage lists, and other planning documents associated with an NCCP must be 
made available for public review in a reasonable and timely manner.  An outreach 
program is also required to provide information to interested persons including 
landowners with an emphasis on getting input from a balance of affected public and 
private interests including state and local governments, county agricultural commissions, 
agricultural organizations, landowners, conservation organizations and the general public 
(State of California, 1991).  Note again, however, the focus is on public participation 
during plan preparation as opposed to during plan implementation. 
In addition to the groups explicitly outlined in the Structure, an Executive 
Committee and a Stakeholder Group were created by the RCA to assist in making 
decisions.  These groups are discussed in more detail below as part of the roles of 
primary actors in the WRMSHCP. 
Wildlife Agencies – 
There’s a decent amount of public outreach through the RCA, and the 
RCA is still learning about the public outreach sphere.  That’s to be expected.  
The RCA took pamphlets to Washington, DC, focused on infrastructure and jobs.  
They were stunned at how much people wanted to pay attention to them with this 
approach as opposed to asking to give USFWS more dollars, or explaining their 
problems with implementation.  Flipping the channel from ‘look at all the 
conservation we’re achieving to look at all the infrastructure and community 
development that’s happening inside our plan area’ was smart in this political 




There seems to be a need for a ‘Friends of the MSHCP’ group; people 
who develop constituencies in certain places.  For example, if we could figure out 
how to get someone in charge of hunting on conservation lands where it’s 
appropriate, that would bring in another constituency.  People have to engage if 
we’re going to keep the MSHCP.  If the local population does not have an 
emotional attachment to the conservation that is achieved, we’re kidding 
ourselves in an expensive and elaborate way.  If there are going to be natural 
resources for future Americans, then it means existing Americans have to not take 
them off the planet (personal communication, Dylan, 2014). 
We need to do a better job with public outreach and support for the plan.  
All the legislators or Supervisors hear is ‘I can’t build my project.’  They’re not 
hearing from the people who say I like the hills or I enjoy hiking, or I’m glad 
there’s open space (personal communication, Morgan, 2014). 
Other Respondents – 
RCA reaches out to others, for instance business groups.  Key 
stakeholders are sought out because they are influential in the area.  RCA wants to 
inform them what they are doing and wants to let people know that, if they have 
concerns, now is the time to voice them.  While there is no requirement for the 
RCA to do the outreach, if it does not, then RCA will have additional issues to 
deal with (personal communication, Harper, 2014). 
RCA is pretty open when it comes to public outreach.  They have field 




RCA Board when they are asked.  It is helpful, but the RCA Director just defends 
their position on species (personal communication, Gerry, 2014). 
“The RCA has done some outreach to try to find out under what conditions people 
would support additional funding.  There was originally some outreach to the public.  
There continues to be outreach to the permittees” (personal communication, Shelby, 
2014). 
Role of Primary Actors (regulatory, political, technical participatory, co-
management) 
With respect to the network of parties associated with the WRMSHCP, a number 
of formal participants are identified and their roles are outlined in the WRMSHCP 
language and the Implementing Agreement.  The current signatory parties to the plan are 
the permittees listed in Table B-2 in Appendix B, and the USFWS and CDFW as the 
Wildlife Agencies.    While some participating entities have engaged in the WRMSHCP 
as envisioned, others have not.  The Implementing Agreement states that successful 
implementation of the WRMSHCP requires both a local administrative structure and 
effective coordination with the state and federal partners (Western Riverside County, 
2004c, Section 11.2).  To do this, they established an organizational structure for 
implementation and management of WRMSHCP activities as described below.   
The RCA website describes 4 of these groups of partners to the WRMSHCP:  
Members or Permittees; Participating Special Entities made up of regional public facility 
providers; Partner Agencies who are responsible for public and quasi-public lands within 




conservation, development, planning, and agricultural special interests (Western 
Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority, 2014). 
The Wildlife Agencies are clearly formal parties to the WRMSHCP as the entities 
issuing the ITPs.  Responsibilities of the USFWS include issuing ITPs to permittees upon 
satisfaction of the legal requirements outlined in the WRMSHCP (Western Riverside 
County, 2004c, Section 14.1).  In addition, the Wildlife Agencies commit to providing 
both technical assistance and seeking additional funding for plan activities to the extent 
practicable during implementation of the plan.  The USFWS also provides various 
assurances to the permittees. They recognize the efforts of permittees within the plan, and 
commit to requiring reasonable and prudent measures associated with approved projects 
that are consistent with the plan.  In recognition of the permittees commitments, the 
USFWS agrees not to designate Critical Habitat within the plan area, and if they do, that 
they will not require any additional protective measures beyond what already exists in the 
WRMSHCP.  They also agree that any subsequent species recovery plans do not obligate 
permittees to take on additional tasks.  In accordance with the No Surprises policy, if 
Unforeseen Circumstances1 are identified requiring additional mitigation, the USFWS 
agrees that any mitigation will be restricted to modification of the MSHCP conservation 
area and will be the least burdensome measures available.   
                                                           
 
1 Unforeseen Circumstances are defined as changes in circumstances affecting a covered 
species adequately conserved or geographic area covered by the MSHCP that could not 
reasonably have been anticipated the by parties at the time of the MSHCP’s negotiation 
and development, and that result in a substantial and adverse change in the status of the 




The CDFW also makes commitments and assurances.  They acknowledge 
authorizing take of protected species by issuance of the NCCP permits.  Like the 
USFWS, they commit to not requiring additional land, water, or financial compensation 
or additional land use restrictions unless they determine that continued implementation of 
the agreement jeopardizes species.  Permittees may be required to take additional 
mitigation action in response to changed conditions.  However, these are not intended to 
require additional funding or impose significant additional burdens on the permittees.  
Both Wildlife Agencies commit to extending ITP protection to recognized Third Parties 
(Western Riverside County, 2004c, Section 17).  
Each permittee is responsible for implementing the WRMSHCP through their 
normal land use, planning, and approval processes (Western Riverside County, 2004a, 
Section 6.0; Western Riverside County, 2004c, Section 3.59).  This includes adopting and 
maintaining resolutions or ordinances to allow them to implement all of the requirements 
of the WRMSHCP for public and private development projects.  Permittees also collect 
Local Development Mitigation Fees and other fees as appropriate, comply with the 
appropriate habitat evaluation and land acquisition strategies identified in the 
WRMSHCP, transmit required documentation and funding to the RCA and Wildlife 
Agencies, and manage WRMSHCP Conservation Area property or conservation 
easements owned or leased by the permittee.  Of the 153,000 acres of reserve required for 
conservation under the plan, the permittees are obligated to provide 97,000 of those acres.  
The remaining 56,000 acres were originally to be paid for by state and federal entities 




One significant step in plan implementation was creating the RCA.  The RCA was 
created as a Joint Powers Authority to provide primary policy direction for 
implementation of the WRMSHCP (Western Riverside County, 2004c, Section 3.93, p. 
13).  Duties of the RCA include land acquisition and administration; land management; 
biological resource monitoring in the WRMSHCP preserve; and mitigation fee collection 
and management.  The RCA also administers budget and funding strategies, reviews 
development of covered activity projects within the WRMSHCP criteria cells, assumes 
some of the duties and responsibilities of the RCHCA pursuant to the SKR HCP, conveys 
taking authority to entities utilizing the Participating Special Entity provision in the plan, 
administers the boards and committees set up by the WRMSHCP, serves as custodian of 
records related to plan implementation, oversees and monitors WRMSHCP clerical 
changes, amendments, and criteria refinements, and generally assists with resolving 
implementation questions, concerns, or disputes (Western Riverside County Regional 
Conservation Authority, 2007). 
Participating Special Entities are regional public facility providers, e.g. a utility 
company, school, water district, etc., that operates or owns land within the WRMSHCP 
Plan Area and applies for take authorization pursuant to the Implementing Agreement 
(Western Riverside County, 2004c, Section 3.83).  The Participating Special Entity 
submits an application to the RCA detailing the proposed activity and its potential 
impacts.  If the RCA finds the proposed activities are in compliance with the 
WRMSHCP, it issues a Certificate of Inclusion to the permit.  Participating Special 




capital costs).  Development activities also pay a Local Development Impact Fee 
(Western Riverside County, California 2004c, Section 11.8). 
The WRMSHCP and Implementing Agreement also make provisions for Third 
Parties Granted Take Authorization.  These parties may be landowners, developers, 
farming interests and other private and public entities undertaking activities covered by 
the WRMSHCP as long as these activities are under the direct control of the permittees, 
or with a Certificate of Inclusion or other written mechanism in compliance with the 
Implementing Agreement and WRMSHCP (Western Riverside County, 2004c, Sections 
3.106 and 17). 
In addition, the RCA has several subgroups and committees to assist with 
oversight and implementation of the WRMSHCP (Western Riverside County, 2004a, 
Section 6.6.2).  Subgroups within the RCA include the Board of Directors, the Executive 
Director and Executive Committee, the Stakeholder Committee, and the Reserve 
Management Oversight Committee.  As previously mentioned, the original WRMSHCP 
Structure did not anticipate a formal Executive Committee or Stakeholder Committee 
(Western Riverside County, 2004a, Section 6.6.2).  Both were added by the RCA Board 
of Directors through the Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority By-
Laws. 
The RCA Board of Directors role is to provide primary policy direction for 
implementation of the WRMSHCP and to provide opportunities for public participation 
in the decision making process.  The Board of Directors convened its first meeting in 
February 2004 and has been meeting approximately monthly ever since.  The Board of 




chosen to meet that obligation by forming the Executive Committee to oversee RCA 
administrative and staff functions (Western Riverside County Regional Conservation 
Authority, 2007).  Per the RCA website, the Executive Committee is appointed by the 
Chairperson of the RCA Board of Directors and ratified by the Board of Directors to 
oversee RCA’s administrative and staff functions, and other matters as delegated by the 
Board.   
The Executive Committee consists of seven members including the Chairperson 
of the Board of Directors, the Vice Chairperson of the Board of Directors, and past 
Chairperson of the Board of Directors, and 2-4 representatives of Riverside County 
(Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority 2015a).  This group began 
meeting in July 2004 and has met approximately monthly ever since. 
Under the current Structure, the Executive Committee forms the Funding 
Coordination Committee which consists of members of the Wildlife Agencies and RCA 
(Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority 2007).  The Funding 
Coordination Committee advises the Executive Director of the RCA on funding 
priorities, acquisition of additional reserve lands, and prioritizing areas for conservation 
as requested (Western Riverside County, 2004a, Section 6.6.2).   
The Executive Director of the RCA is responsible for fulfilling the duties and 
responsibilities and administering the WRMSHCP on behalf of the RCA (Western 
Riverside County, California 2004a, Section 6.6.3).    
The WRMSHCP also created an Elected Officials Ad Hoc Committee to resolve 
outstanding issues regarding permittee project compliance.  The Elected Officials Ad Hoc 




proposing the project (Western Riverside County, 2004a, Section 6.6.2.E.4).  This group 
has been called upon by the Board of Directors as needed since April 2004 to focus on 
specific tasks requested by the Board (Western Riverside County Regional Conservation 
Authority, 2004b). 
The Reserve Management Oversight Committee (RMOC) serves as the 
intermediary between the on-the-ground activities of the Reserve Managers, and the 
decision making function of the RCA.  The Executive Director of the RCA forms and 
chairs the RMOC.  As originally envisioned, the RMOC was composed of representatives 
of the Wildlife Agencies, RCA, and various city, county, state, and federal agencies and 
private individuals managing conservation lands within the WRMSHCP area.  Individual 
members are appointed by the RCA (Western Riverside County, 2004a, Sections 6.6.3 
and 6.6.4.A). 
The RMOC is currently being restructured.  It consists largely of elected 
officials.  As originally structured, all real estate acquisitions had to be approved 
by the entire RMOC, often in closed session due to the level of detail associated 
with each acquisition.  Instead, that function is currently managed by a 
subcommittee of the RMOC consisting of Reserve Managers, RCA, and the 
Wildlife Agencies.  Elected officials now help prioritize acquisitions at the Board 
of Directors level (personal communication, Charles Landry, Executive Director 
of the RCA, November 11, 2014). 
In addition to the committees above, Reserve Managers are individuals selected 
by public and private land owners within the Conservation Areas to ensure that the 




Reserve Managers report to the RCA Executive Director (Western Riverside County, 
2004a, Section 6.6.5). 
There is also a Reserve Monitoring Program Administrator (Administrator) 
responsible for administering the WRMSHCP Monitoring Program.  For the first 8 years 
of the plan, this was the CDFW.  While the CDFW continues to provide monitoring 
support to the Administrator, monitoring activities are currently contracted to staff of the 
Santa Ana Watershed Association (Western Riverside County, 2004a, Section 6.6.6; 
Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority, 2013f). 
Other key participants in implementation of the WRMSHCP are the Independent 
Science Advisors (Advisors) appointed by the RCA Executive Director.  The Advisors 
are subject matter experts that assist in implementation at the request of the Executive 
Director to coordinate with Reserve Managers and the Administrator and provide the best 
scientific information available (Western Riverside County, 2004a, Section 6.6.7).  These 
advisors may be independent, associated with educational institutions or public agencies, 
non-profit organizations, or employees of biological science firms (Western Riverside 
County Regional Conservation Authority, 2007).   
The RCA Board of Directors also created a Stakeholder Committee.  The Western 
Riverside Regional Conservation Authority By-Laws were proposed and approved on 
June 7, 2004.  The by-laws referred to four standing committees:  the Funding 
Coordination Committee, the Reserve Management Oversight Committee, the 
Administrative Committee, and the Stakeholder Advisory Committee.  The Stakeholder 
Advisory Committee was appointed by the Chairperson and ratified by the Board.  It was 




MSHCP; government agencies within Riverside County; groups representing 
environmental interests implicated by the MSHCP; and other stakeholders.  Committee 
members could not appoint alternates (Western Riverside County Regional Conservation 
Authority, 2004a). 
There are references in the Board of Directors meeting minutes of December 6, 
2004 to an Implementation and Guidelines Committee which would meet after January 1, 
2005.  The February 7, 2005 Board of Directors Meeting Minutes include a report stating 
that the first meeting of the Implementation and Administration Guidelines Committee 
(IAGC) occurred on January 12, 2005 and was attended by 12 of 15 appointees.  The 
IAGC asked that several issues be considered in future meetings including the 
opportunity for public comment on the HANS Joint Project Review determinations, a 
flowchart of the HANS process, access to fair market value compensation for lands 
outside the criteria area required for conservation, certainty in the project review process, 
protection of local land use authority, and reduction in the use of species surveys 
(Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority, 2005d).   
The March 7, 2005 Board of Directors Meeting Minutes included items to 
consider Resolution 05-01 Amending Bylaws to Change the Name of the Stakeholder 
Advisory Committee to the Implementation and Administration Guidelines Committee 
and Increasing Membership.  Sixteen members of the committee were requested and the 
name change needed formal approval.  The changes were adopted along with the 
statement that the IAGC would meet when requested by the Board of Directors to review 




were to be made to meet twice yearly (Western Riverside County Regional Conservation 
Authority, 2005e). 
Specific meeting minutes of the early Stakeholder Advisory Committee and the 
subsequent IAGC were not found.  However, reference is made to the IAGC in the Board 
of Directors Meeting Minutes dated June 13, 2005 reporting that the IAGC was 
determining how frequently the committee should meet (Western Riverside County 
Regional Conservation Authority, 2005f).  On October 12, 2005, the RCA Administrative 
Committee Meeting Minutes record that the IAGC made recommendations that the 
composition of the committee should remain unchanged, but that the voting and quorum 
requirements should change; that technical members be added; and the County and 
RCTC should be removed as members since their voices were heard elsewhere.  
Additional recommendations were that the IAGC should meet quarterly, there was 
concern expressed about the restriction on member alternates, and that a workshop be 
scheduled to identify pros and cons associated with development of a wildlife refuge 
(Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority, 2005b).  The Board of 
Directors ratified changes to the IAGC membership at their December 6, 2005 meeting 
but no detail is provided related to those changes (Western Riverside County Regional 
Conservation Authority, 2005c). 
RCA legal counsel addressed the IAGC recommendations at the December 14, 
2005 Administrative Committee meeting.  Counsel reiterated that the IAGC consists of 
16 members and that 9 must be present for a quorum.  Counsel recommended either 
amending the by-laws to set the quorum at six or seven, or reducing the number of 




more active members, perhaps suggesting that participation had been lower than 
expected.  The Executive Director of the RCA (Tom Mullen at that time) recommended 
retaining the IAGC structure and continuing to meet, then reporting back to the 
Administrative Committee in September 2006 to see how IAGC membership responded 
(Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority, 2005a). 
 At the July 12, 2006 Administrative Committee meeting, the Deputy Director of 
the RCA reviewed staff’s proposal to restructure the RCA’s Standing Committees.  The 
Administrative Committee name was changed to the Executive Committee, and the 
membership of the Stakeholder Committee (the IAGC) was changed to include 
representatives of the environmental community, building industry, and property owners.  
The Administrative Committee members agreed to forward these changes to the July 24, 
2006 Board of Directors meeting for final approval (Western Riverside County Regional 
Conservation Authority, 2006a). 
In July of 2006, the recommendation was made to the Board of Directors to 
restructure the Stakeholder Committee to include the requested representatives to review 
implementation issues from a stakeholder perspective, and from time to time, make 
recommendations the RCA Board.  A change to the by-laws would again be necessary.  
The Executive Director of the Property Owners’ Association in Riverside County 
commented that the RCIP process offered an opportunity for stakeholders to discuss 
issues of concern including discussion of the HANS process, protection of local land use 
authority, species surveys, and certainty in the project review process.  The current 
proposal for the Stakeholder Committee to meet only 2 or 3 times per year was not 




Committee schedule of meeting quarterly be continued.  The RCA Executive Director 
noted there was no restriction on the number of meetings that could be held.  Beyond 
that, no further information is recorded (Western Riverside County Regional 
Conservation Authority, 2006b). 
In October 2006, the by-laws were again amended to change the composition of 
the Stakeholder Committee to include 16 members representing property owners, 
environmental interests, and the building industry.  Members could not appoint 
alternates; the committee would meet as often as necessary, at least twice yearly; the 
Executive Director would facilitate discussion, and the Committee would review 
implementation plans from a stakeholder perspective in addition to other duties directed 
by the Board (Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority 2006c). 
There is a large gap in reporting on activities of the Stakeholder Committee 
between 2006 and 2013.  Comments made by respondents and others familiar with the 
WRMSHCP suggest that the Stakeholder Committee did not meet for an extended period 
of time. 
The first of the Stakeholder Committee meetings whose minutes are published on 
the RCA website took place in July 2013, nine years after the WRMSHCP was 
established.  The group discussed the Committee’s purpose and goals as approved by the 
RCA Board of Directors.  The four goals include a 9-year review of the implementation 
process, recommendations to streamline the WRMSHCP project review process, review 
the funding plan and recommend new funding sources, and review the survey process to 
facilitate WRMSHCP objectives and seek to eliminate survey requirements (Western 




Several members of the public spoke during the first Stakeholder Committee 
meeting.  One expressed hope that the Stakeholder Committee will have an opportunity 
to address issues that have presented challenges to individual landowners to date 
including funding and property owner rights issues; that “the Committee will work 
diligently to resolve the problems concerning property owners rights regarding the 
acquisition process, and work diligently, not to just save the multi-species plan, but to 
restore honor to the way it’s being implemented” so her family and others can find some 
sense of justice (Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority, 2013e).  
The second meeting of this group took place on September 5, 2013.  Additional 
comments were made by members of the public identifying frustration by landowners 
whose sales were pulled out of escrow multiple times as a result of MSHCP issues.  
Another landowner said they were being asked to donate property rather than be 
compensated for it in order to get a lot split approved (Western Riverside County 
Regional Conservation Authority, 2013b). 
This group met seven times between July 31, 2013 and September 2014.  As of 
April, 2015, the minutes of the September 2014 meeting remain to be posted.  No 
mention of the Stakeholder Committee appears in Board of Directors or Executive 
Committee agendas or meeting minutes since the September 2014 meeting.  No future 
meetings are currently noticed on the RCA website. 
Each respondent was asked to comment about their roles and the roles and 
capabilities of actors and coalitions in plan implementation. 




The Wildlife Agencies provide technical expertise for project review and 
monitoring by attending meetings, reviewing conservation easements, and 
following up when people are not compliant with the plan (personal 
communication, Morgan, 2014).   
“The USFWS role is implementing the permit policies and procedures leading to 
perfection of the conservation strategy” (personal communication, Dylan, 2014). 
The HCP envisioned the Reserve Management Oversight Committee 
(RMOC).  Its intent was to direct monitoring and management of the resource to 
make a cohesive strategy and set priorities.  The initial thought was that it would 
be the land managers, but as soon as we said the words ‘budget’ and ‘approve and 
control,’ we obviously had the elected officials.  The RMOC grew into this 
unwieldy body; everybody is technically on it from land managers to Supervisors; 
it ended up with a slew of responsibilities.  The RMOC’s not functional; it’s sort 
of a plan weakness.  The RCA has coped by identifying things the RMOC must 
do, approving the monitoring program work plan and delegating them to other 
things.  If someone was going to take anybody to task about what isn’t right, the 
RMOC is a place it could be done (personal communication, Dylan, 2014). 
Other Respondents – 
 “The RMOC structure and function are currently being re-evaluated.  It was not 





Actors have Authority to Implement Plans 
 It appears most formal actors and signatories to the Implementing Agreement 
have sufficient authority to implement their obligations under the WRMSHCP.  In 
particular, the permittees are required to adopt and maintain ordinances and general plans 
that allow them to implement the requirements and fulfill the purposes of the ITP and the 
plan.  This includes collection of designated fees, compliance with acquisition processes, 
protection of species, and implementation of best management practices as appropriate.  
Permittees participate as member agencies in the RCA, and carry out all applicable 
application and review responsibilities outlined in the Implementing Agreement.  
Permittees also manage applicable conservation area properties, and participate as 
members of the RMOC (Western Riverside County, 2004c, Section 13).   
Wildlife Agencies – 
 “Limited authority and multiple interpretations of state law affect NCCP 
implementation which also affects MSHCP implementation.  In some cases, there’s no 
take for state species, so there’s not mitigation policies to be included for some projects” 
(personal communication, Morgan, 2014). 
 There were no interview comments from Other Respondents addressing concerns 
about parties lacking authority to implement the plan.  There is a reference to permittees 
not using the authority that’s accorded them in the Implementing Agreement (personal 
communication, Shelby, 2014). 
Motivation of Participants 
 Common goals of the participants are memorialized within the various 




the species and their habitats.  While many of the permittees and other actors in the 
process have an interest in species protection, the motivation of individual actors varies 
depending on their land use interests.  Respondents were asked to comment on whether 
there was congruency between the objectives of the USFWS and the permittees.   
Wildlife Agencies – 
 The Wildlife Agencies were very direct in stating that they did not think there was 
congruency between their objectives and those of permittees.   
“For USFWS, this is a conservation strategy, and for permittees, it’s a 
development permit” (personal communication, Dylan, 2014).   
It is naïve of regulators to expect permittees to view it as anything but a 
development permit. That said, however, permittees should be proud of their 
stewardship associated with a regional plan because it makes communities better 
and more livable (personal communication, Dylan, 2014). 
The Wildlife Agencies attribute part of the disparity in objectives to turnover of 
people either implementing the plan, or being affected by the plan. 
“You have new people and they don’t remember how difficult it was under the 
old process so they see it as an impingement on their land use authority” (personal 
communication, Morgan, 2014).    
Other Respondents – 
 “Cities see their role as supporting and funding RCA, not as voluntary members 
of the WRMSHCP.  If the cities withdrew, the HCP would fold” (personal 




 Others say that whether or not there is congruity between the objectives of the 
USFWS and permittees depends entirely on the individual.   
Cities approach the WRMSHCP from their own perspective based on their 
needs.  Some are big supporters of the plan since they are seeking open space and 
preservation.  Others signed on because of the poisoned pill on transportation 
funding only available to members of the WRMSHCP.  The major positive 
incentive is that you can’t get major infrastructure or developments done without 
the plan.  Frankly, we couldn’t build any substantial transportation projects prior 
to the plan.  There are currently two billion dollars in transportation projects under 
way within the County that wouldn’t have moved forward without the plan.  And 
because of the MSHCP, for the first ten years of the plan, there were no lawsuits 
against highway transportation projects permitted by the plan (personal 
communication, Harper, 2014). 
 One respondent described the differing motivations as creating a delicate tension 
between USFWS and permittees.   
There is congruency to accomplish the 153,000 acres of additional 
conservation.  There is not congruence on who pays for it.  And there’s a delicate 
tension between choices about which projects get built which way, and how much 
land gets conserved.  But the plan is designed to handle some of that, particularly 
through the Rough Step process.2  USFWS has largely withdrawn from the 
responsibility to fund the plan (personal correspondence, Shelby, 2014). 
                                                           
 
2 Rough Step is a process described within the WRMSHCP to insure that land 




Other respondents suggest there is little congruency between the goals of the 
USFWS and goals of others.   
The goal of property owners is to know that they are going to get the 
maximum amount of money out of their property.  USFWS just wants as many 
acres of somebody else’s property as they can get.  The RCA just wants to leave 
its lights on and make sure it lives another day.  The County wants to make sure 
that nothing gets in the way of their roads and infrastructure projects (personal 
communication, Mackenzie, 2014).     
What I want as a stakeholder is the ability to have beautiful open spaces, 
to know that we can preserve and protect our environment and species.  But I 
want to make sure my city has enough economic opportunity through 
development to be healthy, prosper, and be able to grow and renew itself 
(personal communication, Mackenzie, 2014). 
Quality of Deliberation, Collaboration, and Empowerment 
 The WRMSHCP Structure was developed as described above with the idea of 
allowing high quality deliberation, collaboration, and empowerment.  It’s difficult to say 
to what extent that is occurring.  Feedback received from respondents suggests that while 
deliberation, collaboration, and empowerment may occur at some level between parties to 
the process, not all issues are being resolved satisfactorily. 
Other Respondents – 
                                                           
 
not removing too much of a specific vegetation category (Western Riverside County 




Developers did not expect that the RCA Executive Committee would seek 
to undermine the protections of landowners.  They are very disingenuous and lack 
fulfilling commitments because they are panicked.  The WRMSHCP was never 
adequately funded.  This lack of funding makes them concerned they will run out 
of money and lose the plan so they seek to stop the bleeding and protect 
themselves rather than allowing the plan to move forward.  They do not trust the 
process (personal communication, Shelby, 2014). 
There always will be people who do not agree with plans or processes, so 
there will be lawsuits.  The RCA has had a couple of lawsuits claiming inverse 
condemnation and other issues.  In real estate acquisition, sometimes the 
landowner and the RCA cannot agree on price so neither party is able to move 
forward.    If we can agree, then RCA has four years to come up with the funding 
to purchase the property.  The perception of value for landowners vs. the fair 
market value is sometimes a big problem (personal communication, Harper, 
2014). 
Adequacy of Communication Networks 
 The formal structure set up within the Implementing Agreement created multiple 
committees made up of representatives from multiple agencies in order to create 
communication networks that were deemed necessary for plan implementation.  
Feedback from respondents suggests some communications work well, others less so.  
Responses to questions associated with several factors address aspects of communication 
adequacy. 




We have a real good relationship with USFWS.  We communicate all the 
time.  The USFWS is very much focused on maintaining a good relationship 
because they recognize this is a difficult plan and we are going to have to 
compromise on things (personal communication, Morgan, 2014). 
I would not initially have identified other federal agencies as stakeholders, 
but they appreciate the HCP.  We have asked them to do WRMSHCP as part of 
the CEQA documents for projects.  In response to that, we have a monthly 
meeting with the Water Board, the Corps of Engineers, the CDFW people, and 
staff with the RCA.  We hear about impacts to waters of the state, and talk about 
appropriate site-specific mitigation.  It has fostered working relationships with the 
Corps of Engineers and the Regional Water Board.  That has been extraordinarily 
helpful in USFWS work, but also in their workload.  It is interesting because we 
can link arms and there is trust and there is humor and there are those 
relationships.  It has changed communication patterns within the regulatory 
agencies.  It has made all of our workloads easier and our relationships firmer.  It 
has also helped us deal with applicants who are willfully difficult.  That is the 
thing I value the most (personal communication, Dylan, 2014).    
Other Respondents – 
 “Meeting monthly with the Wildlife Agencies, the RCA, and jurisdictions as 
appropriate has significantly improved the working relationships” (personal 
communication, Harper, 2014).   
The consultants working for the RCA work on issues that may require the 




consultants are assisting in developing the loan program RCA is working on to 
provide early acquisition of properties.  It absolutely pays to keep everyone 
engaged in DC, otherwise our plan is forgotten.  And if the local agency office 
makes a change that could affect the plan use, we must elevate our issues.  
Because of the stove piping at the government agencies, it’s really hard to go up 
the chain and get help if you are blocked at an agency lower level (personal 
communication, Harper, 2014).   
Procedures to Manage Change, adaptive management in leadership 
Section 6.8 of the WRMSHCP and Implementing Agreement, Sections 14.12 and 
11.4 address Unforeseen Circumstances and Changed Circumstances respectively as 
defined within the “No Surprises” policy related to biological issues (Western Riverside 
County, 2004a; Western Riverside County, 2004c).   Section 20 of the Implementing 
Agreement deals with modifications and amendments to the MSHCP and makes 
provision for clerical changes, land use changes, and adaptive management changes.  It 
makes the distinction between minor amendments and major amendments and establishes 
procedures associated with each type of amendment.  Section 21 deals with termination 
of permits and describes the process and responsibilities associated with termination.  
Section 22 of the Implementing Agreement deals with withdrawal of permittees and 
specifies permittee mitigation responsibilities that continue.  It also requires that the RCA 
and the Wildlife Agencies evaluate to what extent the take authorization may be provided 
to remaining permittees.   
As discussed in some detail above, Section 11.2 of the Implementing Agreement 




created as part of that Structure has a description of membership and responsibility that 
define the source of human capital for each committee.  Within the last 10 years, there 
have been changes in leadership within each part of the Structure from the elected 
officials that populate various committees, to the Executive Director and key 
administrative staff at the RCA, and leadership within the Wildlife Agencies.  It appears 
the WRMSHCP plan was developed necessarily anticipating change and turnover of 
people in various positions within the Structure over the 75-year life of the plan.  The 
Implementing Agreement assures the Structure remains the same during the life of the 
plan, unless officially amended by agreed-upon procedures. 
Respondents were generally asked to address change in the roles of actors over 
time. 
Wildlife Agencies – 
The WRMSHCP permit is going into its 10th year.  There have been 
evolving and changing relationships in that time.  The network changes in 
response to changing conditions and that is the trick.  If it does not, it will break.  
Changes in personnel at USFWS and RCA allowed relationships between the two 
agencies to improve (personal communication, Dylan, 2014). 
Turnover of government officials is a huge issue.  The elected officials on 
the RCA Executive Committee are stuck with this plan and see the hurdles, but 
they often do not see the conservation values.  There are places now already in 
conservation that the cities want to exchange for other areas based on 
development opportunities.  Part of the friction between USFWS and RCA is that 




money for conservation purposes and exchange should not be allowed.  That’s a 
political issue they’re dealing with and I’m not confident we’ll be able to resolve 
this.  Cities change the purpose of their development over time.  Either they 
should get in, or get out of the WRMSHCP (personal communication, Dylan, 
2014). 
The network of agencies and permittees is working as well as it could.  It 
has not been ideal because of lack of funding.  With fewer projects coming in 
during the economic downturn, it would have been nice to focus on management, 
monitoring, and acquiring land.  There just were not the resources to do that.  It 
has been improving a little bit.  The RCA is always pointing at the state and 
federal commitments for acquisition and its flat because federal funding for HCPs 
is not increasing.  It would take 150 years, if we got funded every year, to meet 
those obligations when it should be done in 15 years.  And USFWS offered to get 
a national wildlife refuge in the area because that would help acquire a lot of land, 
but it was turned down.  The water districts or the cities weren’t supportive of it.  
They’ll try again but there may not be state support for it in DC (personal 
communication, Morgan, 2014). 
Other Respondents – 
 “The institutional structure has not really changed, it has been workable.  Some of 
the people that put the plan together have been surprised that the plan is functioning as 
well as it is” (personal communication, Harper, 2014). 
I believe that multispecies conservation could be a good thing.  The 




faith from beginning to end.  I do not know how you put a government entity in 
place and maintain enough historical knowledge to have that handshake count 
from year one to completion.  I am not sure it can be done.  I am not sure that is 
not what is wrong with the whole concept, the idea that we would make it better 
for infrastructure projects and development, and that property owners could get 
well-treated and that species could get the landscape level protection, and that we 
could do all those right things.  That appeals to me.  But the process, I do not 
know that the human condition makes it possible to follow through that and not 
have collateral damage.  The collateral damage is always going to be whoever has 
the least amount of financial ability to fight back, and that is going to be the 
individual (personal communication, Mackenzie, 2014).   
The network has not fallen flat yet.  They are still working to try and get 
through it.  Funding would solve most of the problems.  Some in the network 
have been able to be flexible and creative, others have not.  It is the inability for 
some people to act in good faith.  If the RCA just followed the rules established 
instead of trying to remake them every time they bump into a rule they do not 
like, I think the plan would have worked (personal communication, Mackenzie, 
2014). 
  There are many things we would like to change about the plan, almost 
none of them we can easily do.  We do not want to reopen the plan in a way that 
would require us to end up in having to preserve more land, and do more than 
what we have already agreed to in the Implementing Agreement.  Many in the 




changes.  Politically, the plan is a compromise and that is reflected in the 
difficulty in making changes so we look at what changes we can do to tweak 
things and make plan implementation smoother (personal communication, Harper, 
2014).   
“We are at least 10 years old in June and the plan is well and functional.  
Considering the recent recession, RCA is pretty healthy” (personal communication, 
Harper, 2014). 
There have been several leaders over time at RCA.  The first was a 
disaster, especially when coupled with a non-consensus builder at USFWS.  The 
next RCA leader, Tom Mullen, did an outstanding job.  He is a fabulous leader 
whose strength was seeing the bigger picture on how everybody came together, 
and the importance of keeping people together.  His weakness was that, since he 
is a big picture guy, he did not have the detail behind him to follow through.  He 
had to backfill in the details.  Then the next leader was really a follower.  And 
then the current RCA director is bureaucratic and linear in his thinking.  He 
defines his job as “defending the permits” rather than implementing the plan.  The 
result is he always concedes to the Wildlife Agencies.  The group is potentially 
cracking at the seams.  They tried to remove the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors last year, never called a vote.  Very rough, but still hanging together 
(personal communication, Shelby, 2014). 
Procedures to Manage Conflict 
 Section 23 of the Implementing Agreement deals with remedies and enforcement 




enforce the terms of the MSHCP, this Agreement, and the Permits, and to seek remedies 
for any breach, subject to the following limitations” (Western Riverside County, 2004c, 
Section 23.1).  Key to this section is the statement that no party shall be liable in money 
damages to any other party or person for any breach of the agreement, any performance, 
or failure to perform a mandatory or discretionary obligation imposed by the 
Implementing Agreement (Western Riverside County, 2004c, Section 23.1.1).  That said, 
any material breach or violation of the terms of the agreement is considered a default.  If 
any party to the agreement determines that another party is, or may be, in violation of the 
agreement, they will give written notice to the perceived violating party.  That party has 
45 days to cure that violation.  If it takes longer, or if the violating party fails to diligently 
cure the violation, a lawsuit may be filed seeking recovery of damages, etc.  Because of 
the unique nature of the species and the likelihood for irreparable damage to species, 
parties may request injunctive and temporary relief while an issue is resolved.  Permittees 
may generally use their lands as long as the use is in accordance with the WRMSHCP, 
and the Wildlife Agencies may revoke or suspend permits under a list of stated conditions 
in the Implementing Agreement (Western Riverside County, 2004c, Section 23). 
 While these procedures apply to parties to the Implementing Agreement, they do 
not extend to others that are not a party to the Implementing Agreement.  Individual 
landowners, for example, whose property is in an area designated for conservation, with 
or without the landowners knowledge, seem to have little recourse except to 1) work 
through their respective permittee, the RCA, and the Wildlife Agencies, 2) use social and 
political pressure to affect the actions of the parties to the Implementing Agreement, or 3) 




 Several anecdotal examples of individual landowners experiences with the 
WRMSHCP without avenue to a satisfactory conflict resolution process were provided in 
the interviews and transcripts reviewed as part of this research effort.  To maintain 
anonymity, those will not be elaborated upon here.  However, those stories lend credence 
to statements by respondents which suggest that landowners with sufficient knowledge 
and financial capability can either work through the WRMSHCP process to get their land 
use projects approved and/or their property sold, or, take legal action against appropriate 
parties to the Implementing Agreement and the WRMSHCP.  It is those landowners 
without the knowledge or the financial capability to resolve issues or take legal actions 
that are referred to in the interviews as “collateral damage.” 
Process Attributes Findings 
 Based on the literature and the information and emotion contained in this section, 
implementation is largely a function of process (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Brogden 
2003; Lubell, 2003; and Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980).  One thing that seems clear is 
that, without a formalized process of some kind, efforts for multiple parties to organize in 
any consistent way to accomplish multiple, coordinated goals is unlikely to succeed in 
any measure (Ostrom, 1990). 
 With respect to the presence of goals other than biological, neither the Wildlife 
Agencies nor Other Respondents commented.  Other goals are captured in the 
WRMSHCP documents.  It may be that, because these goals are clearly stated and 
support the rest of the process noted, neither party felt it important to comment upon.  




develop the WRMSHCP plan.  Per Beierle and Cayford, goals of both the lead agency 
and the public must be considered when designing public processes (2002, p. 65). 
 With respect to parties to implementation in addition to permittees and the 
Wildlife Agencies, both the Wildlife Agencies and the Other Respondents identified 
other organizations and individuals.     
The Wildlife Agencies mentioned the EHL and Dan Silver in particular, for the 
role they play in furthering the process.  The Other Respondents singled out Tom Mullen 
as both the “Father of the MSHCP,” the former Executive Director of the RCA, and his 
continued role as a consultant to the RCA.  Both groups also commented about 
developers and consultants in the process.  In particular, the Wildlife Agencies singled 
out Ed Sauls as someone who solves problems by thinking outside the box.  They also 
acknowledge the participation of other environmental groups.  The Other Respondents 
commented on occasional friction between developers and landowners.  They highlighted 
the participation of the Building Industry Association that advocates against excessive 
government regulation and policies that make it harder or more expensive to build in the 
region (San Diego County Building Industry Association 2013).  They also mentioned 
other governmental agencies like the US Army Corps of Engineers, the California 
Regional Water Boards, and in some cases, homeowner groups.   
The Structure is consistent with the literature in recognizing the importance of 
state and federal agencies working closely with a local administrative structure to 
effectively implement the WRMSHCP (Lubell and Fulton, 2007; Scheberle, 2004).   
The participation by parties external to the ITP and the Implementing Agreement 




et al., 2002; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier, 2007; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 
1980). 
 With respect to accessibility of the process by entities that are not party to the 
Implementing Agreement, both the Wildlife Agencies and Other Respondents 
acknowledge outreach by the RCA and its importance in moving the process forward.  
The Wildlife Agencies expressed a need for local groups and individuals to engage in the 
management and use of the conservation area. 
 With respect to the roles of the primary actors, both the Wildlife Agencies and the 
Other Respondents identified the current structure of the RMOC as an issue that needs to 
be addressed.  It seems to be a perception by both groups that having too many elected 
officials trying to manage too many of the WRMSHCP details is not considered 
productive. 
 The Wildlife Agencies identified issues with actor authority associated with the 
difference between take for federal and state listed species and the impacts that may have 
on project mitigation.  Other Respondents did not comment.  One conclusion that can be 
drawn is that at least most of the appropriate governmental parties are at the table and can 
exercise whatever authority they have to move toward common plan goals (Brogden, 
2003; Ostrom, 1990; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980). 
 With respect to the motivation of the parties, the one thing both the Wildlife 
Agencies and the Other Respondents agree upon is that there is no congruence between 
the goals of the USFWS and the permittees.  As one respondent stated, the USFWS seeks 
conservation, the permittees seek development.  Other Respondents have goals ranging 




corridors to fund economic development.  This wide range of goals points to the need for 
a uniform process to manage the resulting conflicting activities.  What underlies this 
whole process, however, is a recognition by all the respondents that the whole range of 
goals is worthy of public investment.  As highlighted by Weible and Sabatier, beliefs may 
converge between coalitions seeking solutions, but each coalition remains distinct in their 
beliefs (2009). 
 The Wildlife Agencies did not comment on the quality of deliberation while the 
Other Respondents had a great deal to say on that subject.  Specifically, the nature of the 
relationship between developers and landowners affects the relationship between 
permittees and USFWS.  This supports the idea that developers and landowners have a 
role in the implementation process.  One question would be whether their role could or 
should be expanded beyond that of a Stakeholder Committee member who only gets to 
comment intermittently when called upon by the Board of Directors to do so, or whether 
there should be other avenues besides the courts or the political realm for their 
participation.  Another interesting observation was that RCA does not trust the process 
since they are largely responsible for implementing the process.  It may just be one 
person’s opinion, or it may indicate a larger problem that has not yet come to light.   
Beierle and Cayford specifically identified the quality of deliberation as a process 
factor related to the likelihood of implementation.  This includes the opportunity for good 
arguments to win out over overt power; the ability to question claims and assumptions; 
and participant sincerity, honesty, and comprehension.  Lack of these attributes may 




 With respect to adequacy of communication networks, both the Wildlife Agencies 
and the Other Respondents agree that communication has improved the relationships with 
parties to the plan and with other government agencies in particular. 
 As far as having procedures in place to manage change and adaptive leadership, 
there are many things in common between the Wildlife Agencies and the Other 
Respondents feedback.  Both groups speak of evolving relationships over time that 
encourage commitment of both parties to be flexible.  Both groups identify turnover of 
participants as an issue, particularly as permittee cities perspectives change over time.  
The Other Respondents expanded on change and express concerns about the ability of 
any institutional structure to be able to successfully transfer knowledge from one 
generation to the next and how that translates to good faith among the parties.  They 
express concerns about human failings in general over the long term.  While the Wildlife 
Agencies are concerned about how cities change their point of view over time, the Other 
Respondents express concerns about RCA changing the rules over time.  Once again, the 
Other Respondents highlight Tom Mullen’s participation throughout the years in his 
various roles as an example of how good leadership matters.   
 One of Pressman and Wildavsky’s pivotal ideas is that policy efforts must build in 
ways to manage change in order to be successful (1984).  Ostrom also discusses the need 
for incremental change over time due to learning through trial and error (1990).  At the 
very least, the network and its rules in the case of the WRMSHP had flexibility built into 
the plan that members are using to adapt over time.  The network implementing the 




 As far as having procedures in place to manage conflict, those are clearly present 
in the plan.  One primary drawback observation from this review, however, is that formal 
procedures can only be outlined and enforced between parties to the Implementing 
Agreement.  There are a number of stakeholders affected by WRMSHCP decisions that 
are not a party to that agreement, and that have limited and often unsatisfactory avenues 
available to them to resolve conflict.  The Other Respondents refer frequently to the 
collateral damage which results from this process.  The inability to manage conflict 
between parties to the Implementing Agreement and other stakeholders may ultimately 
reduce the likelihood of implementation (Lubell, 2003; Lubell et al., 2002; Beierle and 
Cayford, 2002). 
Results/Implementation Attributes 
 The results/implementation attributes examine implementation progress and 
measures of success (Beierle and Cayford, 2002) . 
Stage of Implementation 
 Utilizing Beierle and Cayford’s stages of implementation as a guide, the 
WRMSHCP is in Stage 4, Actions Taken on the Ground.  Stage 1 is interpreted as the 
completion of the plan.  Stage 2 refers to commitments made by lead agencies or other 
authorities interpreted in this case to be issuance of the ITP.  Stage 3 involves changes in 
law, policy or regulation.  Ordinances or resolutions adopted by local governments as 
permittees would be examples of Stage 3 activities completed.  Stage 5 is considered the 
final stage of implementation where plan goals are reached.  In this case, you could argue 
that the earliest Stage 5 could start is upon completion of acquisitions of reserve lands.  




assess the likelihood of implementation.  The closer the stage to completion of an 
implementation action, the higher the likelihood it will be completed.  Actions taken on 
the ground typically involve staff and large budgets.  That is certainly the case for the 
WRMSHCP (Beierle and Cayford, 2002, p. 57-59). 
Up-to-date monitoring plan and relevant metrics for other than biological goals 
 The Implementing Agreement addresses reporting requirements for the 
WRMSHCP.  Of the nine elements listed for annual reporting, there is one element for 
reporting the clerical and minor amendments to the plan each year, and one associated 
with the collection of development fees.  The remaining elements relate to measures of 
compliance with conservation and land use restrictions.  There are no stated elements 
related to achievement of social goals or other development goals except to identify 
development that may be in violation of the plan.  This is consistent with the responses of 
the Wildlife Agencies below where their goals are largely biologically related.  Other 
Respondents had no responses associated with this attribute. 
Wildlife Agencies – 
Success occurs in several stages.  At the Joint Project Review level, is this 
project implementing the MSHCP?  We are evaluating success project by project.  
Then there’s Rough Step.  That counts that as a huge success.  There are also two 
policy successes.  We now do streamlined Section 7 consultations when inside the 
MSHCP plan area.  Also, the definition of conservation in the plan includes a 
legal instrument for the protection of conservation property.  That is going to be 
an added annual reporting requirement. WRMSHCP is the only plan in Southern 




unfair statement, but as an implementation structure, this plan is leaps and bounds 
ahead.  The ways to count success:  acquisition, things coming together, our 
successes and failures are still local and on the spot (personal communication, 
Dylan, 2014).  
Presence of forces negatively affecting implementation/barriers to success 
The interviews conducted as part of this case study suggest that accomplishing the 
WRMSHCP goals is more difficult and controversial than was originally anticipated even 
with the conflict experienced as part of the SKR HCP prior to development of this plan.  
Primary areas of concern include funding adequacy and equity concerns associated with 
land acquisition processes.   In general, equity issues associated with land acquisition 
processes in this and other contexts may be an appropriate topic for future study because 
of the inherent tension between public good vs. private property rights.   
Funding is an essential element of the WRMSHCP and was originally anticipated 
to be provided by permit holders in proportion to their impacts within the WRMSHCP 
area.  Funds to mitigate the effects of local projects were expected to be spread equitably 
among public and private sources to balance costs and benefits.  A national economic 
downturn beginning in late 2007, sometimes described as the Great Recession (Economic 
Policy Institute, 2014), impacted revenue garnered from development fees and had a 
significant negative impact on fund availability for land acquisition.  Results from the 
interviews suggest that although a great deal of attention was paid in the development of 
the WRMSHCP to revenue generation to minimize funding issues, the economic 
downturn during the early acquisition phase contributes greatly to individual beliefs 




reserve lands are expected to be acquired within the first 25 years of the permit and 
funded by development of more than 330,000 residential units and associated commercial 
and industrial development to be built during the same timeframe (Western Riverside 
County, 2004a, Section 8.1).  Actual progress in land acquisition has been delayed 
beyond that originally anticipated, at least in part because of funding issues. 
Wildlife Agencies – 
The major weakness in a developer fee paid for conservation strategy is 
that when the economy is booming, there are lots of developer fees.  Land prices 
are as high as can be.  When the economy is not booming, land prices are low, but 
there are no developer fees coming in to take advantage of more reasonable land 
prices.  Without enough funding to acquire property, the RCA has to make 
priority decisions.  The WRMSHCP has a Rough Step process to keep 
conservation and development apace of each other.  The purpose is to prevent the 
acquisition of all the cheap land while the high development pressure area 
develops, and then you can’t afford to purchase the conservation land in the high 
development area.  Part of the obligation of the cities as permittees is to permit 
only development that will keep them in Rough Step.  They don’t understand that 
as land use authorities, it is their role to maintain Rough Step, not the RCA’s 
(personal communication, Dylan, 2014). 
The plan assumed there would be a percentage of developable land that 
would go into conservation.  For example, if you have 100 acres, you get to 
develop maybe 60 acres, or 80 acres, or 20 acres depending on multiple factors, 




woefully short.  The fee system may need to be restructured if permittees don’t 
step up to the plate.  The slowing economy at the same time development is 
slowing means you are trapped with conservation being purchased at the most 
expensive level.   The RCA is working on getting a loan program so that regional 
HCPs can borrow federal dollars and then pay them back with those development 
fees.  It’s modeled on the state revolving fund loan programs through EPA.  
Nobody but the federal government has enough resources to pull it off.  As a 
nation, we have said through the ESA that it is among our needs not to have 
species fall off the planet, so it is appropriate for there to be access to federal 
dollars to solve local communities’ problems.  A teeny, tiny national tax could 
fund all of these plans (personal communication, Dylan, 2014). 
National will is important in implementation of long term plans.  Frankly, 
the Congressional environment is important.  Sequestration affects 
implementation of this plan.  We prioritize, we triage.  National will shows up in 
lots of ways.  Ecological Services as an organization does a great job.  They teach 
themselves and reward themselves for their negotiation ability.  They suck at 
implementation.  They fight for months over square feet and then walk away and 
never look at the thing again.  They should figure out how to charge for each 
Section 7 consultation and there should be somebody who uses those funds for 
implementation (personal communication, Dylan, 2014). 
Barriers to success include limited authority and multiple interpretations 
of state law affecting NCCP implementation which affects MSHCP 




land acquisition.  The State of California is just coming back from the economic 
downturn.  All the staff is stressed out because they have been doing a huge 
workload for a while.  They are getting ready to hire new people but it has been 
really bad.  And then there is the lack of federal support for HCPs in general.  A 
lot of influence is local.  There is a perception that developer interests affect local 
elections resulting in changing levels of support for the WRMSHCP.  And 
another city changed their rules about subdividing parcels in a way that was 
inconsistent with the plan.  EHL sued them and won so the city had to stop 
(personal communication, Morgan, 2014).  
Other Respondents – 
“The WRMSHCP works well when permittees take authority, not when they 
default land use decisions by conceding authority to the RCA and Wildlife Agencies” 
(personal communication, Shelby, 2014).  
One of the big problems right now, 10 years into the plan, is that people 
forget how difficult it used to be to get projects permitted and infrastructure built 
before the MSHCP.  We also have had a huge turnover politically in the 
champions who created the plan.  Because it has been so long since many have 
had to deal with the Endangered Species Act, some do not understand the 
difficulties that would be faced without the plan.  The biggest struggle is funding.  
If there were more dollars available, RCA would be buying a lot more land right 
now.  We would have a lot less friction, particularly from landowners, because the 
money to buy property would be available.  However, in any type of plan there 




what they want.  By policy, RCA uses the Federal Yellow Book process as a 
standard (personal communication, Harper, 2014).  
One problem we expect is that, as the economy improves, land prices will 
go up faster than we gain revenue.  There is a long delay factor in the building 
cycle so it is difficult for RCA to get in front of the wave using the current source 
of funding, development mitigation fees (personal communication, Harper, 2014). 
“Property rights concerns are significant and this is an issue we have to continue 
to address since it is part of the current political climate of the area” (personal 
communication, Harper, 2014). 
With respect to barriers to implementation, each permittee has a different 
level of sophistication about planning overall, and about how the MSHCP fits into 
that.  Often, they will defer to RCA when they do not need to.  Background varies 
between officials.  Some are very savvy.  In addition, lack of interest, funding, 
and political support are all barriers.  Lack of leadership is also a barrier.  Maybe 
lack of leadership would not be such an important issue if adequate funding was 
available.  With respect to lack of funding, early on the Board of Supervisors 
stated they were going to take a leap of faith that the funding would be there for 
land acquisition (personal communication, Shelby, 2014).   
Other negative external influences include the economic downturn and 
that the leadership did not plan for variations in economic cycles.  No funding 
was ever set aside to take advantage of market cycles, although it was discussed 




Another barrier is that the plan spends time protecting species that are not 
even endangered or threatened, just there.  And there are imbalances in those 
protections like the cougars, who keep the deer population down, until the deer 
population gets down too far, then cougars start eating pets.  The RCA could 
capitalize on this and raise revenue by issuing permits to kill cougars when they 
need to, but they will not do it.  Barriers also include limited physical access to 
acquired habitat.  In some cases, the County condemns land (like shooting areas) 
so they do not have to go clean it up (personal communication, Gerry, 2014). 
“The WRMSHCP implementing agreement is not working well.  Landowners 
have to give up their land at below market prices.  Some people view the RCA as a land 
grabbing organization” (personal communication, Gerry, 2014). 
Funding is not sufficient.  Funds are raised through developer fees and a 
mitigation fee is assessed for other properties to take care of the habitat areas.  
Also, the RCA lobbies Washington, DC for funds.  And then the RCA acquires 
property on tax lien sales at cost rather than at fair market value.  RCA also writes 
a contract to buy property when they don’t have funds, then the landowners have 
to wait until funds are available.  Landowners have to donate a portion of their 
property to the RCA in order to get development permits.  What is to prevent the 
RCA from selling some of their property to developers if they need money 




“There are no funds, they do not have the funds, and they never did.  The RAND 
report came out and said you do not have enough money to do this” (personal 
communication, Mackenzie, 2014).3 
Barriers to implementation involve the non-project HANS and the project 
HANS.4    Project HANS is the one developers use.  There was a big blowup 
recently at the RCA.  Board Members walked out.  It was a circus.  The RCA is 
underfunded, they have problems, they do not want to walk the hard line, and they 
want to push off doomsday as far as they can.  And I think the goal is if we push it 
out far enough, we will find a way to get the money (personal communication, 
Mackenzie, 2014).   
The collateral damage is the property owners who are stuck because there 
is no funding.  If you are a property owner and you need to sell your property 
because you just found out you have a terminal disease and you need the money, 
you cannot wait years, and you also cannot afford to file a project HANS and say 
you are going to do all these studies and produce these maps.  And it is different 
from city to city.  Cities have the ability to make their own kind of 
implementation criteria which can complicate it for some more than it needs to be.  
                                                           
 
3 The RAND report titled “Balancing Environment and Development Costs, Revenues, and Benefits of the 
Western Riverside Multiple Species Habitat Conservation Plan” published in 2008.  This report examines 
the value of the land needed for the reserve, the financial consequences of acquiring the land over different 
periods of time, and the projected costs of operating the reserve. It compares projected costs and revenues 
and identifies potential funding sources to fill any resulting funding gap. It also examines the prospect for 
achieving the MSHCP's habitat-conservation goals and whether the MSHCP has, in fact, streamlined the 
permitting processes. Finally, it identifies issues that the RCA Board of Directors, RCA staff, and 
stakeholders should address to ensure the plan's success and the ongoing economic and ecological health of 
the county (Dixon, et al. 2008). 




We suggested that RCA should help the cities adopt more uniform policies that 
give the property owners a better option than when they file their HANS 
application so they were not forcing property owners into the non-project HANS, 
which is where RCA does not want them to go (personal communication, 
Mackenzie, 2014).   
A non-project HANS is where I just go in and say how much do you 
need?  What of my property do you need for your MSHCP?  They do a criteria 
determination and get back to you and tell you this is what we need to have.  
Right now every application submitted is going to be 100% because RCA is 
behind the curve.  They define it not by the acres they need, but by how much of 
the criteria cell they need.  If you’re the last bastion of hope for that cell and you 
file your application, they need all of you (personal communication, Mackenzie, 
2014). 
If we do a project HANS, RCA gets to play with the criteria a little 
differently.  They get to negotiate with you a little.  They may say that you can 
have 10% development, but you have to give us the other 90%.  This is how we 
negotiate when we do not have money.  I am not going to buy you.  I am going to 
give you enough development so that I can say you were not harmed.  And you 
give me the rest of it (personal communication, Mackenzie, 2014). 
If I come in with a non-project HANS, I am 100% conservation and RCA 
has to buy it.  That is not how it was supposed to work, but that is what you do 
when you are desperate.  The MSHCP requires appraisal.  They have to give you 




they are negotiating with you under a project HANS, they can throw that onto the 
table because you are trying to get a development. And if you are a developer, 
you do all kinds of things; pay all kinds of blackmail to get things done.  The 
cities play with you.  So you grow – developers are accustomed to that.  The 
ordinary property owner says what?  They want to get rid of the non-project 
HANS because that allows a homeowner with 20 acres to say, I just realized 
nobody will buy my property because of the MSHCP.  So here is my HANS 
application.  How much of my property do you want?  Oh, you want all of it?  
OK.  Buy it.  What do you mean you only want to buy it for a third of what I think 
it is worth?  That is not right.  As a property owner, you have the right not to 
spend $15,000 and do your own appraisal according to the Yellow Book 
standards.  And the appraised value is 100% based on fair market value as if the 
MSHCP did not exist.  That is what they are supposed to do.  The problem is, you 
cannot find comparable properties where that has not been a factor.  The reality is 
you cannot get freeway market value for a piece of property that is next to a 
freeway.  You cannot get fair market value when all the comps are also in the 
MSHCP.  It skews the values.  So the RCA makes its own rules.  And none of the 
rules have been tested in court because RCA settles lawsuits.  The only way to get 
a deal at RCA is to sue them (personal communication, Mackenzie, 2014).   
One of the barriers to the MSHCP is the fee.  It really does bother me that 
property owners have to pay a fee of $1500 or more to get a criteria 
determination.  I would have fought that from the very beginning.  I would have 




a property address, and you should be able to give them a determination.  I know 
they did not want to do that and I know the fees and the applications are all 
barriers to getting that answer quickly.  But the fact you cannot get to that answer 
quickly is a fundamental flaw in the process.  It is a moral flaw.  It is not right 
(personal communication, Mackenzie, 2014).  
There are holes built into the plan.  Given the current course, it would be 
entirely plausible for people like me to go out en masse and start lobbying 
Congress differently than we do now.  Congressional members may be the ones 
that are going to make this decision.  When it comes to Congressional members, 
the voice of the property owners is a huge lobby.  We really do matter.  We are 
votes, but we ring very true in the minds of Congressional members.  
Congressional members hear the property owner, the small business owner.  They 
hear them pretty darn well.  And if we are sending messages that are even-handed, 
it doesn’t matter what party affiliation you have.  My message can be that the 
MSHCP is a huge opportunity for everybody, it can protect species, it can help 
infrastructure projects go, it can be good for business and it can be fair to property 
owners if it can be properly funded.  I can also change my message and say this is 
what it could have been, but here is what is happening.  If I come marching back 
into your office and say here is my elderly property owner who has been waiting 
over ten years to get paid half the value the property should have been, and here is 
my retired homeowner who has been dealing with this now for years jumping 
through every hoop, and now they are going on a waiting list and no one will buy 




goes away, so one person can just sell their property to a developer because it is 
right next door to the freeway that is coming through and it should be worth a 
fortune.  But the property owner cannot get there, so do not fund it.  Make it go 
away so they get the relief they need and deserve.  They have played the game as 
long as they can.  It is not fair.  Those are different messages and they resonate 
clearly and fairly and soundly to elected officials (personal communication, 
Mackenzie, 2014). 
Relationships between Implementing Parties 
 As noted in the sections above, changes have occurred in the relationships 
between parties over time.  The comments below relate to relationships between parties at 
the time of the interviews. 
Wildlife Agencies – 
There is as much trust between the USFWS and the RCA as there has ever 
been in the trust but verify category.  USFWS trusts the RCA to do their best to 
implement the plan.  There are sometimes differences in what the RCA thinks is 
the best way to implement and the way USFWS thinks is the best way to 
implement the plan.  RCA is subject to elected officials which is difficult 
(personal communication, Dylan, 2014). 
Generally, permittees are meeting the expectations of USFWS.  They have 
a really critical role.  We have been frustrated by their intentional zoning 
practices, e.g., when they zone vernal pool habitat as a light industrial area, then 
you create immediate conflict with people who buy the property and then find out 




they want to rezone rural agricultural land as high density housing, right next to a 
wildlife area.  We tell them that it is not a good idea and they ignore us (personal 
communication, Morgan, 2014). 
Other Respondents - 
The nature of the relationship between developers and landowners affects 
the relationship between permittees and USFWS.  USFWS cares little for how 
landowners pay for or give up property; landowners don’t care as much about 
biology.  Instead, landowners care about open space and permits, and about the 
lack of efficiency in the process.  They care a lot about when they give things up 
and are inadequately compensated (personal communication, Shelby, 2014). 
Trust issues associated with the Wildlife Agencies during implementation 
relate to designation of critical habitat within the plan area and use of state funds 
to match federal funds to date.  There have also been issues related to differences 
between State NCCP requirements and Federal HCP requirements.  In general, 
however, plan implementation is progressing well (personal communication, 
Harper, 2014). 
The people whose jobs depend on the plan are determined to keep the plan 
afloat no matter what.  It is their job.  I have had the Director of the RCA say ‘I 
have to protect the plan.’  And I said, ‘No, the plan exists to accomplish a set of 
goals.  It isn’t its own entity that must survive at all costs.’  It exists for a purpose 
and if it cannot fulfill that purpose, it needs to either cease to exist or we need to 
go back to the drawing board and fix it, make it right.  And you cannot do that 




how to fix it.  That is not what is happening because the fix is really hard 
(personal communication, Mackenzie, 2014). 
Overall Sense of Progress/Satisfaction/Success 
 Wildlife Agencies – 
The overall success varies from hopeful to going home and thinking this is 
just not worth my time.  It is never going to work and humans get what they 
deserve.  We are going to kill the planet and ourselves.  Everybody should learn 
how to vegetable garden and can food because we are going to need it.  If we get 
a refuge here, all this counts, this could work.  The USFWS has an outstanding 
obligation to this plan.  If the political reality of the federal government is that 
permittees cannot trust the government to maintain direction for long term plans, 
then they have no business doing this.  If the government cannot meet obligations 
to local communities then it is personally an integrity issue.  It should be an 
integrity issue for the public too.  So getting the government to meet their 
obligations here is one of the biggest ways to count success on this (personal 
communication, Dylan, 2014). 
I think the plan works actually, I think it works.  It goes back to staffing.  
If USFWS had one or two more people, they could work more closely with the 
permittees and work things out before they got to the State.  And there would be 
an earlier working relationship with the permittees.  The same is true for the State.  
Maybe it still would not matter because permittees are listening to the building 
industry.  But I think we could be more effective with people (personal 




“The USFWS looks at success as not having to pull a permit.  And linkages are 
starting to be pieced together so that is good” (personal communication, Morgan, 2014).   
We have been telling RCA we need a feel good meeting where we can see 
some good stuff because we are getting discouraged.  And it is good because 
RCA has an active management and monitoring program.  The RCA is not as 
well-funded as they would like, but they are out there doing it on the ground 
(personal communication, Morgan, 2014). 
We are behind on acquisition and we are behind on easements being 
recorded but everyone knew this would be a difficult plan.  I am so down in the 
weeds all the time, I do not really step out and look to see if we are on track or 
not.  I think it would feel more successful if I thought more people were 
supportive of the plan.  A lot of people do not even know what it is or that it exists 
(personal communication, Morgan, 2014).   
It would be helpful to think of the plan in terms of milestones.  You could 
have success on one front but not on another.  If we had a good outreach program, 
and people like the plan, that would be success.  Of if we had a good monitoring 
program.  But if we are behind on land acquisition, then we are failing on that 
front.  I think it will switch back and forth depending on where we decide to focus 
(personal communication, Morgan, 2014). 
With respect to other network members’ vision of success, it varies.  
Riverside County is one of the fastest growing counties.  But it’s like, ‘What is 
your long-term vision and who are you trying to attract?’  In one city, the water 




to take over the water district.  I think half of the permittees would like to get rid 
of the plan.  Their idea of success is building their project and getting their 
development or road or whatever it is built in a streamlined way.  There are some 
cities the agencies never work with on the plan because the cities want more 
conservation within their boundary.  And others want to protect their view shed so 
they have been pretty good partners.  Other cities do not want to pay their fees, 
they do not want to follow the plan, and they feel like they have a huge burden of 
conservation in their boundary, even though they annexed it into their sphere of 
influence.  Some cities are really not thinking.  They try to reach across all this 
conservation land to put in a high traffic road and business space, and then they 
are horrified when they realize it may be tougher than they thought.  Other cities 
we just never hear from and we do not know why.  They may not be developing 
or they don’t have sensitive resources.  There are entities like Southern California 
Edison who are participating special entities in the plan.  They have take coverage 
for what they do in an area.  It is not cheap at 3-5% of project costs, but they are 
part of the plan.  When they are out of the plan area, they have to go through other 
state and federal processes to work.  In conservation areas, there are more surveys 
required so it may not feel as streamlined to them because we want them to avoid 
sensitive resources (personal communication, Morgan, 2014). 
I feel success when I get something out on time.  I see success when 
projects come back in and they have revised their footprint.  It still does not 
always meet the plan guidelines, but at least it is avoiding most of the sensitive 




we look to the city to make up additional acreage.  Sometimes I do come up for 
air and wonder how we are doing.  How are the reserves coming together?  Each 
annual report talks about gains and losses.  I would like to have a meeting to step 
back and look at what we have lost or see if we are on track.  It feels like every 
project is coming in at below the minimum acreage.  Are we losing or am I only 
seeing the really controversial projects?  I do not have a good sense of how we are 
doing overall (personal communication, Morgan, 2014). 
There is concern over losing linkages for species that are not part of the 
plan.  There is also concern for the County Fish and Game Commission.  They are 
anti-MSHCP because they are kind of cut out of it.  And the State is supportive on 
hunting where appropriate so it seems like a huge tactical error not to beg them as 
advocates. People don’t see hunting as part of the plan.  Conservation and hunting 
are not mutually exclusive.  Other plans as they develop should have that as part 
of their plan.  The plan does not say there is no hunting.  But there is a public 
perception that, if the land goes into RCA ownership, they cannot hunt on it.  And 
RCA does not have the staff to deal with the hunter, but it should be on their radar 
screen, and they could work with local groups willing to manage it.  There is 
currently a problem with feral pigs hunters could help with (personal 
communication, Morgan, 2014). 
There are complaints others have registered about the lack of recreational 
access to areas in the plan which is interesting because RCA is very supportive of 
trails and public use and it could just be that we do not have the management 




going to be supportive.  We want local advocates.  We need eyes on the ground 
that care about the plan.  You have to build community support for that (personal 
communication, Morgan, 2014). 
“Sometimes I wonder why we even review stuff if they are just going to ignore it.  
I should just go out and talk with school kids.  I would be a lot happier” (personal 
communication, Morgan, 2014). 
Other Respondents – 
While there are a number of issues where we have disputes between the 
various stakeholders, all are still working effectively together.  The biggest 
challenges the MSHCP has is funding.  It is not as robust as any of the 
stakeholders would like.  RCA is doing a new Nexus study.5  The Nexus study 
examines the required revenue and what the expected revenue is.  Do we need to 
change RCA fees?  What fees do we need to generate in the next five years and 
how is that going to be done?  The study identifies the fee requirements per acre 
for commercial residential, commercial industrial, rooftop residential, etc., 
(personal communication, Harper, 2014). 
There are different ways the plan defines success.  What are the 
infrastructure projects that have been expedited by the plan, and can we point to 
                                                           
 
5 A Fee Nexus Study is required under California law to determine the level of the mitigation 
fees. The Nexus Study Update is necessary to revise the mitigation fee to reflect current market 
conditions, values of land slated for conservation, monitoring requirements, management efforts 
and funding an endowment as required by the MSHCP.  The original nexus study for the 
MSHCP, Final Mitigation Fee Nexus Report of the Western Riverside County Multiple Species 
Habitat Conservation Plan, formed the basis for the current local development mitigation fee. 




those?  Has development become certain?  Yes.  If you are a developer, you know 
what you are going to be able to do in what areas.  The second way we define 
success is ‘Are we acquiring what we need to for the reserve?’  If we look at acres 
per year acquired, then we have dropped a bit below the straight line; however, 
the RCA focus is on the high-cost areas because those are the habitat linkages that 
are already under development pressure.  RCA is more concerned about acquiring 
those high-cost properties now and then worrying about the number of acres later 
because we can catch up.  Another measure of success is when we hear people say 
‘This is a good thing’ and ‘They preserved this area out near my house.’  That is a 
success (personal communication, Harper, 2014). 
It is appropriate to think in terms of multiple interim milestones.  We are 
looking at what projects have been facilitated, what development has been 
approved, and what acres have been preserved.  Then there is a whole set of 
management metrics to examine.  For example, do we see increases in species in 
an area, etc.?  Both the RCA and University of California, Riverside Center for 
Conservation Biology are monitoring the species within the plan.  All stakeholder 
groups are watching RCA’s progress.  Recently a water district in a lawsuit with a 
number of environmental groups asked for assistance to help solve their issues.  
RCA worked with both sides and came up with a solution which provided species 
coverage for the water district project, while preserving valuable species and its 
habitat.  The plan is working (personal communication, Harper, 2014). 
The failure of the plan is the failure to treat people properly in 




areas where there is development occurring, so they have delayed people in 
selling their property.  Owners face multiple levels of bureaucracy rather than 
clarity.  The interests of the owners are not being honored.  Several lawsuits are 
pending.  Successes include lots of property that has been acquired for 
conservation, and many development projects that have been permitted.  There is 
a mix of successes and failures.  There are ways the plan could be implemented 
fairly and as intended.  Lack of funding can be strategically addressed, but RCA 
has failed to do that.  So the leadership failure has resulted in secondary things 
failing (personal communication, Shelby, 2014). 
The USFWS will never consider this a success.  Previously vacant land 
had local jurisdiction over it.  Now the RCA has jurisdiction.  A councilman 
would only consider it a success because now it could lower or eliminate some 
developer fees.  Success would also be reducing the cost of development by 
eliminating developer and landowner fees (personal communication, Gerry, 
2014). 
 “The implementation is really messy, really messy.  It is complicated.  It is messy 
from a property owner’s viewpoint” (personal communication, Mackenzie, 2014). 
Success is everybody wins.  That is what the plan was designed to do.  
Everybody was supposed to win.  We all gave up a little, but we won.  No 
collateral damage.   The core of the question is success is measured in the eyes of 
the beholder and the beholder is going to depend on whether you are a plan 
person, whether you are a member of the RCA, whether you are a conservation 




perspective on that word as it applies to the plan is going to be different for 
everyone (personal communication, Mackenzie, 2014). 
Success of this plan is that fairness remains the key because it has to be 
the core.  So a fair, even-handed approach where we get the conservation we need 
is success.  Maybe not as much as we wanted, but we got all of it we needed to be 
able to accomplish conservation goals.  I would consider success the flexibility to 
recognize that sometimes we give up some acres, but we enhance habitat in other 
areas to help us achieve those goals; that cities found less frustration getting to 
their targets, getting to their goals.  Right now, the cities are very frustrated 
(personal communication, Mackenzie, 2014).   
The overall sense of the plan is that it is a failure.  I think the 
implementation currently is in failure status.  I think it is going down.  I think it is 
on its way out.  I think they need a new captain and somebody that knows how to 
redirect the crew.  I think they are just taking it to the end of the world and then 
they are going to drive it over the edge.  They are unsuccessful at this point 
because they spent a lot of money.  They bought a lot of land.  They have also 
wasted a lot.  They spent a lot of money on low hanging fruit that they did not 
have to go after.  This plan was heaven sent for deep-pocket developers.  They 
took all the cherries off the top early on and they left everyone else holding the 
bag.  So all the big guys, everybody that everybody’s supposed to love to hate, 
you just gave it to them.  You just gave them everything.  And you left the rest; 




regard.  And now, because of the lack of funding and the unfairness that goes with 
it, the plan is imploding (personal communication, Mackenzie, 2014).   
Likelihood of Implementation  
 Referring to Beierle and Cayford’s conceptual model, the likelihood of 
implementation can be low, moderate, or high.  They identify several forces acting on 
implementation that will either help, halt it, or make it irrelevant.  Based on their previous 
assessment of a number of case studies they identify 1) disagreements that stall 
implementation, 2) exclusion of people or issues that leave conflict unresolved, 3) 
political intervention, 4) changing circumstances making implementation undesirable, 
and 5) links to other policies or programs as elements to consider when identifying the 
likelihood of implementation (Beierle and Cayford, 2002, p. 62). 
 For the most part, parties to the Implementing Agreement seem to have found a 
way to resolve many disagreements that stall implementation.  One major criticism of this 
plan is that it has seemingly left issues involving individual landowners that are not 
signatories to the plan with unresolved conflict.  There are multiple examples of the RCA 
and others inviting political intervention.  Parties to the plan still see accomplishment of 
plan goals as desirable.  With respect to the linkage to other plans, the WRMSHCP was 
specifically developed to dovetail with other Riverside County Plans and agreements like 
the SKR HCP.  From that perspective alone, the County has a vested interest in the plan 
continuing to move forward.  So, while the road to accomplishment has its share of 
potholes, there is at least a moderate likelihood of implementing the plan.  There are 
forces negatively affecting implementation that will continue to cause delays and 




well.  It would seem these must be addressed at some point in order to move forward.  
The quality of deliberation is associated with likelihood of implementation.  This is an 
area of concern between parties associated with the WRMSHCP and others. 
Beierle and Cayford note that what fosters or hinders implementation is not the 
level of participation in the program per se, but results from impacts to the larger 
regulatory program in which implementation operates (Beierle and Cayford, 2002, p. 62).  
This suggests that if biological goals are being met, and if transportation needs are being 
addressed, an argument can be made that the likelihood of implementation of the plan is 
at least moderate. 
Results/Implementation Attributes Findings 
 The first attribute here is Stage of Implementation.  The WRMSHCP is in its tenth 
year, and has reached Stage 4 of implementation in Beierle and Cayford’s conceptual 
model (2002).  It has already passed many of the hurdles necessary to increase the 
likelihood of implementation. There are certainly negative influences and barriers to 
implementation, but there are also things that are working.  Looking from a different 
perspective, large amounts of time, money, political and social capital are invested in the 
plan.  Parties are still interested in achieving their goals so they continue to have a vested 
interest in working together.   
 Factors negatively affecting implementation are described in detail.  The single 
most often mentioned factor by both Wildlife Agencies and Other Respondents is lack of 
funding.  There are differing perspectives on how participants got to this point.  These 
vary from the consultant reports expressing concerns about the availability of resources, 




available.  Certainly the economic downturn affected progress.  However, varying 
economic cycles are a constant, and in fact were an issue with previous HCPs in the 
region. The implementing network is currently in the process of updating the funding 
study done, ten years into the plan implementation, to identify ways the funding issue can 
be addressed moving forward.  The literature identifies funding again and again as a 
mandatory resource to assure successful implementation by a policy network (Beierle and 
Cayford, 2002; Brogden, 2003, Gruber, 2010; Lubell et al., 2002; Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980). 
Both Wildlife Agencies and Other Respondents identify authority issues as a 
barrier to success, although in different ways.  From the Wildlife Agencies perspective, it 
is a jurisdictional issue that translates to lack of mitigation for certain species.  From the 
Other Respondents perspective, it is a result of permittees not exercising the authority 
that is available to them to make land use decisions. Both groups identify the constant 
turnover of plan participants as a barrier to implementation.  Other Respondents express 
concerns related to climate change that may affect long-term viability of the species that 
has not been addressed.  Lack of interest and political support to deal with funding or 
degrading private property rights are a growing concern.  Other Respondents repeatedly 
expressed concerns that collateral damage to individuals not only seems inevitable, but 
that it also seems to be an acceptable outcome of the process. 
 Comments from the Wildlife Agencies suggest that relationships have improved 
over time with respect to both permittees and RCA.  Trust issues remain for Other 
Respondents with both the RCA and Wildlife Agencies.  One take-away from the 




a network may change over time as predicted by Weible (2008).  The adversarial SKR 
HCP network worked together to form a more collaborative effort under the WRMSHCP.  
However, collaboration alone doesn’t insure success.  Unmanaged difficulties that 
marginalize some members in a collaborative effort may also lead back to unitary or 
adversarial network relationships (Weible, 2008).  
 There are a multitude of responses across the board when it comes to describing 
participants overall sense of satisfaction and progress.  There are responses from both the 
Wildlife Agencies and Other Respondents who think the WRMSHCP is working well 
overall.  And there are also respondents from both groups who think the WRMSHCP is 
either not working overall, or they just do not know what is working and what is not.  
Sometimes all three responses come from the same individual.  This suggests there may 
be much work to be done in identifying more of those “other than biological” metrics to 
really assess progress of the WRMSHCP toward all three goals of the plan.    
The statement regarding being so far down in the weeds you do not know whether 
the plan is successful or not suggests there is an opportunity for someone to pull the big 
picture together and frame those successes for both participants and the larger 
community.  Annual reporting does that to a certain extent. Perhaps other metrics could 
be developed to give a more well-rounded sense of success.   
One comment of note is the Wildlife Agencies’ awareness of the implications for 
the plan if the federal government cannot maintain long term plans due to funding, 
authority, or other constraints.   
With respect to Other Respondents feedback, there are metrics relevant to 




noted relate to ways people are treated during implementation of the plan.  The presence 
of lawsuits suggests there may be opportunities to cooperate, particularly when at least a 
portion of those lawsuits are settled before going to court.  As Lubell notes, perceptions 
of effectiveness depend on policy core beliefs and institutional structure.  In particular, 
institutions that resolve conflict are perceived to be more effective by stakeholders who 
believe the process is fair, and trust the implementing parties (Lubell, 2003). 
Leadership is a requirement that has been mentioned throughout this effort.  Some 
respondents talk about the leadership of individuals during negotiation of the 
WRMSHCP that were able to pull divergent coalitions together to form the plan.  
Concerns were also expressed that lack of leadership will result in the failure to fully 
implement the plan.  Leadership is not something you can easily build into an agreement, 
particularly one designed to last multiple generations.     
It is appropriate at this juncture to compare the findings above with elements of 
Scheberle’s implementation model examining the relationship between federal and state 
actors in policy implementation.  She refers to implementation energizers; extrinsic 
factors, or those outside the implementing agencies control; intrinsic factors, or those 
within the implementing agencies control or “within part of the constellation of forces 
unique to a particular implementing agency;” and refocusing events (Scheberle, 2004, p. 
43).  Extrinsic and intrinsic factors were included within the case study as factors 
affecting implementation in Beierle and Cayford’s model.   
Scheberle defines implementation energizers as those focusing, day in and day 
out, on achieving on-the-ground results (2004).  There are a handful of individuals within 




included in the reserve to be protected and appropriately managed.  Several individuals 
outside the Wildlife Agencies were mentioned in the interviews that could also be 
considered implementation energizers.  Tom Mullen is given credit by both Wildlife 
Agencies and Other Respondents as being a pivotal actor in the creation and 
implementation of the WRMSHCP.  His involvement was not as a representative of a 
federal or state government with a mandate to improve endangered species habitat, but as 
a representative of a county experiencing tremendous demand for growth with the 
potential to significantly harm species management efforts in the region.  Ed Sauls as a 
developer, and Dan Silver, as the Executive Director of the EHL, were two other names 
mentioned by multiple respondents as individuals who make significant contributions, 
one way or another, to the creation and implementation of the WRMSHCP.  Whether 
they are “implementation heroes” or not in Scheberle’s vernacular is surely a matter of 
policy network perspective, but there appears to be general agreement that they have the 
capacity to influence both the direction and magnitude of implementation activities.  
There are other voices heard throughout the interviews as well.  These are voices of 
individuals seeking healthy communities with a high quality of life, but seeking 
accomplishment of those goals in a way that respects not only the communities 
participating in the WRMSHCP, but the individuals affected by implementation of the 
plan. 
Scheberle defines refocusing events as events which change the implementation 
direction or pace.  The economic slowdown beginning in 2008 fits that definition with 
respect to its impact on the pace of anticipated land acquisition.  Resulting activities 




changes in amount and timing of payments due to the RCA from permittees.  It’s not 
clear yet whether these changes will alleviate barriers to plan accomplishment, or exact a 
price too high and cause some permittees to withdraw from further participation in the 
plan (Scheberle, 2004). 
Scheberle’s typology was discussed in Chapter 2 (2004).   She notes that the role 
of federal actors can dramatically affect working relationships and implementation 
patterns.   This typology identifies two characteristics critical to predicting whether 
federal and state officials will respond positively to each other; mutual trust, and extent of 
involvement by oversight personnel.  More trust is considered better, more oversight is 
not always considered beneficial for working relationships (2004).  At this stage of 
development, interviews with staff from both federal and state agencies involved in the 
WRMSHCP, and others in a position to observe interactions between the two, indicate a 
relationship where agency participants are generally pulling together in a way that 
achieves more that either could do alone.  This indicates a shared commitment to policy 
objectives while each agency answers to different constituents and stakeholders.  
Scheberle notes that pulling together is a result of efforts of both state and federal 
participants to achieve programmatic success (2004).  This type of relationship, in 
addition to the presence of various implementation energizers, seems like key factors 
when considering the long-term likelihood of implementation of the plan.   One element 
associated with implementation energizers not addressed by Scheberle is why these 
individuals choose to fight so hard for program success.  That was not taken on by this 




A final evaluation looks back to Bardach’s supposition that implementation is 
really a control problem where one person is asserting control while another person is 
attempting to escape it (1977).  In chapter 2, the USFWS was identified as the sponsoring 
coalition, and the permittees were identified as the coalition seeking non-programmatic 
benefits.  Interview responses related to the overall sense of progress and success of 
implementation of the WRMSCHP in its first decade are both discouraging and hopeful.  
The Wildlife Agencies recognize they are behind where they expected in acquiring 
reserve lands, but are hopeful that funding, in particular, will improve and still allow 
acquisition goals to be met.  They reference other goals achieved in terms of preservation 
of habitat and related corridors.  In addition to these programmatic goals, they talk about 
the importance of acceptance of the benefits of the plan to communities who must 
embrace the reserve lands to preserve them in the future.  One concern they expressed is 
whether or not programmatic goals can ultimately be achieved without long-term federal 
support.  Other Respondents also express both discouragement and hope.  From the 
permittees perspective, the desired outcome was increased growth, largely dependent 
upon building transportation corridors.  There are indicators to suggest the permittees 
have achieved more working in partnership with the Wildlife Agencies within the 
WRMSHCP than they would have been able to accomplish absent the plan.  This success, 
however, comes at both the cost of participation in the program related to fees used to 
fund reserve land acquisition and long-term monitoring, but also at great personal cost to 





While it’s far too early in the implementation process to determine whether or not 
the HCP will ultimately be considered a success, it is clear that there are a number of 
smaller, incremental successes and failures along the way.  Given the 65 years remaining 
for the permit, fifteen years of which remain for reserve land acquisition on the current 
path, it is not yet possible to project the final outcome.  It is possible to say, however, that 
implementation in this case supports what the literature largely describes as a dynamic, 
ever-changing process requiring investment of significant resources with the objectives of 






Summary of Findings, Implications, and Future Research Possibilities 
 
While Phase I results are helpful in looking at HCPs in California from an 
historical perspective, the Phase II findings allow comparison of generalizations 
described in the literature to actual case study findings.  It is hoped that as more cases are 
examined, the individual findings can be used to improve theoretical considerations.  The 
WRMSHCP studied is considered an extreme or unique case within the context of Yin’s 
five rationales (Yin, 2009).  It is exactly the complexity of this case, however, that allows 
greater analysis of the characteristics identified in Table B-1 in Appendix B, and 
application of these to address the research questions. 
Research Questions 
Research Question 1:  What factors play a role in successful HCP implementation? 
 The literature identifies many factors that may play a role in successful HCP 
implementation.  Some of the most common were identified in this research effort and 
organized into context, process, and results/implementation attributes shown in Table B-1 
in Appendix B based on the previous work of Beierle and Cayford (2002). 
 Phase I findings suggest that groups will not form to create HCPs unless it 
appears that groups need to form in order to successfully accomplish their goals (Berry, 
et al., 2004; Lubell and Fulton, 2007; Lubell et al., 2002; North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; 
Williamson, 1979).  With respect to context attributes, Phase II findings indicate that 
problem complexity, pre-existing conflict, and the capacity of individuals and groups to 
participate in implementation activities do have the potential to affect the success of 




Lubell et al., 2002).  The case study findings support the idea that transaction costs can be 
reduced by groups of actors coming together to resolve complex issues.  Pre-existing 
conflict was a significant factor in affecting decisions to form the WRMSHCP and in 
exacting commitments by multiple parties to move forward with the plan.  That said, 
however, group memory of that conflict seems to be fading over time.  Absence of 
conflict, or at least different levels and types of conflict between parties during 
implementation ten years after negotiation of the plan suggest that some participants have 
forgotten or are unaware of how difficult it was to develop regional projects prior to the 
existence of the WRMSHCP.  What has become more apparent during this time, 
however, is that putting an institution in place to develop regional projects is having 
significant impacts on at least a portion of individual landowners, whether they are 
choosing to develop or not. 
 Process attributes findings confirm that, for complex coordinated implementation 
efforts, the presence of a formalized, flexible process appears necessary to implement 
HCP activities (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Brogden, 2003; North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; 
Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980; Williamson, 1979).  
Much of the WRMSHCP organizational structure seems to be working as envisioned.  
The RMOC and the Stakeholder Committee in both its configurations since issuance of 
the ITPs may be the exceptions.  Both committees are being reinvented in ways that will 
hopefully assist with implementation success over the long-term. 
 Results attributes observed in the WRMSHCP case include relationships between 
the parties to the WRMSHCP and stakeholders, and their contribution to the overall sense 




The case study clearly suggests the importance of not only identifying, but 
measuring progress toward multiple, seemingly at odds, goals (Pressman and Wildavsky, 
1984).  Multiple respondents expressed hope and concern about whether stated 
biological, economic, and social goals stated in the WRMSHCP are being met.  Breaking 
these goals into multiple, interim milestones may be a way to either reassure participants 
that progress is being made, or provide an opportunity to reassess individual aspects of 
plan implementation allowing appropriate revision of activities as implementation 
progresses to improve accomplishment of goals. 
Relationships between developers and landowners, neither of which are 
signatories to the WRMSHCP, affect the relationship between the permittees and the 
USFWS, and ultimately the perception of success or failures of the HCP goals.  This 
reinforces the idea that there exist both formal and informal policy networks, the effects 
of which must be recognized throughout implementation (Scheberle, 2004). 
While the quality of deliberation varies amongst permittees, and certainly 
amongst stakeholders outside of the ITP, findings from the WRMSHCP case reinforce 
that adequate deliberation is required during implementation (Beierle and Cayford, 2002).  
It appears to be a necessary process element to utilize flexibility built into the 
Implementing Agreement to adapt to changing circumstances over time.  Having an 
adaptive process to overcome the transaction costs associated with evolving relationships 
and changes resulting from external events affecting implementation allows for changes 
in activities to compensate for negative impacts.  Findings from Phase II support the idea 
that the presence of trust in relationships amongst the implementing parties is important 




One of the barriers to success identified in the WRMSHCP is that there are a 
number of stakeholders affected that are not parties to the HCP and therefore have limited 
avenues available to them for conflict resolution (Lubell, 2003).  The idea of perceived 
fairness in treatment of all is a key element of success identified by various stakeholders.  
Other barriers identified include lack of adequate resources like funding and political 
support across jurisdictions and governmental levels to accomplish implementation 
objectives, fees perceived as excessive charged to individual landowners to find out 
whether or not they are affected by the WRMSHCP and how that affects their land use 
decisions, and multiple interpretations of law and policy related to species management.  
Lack of trust between signatories to the WRMSHCP and between affected stakeholders is 
negatively affecting the likelihood of success.  Broadening the scope and quality of 
deliberation may offer some relief by allowing affected voices to be heard and their 
concerns addressed.  
Research Question 2:  How is success defined and measured in the HCP implementation 
process by the USFWS and by permittees? 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, some of the ways Wildlife Agencies measure success 
is based on achievement of their land acquisitions goals, maintenance of habitat linkages 
for protection of species, and fulfillment of long-term commitments of the government.  
The presence of good working relationships with permittees was also noted as a measure 
of success, as is not having to pull, or cancel, a permit.  Permittees currently measure 
success in terms of the infrastructure development that habitat acquisition allows.   
 There was a significant amount of input in the interviews about the relative 




permittees.  The perceived fairness of the HCP processes affecting landowners is at the 
heart of many of these comments. 
While Bardach’s recommendations to choose the point of view of an idealistic 
group and a group seeking non-programmatic benefits for study to determine the success 
rate of a policy are clearly necessary and informative (1977), the case study strongly 
suggests that impacts to groups other than the Wildlife Agencies and permittees is also 
necessary to evaluate overall policy success.  For example, specific feedback to 
politicians by non-signatories to the WRMSHCP regarding effects to private property 
rights and landowner perspectives on the success or failure of the plan could ultimately 
change the tide of political will to no longer support the HCP.    
Research Question 3:  How might the presence of various policy actors and the roles they 
play in a network that comes together to implement a multi-party HCP affect the 
likelihood of successful implementation?  
 One of the findings from the Phase I analysis of multi-applicant HCPs indicates 
that the No Surprises Policy may have made individual-applicant HCPs more attractive.  
In fact, individuals applied for ITPs only after creation of the No Surprises Policy in 
California.  This supports the findings of North (1990) and Williamson (1979) that 
groups or coalitions will not form unless the transaction costs of moving forward without 
them are too high.   
Accordingly, more complex ITP needs may require partnerships to accomplish 
the HCP goals (Lubell and Fulton, 2007; Lubell et al., 2002, and Ostrom, 1990).  The 
presence of various policy actors in WRMSHCP implementation suggests that 1) there 




venues for managing policy actors’ issues, the transaction costs of participating in 
another venue are higher than for participating in the WRMSHCP process, regardless of 
whether actors are part of an idealistic policy group or a group focused on non-
programmatic success (Bardach, 1977; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984).  The fact that 
diverse groups of actors do, in fact, come together to implement HCPs suggests that those 
actors perceive their chances of success are increased by utilizing HCPs to accomplish 
their goals.  The WRMSHCP likely would not have been created, or at least would look 
very different today if parties to the SKR HCP had not recognized the importance of 
habitat preservation to allow development, and taken steps to negotiate the Implementing 
Agreement to improve the likelihood of implementation of the WRMSHCP. 
Research Question 4:  Why does success matter?  Does policy network success relate to 
more successful HCP implementation? 
 For long-term HCPs like the WRMSHCP, one of the most important ways 
success matters during the implementation period is to assure that the plan continues to 
move forward toward achieving its goals.  In order to do that, it needs a continued influx 
of resources including funding and political will (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Brogden, 
2003; Lubell et al., 2002; Ostrom, 1990; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier and 
Mazmanian, 1980; Scheberle, 2004).   
 Since the Phase II findings support the idea that a policy network does influence 
the success of implementation, one may also conclude that policy network success may 
relate to more successful HCP implementation.  Interviewees of the WRMSHCP policy 
network describe both wins and losses to date.  The history of this network suggests that 




differing jurisdictions and goals, the short-term memory of actors in the process, 
especially elected officials, etc., there is an increased likelihood of implementation 
success. 
Research Question 5:  Beyond HCPs specifically, is there something that can be learned 
from the case study here that adds value to other environmental management efforts? 
The findings above suggest that the attributes described in the literature utilized 
throughout the Phase II analysis are useful ways to characterize aspects of success or 
failure of an implementation effort by a policy network (Beierle and Cayford, 2002).   
Implications for both policy makers and practitioners implementing HCPs are described 
below.  While the study of a single case does not support generalizing the findings 
described above, it does suggest that there is merit to comparing findings from this case 
to similar findings from other cases in future research in order to develop findings that 
may be generalized to other environmental policy networks.  Elements of HCPs are 
similar to elements of other policies focused on environmental preservation or 
improvement, especially as they affect private property rights.  Many of the implications 
described below may apply to other federal/state/local collaborative efforts and to joint 
regulatory efforts as well.  Trust between parties and fairness issues appear to be 
universal concerns when considering collaborative problem solving strategies. 
Implications for Policy Makers 
 The findings from the WRMSHCP suggest the following implications for policy 
makers that may be considered for other long-term, negotiated environmental 




agreements, and implications related to stakeholders, any of whom may be part of the 
policy network.  Within these categories, they are not listed in any particular order. 
 Prior to discussing implications in each of those categories, however, it should be 
pointed out that one implication applies to both categories of network participants.  This 
relates to that nebulous quality called leadership.  While a full discussion of leadership is 
not possible here, a few thoughts on the subject stand out in the literature.  As noted by 
Denhardt and Denhardt (2006), leadership is not a science but an art that gives people and 
organizations purpose and direction, and energizes people.  Anyone can lead from any 
level.  Per the Denhardt’s, leadership is about change, and change involves deeply rooted 
human values.  They state that “We may go along with monetary incentives, management 
reports, and performance targets, but only leadership that touches our emotions and is 
consistent with our values will engage our full energy.” (2006, p. 8).  De Pree highlights 
three themes he associates with leaders that may be worthy of consideration here:  
integrity, skill in building and nurturing relationships, and the nature of building 
communities (De Pree, 2004, pp. ix-xi).  He goes on to state that integrity is a principle 
that serves society; that the ability of each of us to exercise our special gifts depends on 
the presence of the gifts and skills of others; and the recognition that community is where 
we have opportunities, where meaningful goals can be set and their achievement 
measured, where we can grow and prosper, and respect, honor, and thank the people who 
contribute to our lives (2004, p. xi). 
Leadership, or lack of it, is identified by multiple participants in Phase II as an 
important element in implementation of the WRMSHCP.  The recognition of the 




policy network is one overarching element to consider when developing and 
implementing policy over the long-term. 
Parties to Agreements 
The first policy implication from Phase I associated with parties to negotiated 
environmental agreements is that fewer partnerships may be required for less complex 
HCP needs.  This is based on the number of ITPs and type of NEPA analyses associated 
with ITPs issued in the State of California.  Likewise, single species HCPs are the most 
common across all three generations of HCPs developed within California to date, as are 
single land uses like residential construction. 
The second implication suggests that adding adaptive management requirements 
to HCPs does not seem to have caused a shift in the percentage of single vs. multiple 
applicant HCPs in the State of California.   
The third implication for policy makers can be gleaned from an historical look at 
passage of the No Surprises clause in the ESA.  Phase I findings suggest that inclusion of 
the No Surprises clause in the ESA seems to have made HCPs more desirable in the State 
of California, particularly for single ITP applicants.  One explanation could be that the 
desired policy outcome of reducing the long-term financial risk of landowners does 
encourage the use of HCPs as a development tool.  Reducing the long-term financial risk 
of landowners may apply to other environmental improvement activities.  
A fourth policy implication from Phase II reinforces previous findings in the 
literature by authors including Beierle and Cayford (2002), Brogden (2003), Lubell 
(2003), Lubell et al. (2002), North (1990), Ostrom (1990), Pressman and Wildavsky 




process is necessary when working with multiple parties to assure that successful HCP 
implementation proceeds as planned.  Agreed upon roles and responsibilities, and rules 
for interaction are seen as key.  This structure plays an important role in moving forward 
as institutional memory fades or becomes distorted over time, as political and economic 
cycles change, and as individual actors enter and leave the action arena.   
A fifth policy implication relates to public outreach.  Based on USFWS and 
CDFW experience discussed in Phase II, public outreach activities have a positive impact 
on implementation of the WRMSHCP.  In this case, permittees may not be taking full 
advantage of the opportunities to reach out to the public within their jurisdictions.  Public 
outreach, while not without cost, and with questions over how much benefit may be 
received by authors like Beierle and Cayford (2002), may still be helpful in undertaking 
environmental management issues. 
The sixth observation for policy consideration relates to intergovernmental 
relationships.  Study of the WRMSHCP in Phase II recognizes the importance of state 
and federal cooperative relationships in working closely with a local administrative 
network to implement multi-jurisdictional activities associated with the plan.  This may 
also apply to other types of negotiated environmental agreements (Lubell and Fulton, 
2007; Scheberle, 2004). 
The seventh implication for policy makers from Phase II recognizes that political 
will is a key element identified to insure continued implementation of the WRMSHCP.  
Since politics and their related economics are generally cyclic in nature, the 




activities as political will waxes and wanes over time.  Elements that assure a continuous 
funding stream are examples of necessary provisions. 
Stakeholders 
The first implication for policy consideration related to affected stakeholders 
demonstrates that numerous actors participate in WRMSHCP implementation in addition 
to the Wildlife Agencies and permittees who are signatories to the HCP.  As noted in the 
Phase II case study, the policy network includes developers, environmental groups, 
agricultural groups, public/private landowners, and private citizens.  The interests of 
these parties are sometimes utilized, or in other cases, could be utilized to fulfill needs of 
the HCP.  For example, it was mentioned in the case study interviews that there could be 
a substantial role for a Friends of the MSHCP group, as well as hunters and other 
conservation groups in management of WRMSHCP lands. 
A second implication for policy relates to consideration of effects to stakeholders 
which may appear as unintended consequences.  Policy rules are often developed around 
the targeted parties whose behavior the policy is seeking to change.  In the context of the 
WRMSHCP in Phase II, it is appropriate to recognize the need to include non-targeted, 
but affected, parties when developing policy rules to minimize unintended policy 
consequences resulting in the collateral damage described in the case study. 
For example, the Phase II case study suggests that the price of land and the length 
of time it takes to sell in areas that develop during implementation of an HCP may be 
negatively affected.  This results in negative impacts to individual landowners within 
HCP-targeted criteria cells.  Because of the way real estate is typically valued in the US, 




maintain historical land uses within a criteria cell, but may ripple outward throughout a 
geographic region to other landowners.  These kinds of negative, long-term regional 
economic results should be considered when identifying broader environmental 
management strategies.  There is nothing in this study to suggest, however, that 
development of other economic land management practices more in synch with habitat 
preservation are precluded.  On a regional geographic scale, however, this may be a 
significant shift that would need to be supported by other factors such as changes in 
permittee zoning and targeted economic development efforts.   
Another example of unintended consequences demonstrated by the WRMSHCP 
case suggests that additional consideration be given to the development of 
implementation fee structures paid by citizens bound to the WRMSHCP through the 
permittees to avoid appearing to penalize landowners upon whom the HCP success 
depends.  This fee structure could be addressed as the implementation policy network 
reevaluates funding sources for future land acquisition under the WRMSHCP.  The sense 
of fairness associated with this issue would seem to apply to other environmental 
management strategies.   
Implications for Practitioners 
 The following points demonstrated in the WRMSHCP case seem relevant to on-
the-ground efforts to implement similar long-term negotiated environmental agreements.  
And unlike the implications for policy makers, these relate to implementation more at the 




The first implication for practitioners is the acknowledgement that relationships 
between individuals associated with the WRMSHCP, both in the formal and informal 
policy networks, are important and continue to evolve over time.   
The second implication recognizes the need for access to a venue for deliberation 
not only amongst the parties to an HCP, but associated stakeholders and affected parties.  
This may significantly increase the likelihood of successful HCP implementation.  Input 
and participation by the public and special interest groups should be considered when 
developing strategies for environmental activities implemented by policy networks.   
Similar to the comment made for policy makers, the third implication for 
practitioners from the WRMSHCP case suggests that rigid approaches to resolving 
implementation issues as they develop over time may not be effective, especially as 
political and economic cycles change.  Development of innovative strategies for meeting 
agreed upon goals may be necessary throughout plan implementation.  
The fourth implication for practitioners suggests that continued, long-term plans 
for outreach may assist the policy network in achieving implementation goals.  Over 
time, not only do people in the formal and informal policy networks change, but 
individual members of the public change as well.  In the case of both the SKR HCP and 
the WRMSHCP, a great deal of attention is paid by all parties during early phases of 
development and implementation of HCPs.  For a number of reasons, as implementation 
moves forward, outreach may seem like a lower priority given other needs of the 
network.  Feedback from the WRMSHCP suggests, however, that continued outreach to 
the policy network, affected stakeholders, elected officials, and members of the public 




effort as well as developing an understanding of issues needing resolution in order to 
continue implementation activities.  
The fifth implication from this research effort for practitioners is that care must be 
given to insure that the function of a given committee is congruent with the expertise and 
role of selected committee members.  For example, within the WRMSHCP case, the 
RMOC is currently being restructured to allow technical experts to better perform 
technical functions while better enabling the elected officials to more appropriately fulfill 
their oversight function.  Another example is the recently repopulated Stakeholder 
Committee.  There is a substantial amount of distrust of the process and the parties 
implementing the WRMSHCP by some affected stakeholders.  The intermittent nature of 
the Stakeholder Committee meetings and perceived lack of opportunity for feedback 
serve to reinforce distrust of the process.  
At least within the WRMSHCP, fairness is a policy core belief and is seen as 
necessary in the execution of day-to-day business among signatories to the HCP and 
among stakeholders.  A resulting implication for practitioners suggests that treating all 
members of the policy network and the public respectfully and fairly may contribute to 
perceived policy effectiveness.    
Implementation energizers as characterized by Scheberle (2004) can be anyone 
within a policy network regardless of whether or not they play a formal role.  The 
WRMSHCP case findings appear to support this.  One implication for practitioners is to 
be aware of, and seek out the assistance of these energizers, regardless of their role in 




Energizers’ influence, by definition, may lead to measureable results and achievement of 
implementation outcomes. 
Implications for Researchers 
 The primary implication for researchers resulting from this effort is the 
recognition that individual case studies utilizing elements common to multiple research 
efforts can provide valuable examples of real-world policy networks and their effect on 
implementation of long-term negotiated agreements like HCPs for managing 
environmental resources.  Implications like those suggested above can be tested to either 
support or question various suppositions about the roles of formal and informal policy 
networks. 
Linking Research Findings to the Literature, and Back Again 
 In order for findings from this work and others to be assimilated in a useful way, 
it is important to link them back to the literature associated with implementation of policy 
activities like HCPs and the policy network literature.  These findings also suggest future 
research opportunities. 
 Returning to the implementation literature discussed in Chapter 2, Beierle and 
Cayford (2002) and Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) explicitly recognize that 
implementation occurs in stages.  A review of the WRMSHCP case supports this 
hypothesis.  Beierle and Cayford’s work provides a structure within which to observe 
these stages ranging from creation of the WRMSHCP agreement resulting from a public 
process, a commitment by the Wildlife Agencies and permittees, changes in law, 
regulation or policy including resolutions and other requirements agreed to by the various 




finally, changes in environmental quality.  In the case of the WRMSHCP, this includes 
preservation of selected habitat and specific habitat linkages between development 
projects.  One way the WRMSHCP case study builds upon this literature is by identifying 
that, while these stages initially appear to be a quantifiable linear process, some stages 
will need to be revisited over time.  With respect to the original agreement, for example, 
efforts are currently underway to re-establish the RMOC and the Stakeholder Committees 
in ways that better serve ongoing implementation activities based on policy network 
learning to date.  In addition, the network has experienced major funding issues over the 
first ten years of implementation and is in the process of re-evaluating previously 
identified funding sources, and other sources of funding that could be utilized to continue 
the work started under the HCP.  While some permittees seem to be embracing the 
benefits of the WRMSHCP, other permittees are dissatisfied with the perceived benefits 
to date.  This may result in changes to permittee codes, zoning, or other regulations, or it 
may ultimately result in individual permittees withdrawing from the HCP.  As the costs 
of land acquisition and management continue to grow, different on-the-ground strategies 
may be required.  Like the uncertainty associated with the science of HCPs requiring 
adaptive management over time as more is learned, the same may be said for adaptive 
management of more administrative aspects of implementation.     
 Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) also state that implementation of policy 
objectives is enhanced by including opportunities for participation by non-agency actors.  
The Implementing Agreement in the WRMSHCP case creates an institutional structure 
that addresses roles and responsibilities of signatories, identifies legal and financial 




recommendations made by Sabatier and Mazmanian and other authors referenced herein.  
It can be argued however, how well the current WRMSHCP structure creates 
opportunities for participation by others.  Some of the most negative feedback of the 
implementation process to date focuses exactly on this question and therefore, supports 
the supposition that some form of public participation is necessary throughout the 
implementation phase for long-term negotiated environmental agreements.  As noted 
above, one way the WRMSHCP policy network has an opportunity to address this is as it 
re-evaluates the role of the Stakeholder Committee. 
 Berry, et al. (2004), Pressman and Wildavsky (1984), and Sabatier and 
Mazmanian (1980) directly address the potential drawbacks associated with the extent of 
hierarchical integration and the number of veto points in a complex organizational 
structure.  Berry, et al. (2004), Lubell and Fulton (2007), and Scheberle (2004) and note 
the benefits of hierarchical participation between federal, state, and local governments 
and others.  The WRMSHCP case demonstrates that there is validity in both of these 
perspectives.  The WRMSHCP demonstrates that complex problems like regional habitat 
management and economic development appear to focus on obviously conflicting 
biological, economic, and social goals.  It is exactly these conflicting goals, however, that 
require a more complex organizational structure to achieve these goals simultaneously.  
Having multiple levels of government involved may allow more flexibility and support of 
long-term implementation activities.  For example, as federal funding becomes more 
limited, funding and other resources from state and local governments, and other non-
governmental organizations may be utilized to continue land acquisition activities.  




easements may reduce funding needs.  Future cases studied could focus on identifying 
more of the “how” to deal with hierarchical structures to maximize benefits. 
 One of the fundamental findings from Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1984) work 
that is explicitly supported by Beierle and Cayford (2002), Brogden (2003), Gruber 
(2010), Ostrom (1990), and Scheberle (2004) is the recognition that mechanisms for 
managing change throughout an implementation process are critical to its success.  The 
WRMSHCP case is really just getting started.  The plan is ten years into its 25-year 
acquisition phase and its 75-year anticipated life span.  In addition to the organization’s 
structural changes currently being pursued, leadership changes and individuals 
participating in the process, like Tom Mullen and the revolving door of elected officials 
noted by interviewees, affect implementation progress as do the impacts of fundamental 
economic assumptions that must be anticipated and adapted to cyclic changes.  The 
WRMSHCP Implementing Agreement allows for continued negotiation amongst the 
parties to adapt to these changing conditions over time.   
One area rife with potential for future research relates to implementation 
energizers as described by Scheberle (2004).  Are these formal and informal leaders 
within a network?  What is it about implementation energizers that allow them to 
motivate others to overcome obstacles to achieving program success?   
 The analytical recommendation by Bardach (1977) that the success of 
implementation be defined from the sponsor point of view where the sponsor is part of 
the process was critical in laying out the research strategy for this case study effort.  As 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, the USFWS recognizes both successes and barriers 




permittees.  Certainly habitat is being conserved as part of the WRMSHCP effort.  
Economic development goals are also making progress.  The WRMSHCP case, however, 
demonstrates that focusing on only the idealistic sponsor perspective and the other 
perspective seeking non-programmatic benefits does not paint a complete picture related 
to the success or failure of policy implementation.  If policy goals are being met at the 
expense of other social goals, then the lines become blurred with respect to policy 
success.  Future case studies may wish to add a third element to the research strategy 
seeking impacts or benefits to others than the sponsor and the non-programmatic parties’ 
perspectives.  
 Beierle and Cayford’s (2002) work also played a central role in development of 
this research effort.  Most significantly, they provided the structure for consideration of 
context, process, and results attributes.  The WRMSHCP case demonstrates that this 
structure is a useful one when attempting to understand the history of the HCP, the 
progress that has been made to date, and the goals that have yet to be reached.  One 
beneficial aspect of this structure is that it can be adapted to include other variables of 
interest within the three categories noted as was done for the WRMSHCP case.  This 
makes the structure a very versatile way to compare and contrast many different cases.  
One of the lessons learned from the WRMSHCP effort is that, while Relationships 
between Implementing Parties was considered a Results attribute in this analysis, the 
relationships between various policy network participants, both signatories to the 
Implementing Agreement and others, are inherent in the descriptions of almost all the 
other attributes in Table B-1 in Appendix B.  The specific Relationships attribute is also 




implementing parties including new coalitions that may develop throughout 
implementation of a long-term environmental agreement.  Thought should be given in 
future case studies for better ways to manage research around these relationships based 
on their importance to other research questions.  The WRMSHCP case attempts to 
summarize the relationships discussed by interviewees at a very coarse scale. 
Beierle and Cayford (2002) conclude in their study that success or failure of 
implementation in the cases they studied was largely due to the process of public 
participation rather than its context.  Comments in the WRMSHCP case support this 
finding.  While pre-existing conflict between the parties, and the capacity of participants 
to navigate various aspects of the process define a starting point for relationships and 
activities prior to implementation of the WRMSHCP, it is the actions taken during the 
implementation process related to quality of deliberation, adequacy of communication 
networks, and procedures to manage change and conflict that have a direct impact on 
participants’ perceptions of success.  Examples include criticisms relating to lack of a 
venue or process to manage negative stakeholder effects outside the signatories to the 
Implementing Agreement, and observations by Wildlife Agencies about the potential 
missed opportunities from their perspective for public education, and for permittees to 
educate their citizenry.  A large amount of study remains to be done documenting the 
connection between good public participation and good implementation.  This seems 
especially important to long-term agreements like HCPs. 
 One theme addressed by multiple authors cited relating to policy networks is that 
of transaction costs associated with creating contracts between members of a network.  




(1990), and Williamson (1979) all explicitly note in their work that evidence supports the 
formation of groups or coalitions to lower transaction costs of an activity.  The Phase I 
findings suggest that groups will not form unless explicitly needed to lower transaction 
costs.  Additional research may be helpful in gaining insights into the relationships 
between the use of HCPs for simple vs. more complex habitat conservation or related 
development efforts and whether actors seeking ITPs choose to apply as an individual 
permittee, or as part of a group effort.  A better understanding of these relationships may 
assist the USFWS in tailoring their HCP guidance to meet specific agency goals.   
The number of HCPs increased significantly as more individual applicants applied 
for ITPs to complete short-term residential construction.  What is the correlation between 
other types of land use and long-term HCP durations? 
 What factors explain the shift between the second and third generation plans 
toward categorical exclusions, and is this correlated with the increase in single applicants 
for HCP ITPs? 
Analysis of the number of HCPs in California by generation suggests that the No 
Surprises Policy increased the number of HCPS in the second generation, particularly for 
single applicant ITPs.  However, the development of third generation HCPs after 
inclusion of plan components including adaptive management seems to have slowed.  
One explanation could be that landowner aversion to financial risk was reduced by the 
No Surprises policy, but that adaptive management strategies are not perceived to be as 
beneficial for landowners in California.  Additional research into other HCP cases or 
other negotiated environmental agreements could test this idea and identify other factors 




adaptive management policy result in increased transaction costs, thereby reducing the 
attractiveness of HCPs as a viable development tool?  If landowners avoid using HCPs as 
a tool because of concern over increased long-term costs perceived necessary as a result 
of adaptive management, are there better ways to meet USFWS policy goals?   
Because achievement of habitat conservation goals is dependent upon landowner 
and community participation, identifying factors that encourage use of HCPs is 
fundamental to appropriately crafting policy changes.   
 Each of the questions above relate to transaction costs amongst participants in a 
political arena to meet multiple and often conflicting goals.  Williamson’s (1979) work 
brings together economic and organizational theory.  As Williamson notes, “That simple 
governance structures should be used in conjunction with simple contractual relations and 
complex governance structures reserved for complex relations seems generally sensible” 
(1979, p. 239).  Three characterizations of transactions he proposes include uncertainty, 
frequency of transactions, and the degree to which transaction-specific investments are 
incurred.  Essentially, idiosyncratic exchanges, or those upon which the specific identify 
of the parties has cost-bearing consequences, built upon personal trust will survive 
greater stress and are more adaptable than other exchanges (1979, pp. 239-240).  
Familiarity permits communication economies to be realized.  The benefits of building 
that personal trust, however, come at the costs associated with maintaining those 
relationships.    A better understanding of the range of conditions that motivate groups to 
form and develop multiple applicant HCPs will continue to build upon the literature 
associated with transaction costs and may allow HCP policy to adapt where appropriate 




The WRMSHP case study in Phase II demonstrates that the parties to the 
Implementing Agreement, many of whom were previously involved in the SKR HCP, 
believe it is important to obligate time and resources to the group efforts described in the 
WRMSHCP to accomplish the HCP’s stated goals.  As suggested in some of the 
interview comments, however, if parties and stakeholders to the Implementing 
Agreement believe that the costs of maintaining the policy network created to implement 
the WRMSHCP are increasing beyond the benefits they perceive, ongoing support for the 
WRMSHCP effort may change.  This possible outcome mirrors those observed in the 
works noted above in addition to the research cited by Lubell (2003), and Weible and 
Sabatier (2009).  Weible (2008) built upon this kind of observation in his research when 
he noted that unitary, collaborative, and adversarial policy system types can change 
within the same implementation effort over time. 
 While the concept of transaction costs is very well supported when it comes to 
creation of social contracts, there remains much to learn about the details of how people 
perceive benefits and costs of group participation.  Lubell’s work with others has begun 
isolating variables like problem severity, institutional opportunities, and political 
incentives in the studies cited to better describe transaction costs and benefits perceived 
(Lubell, 2003; Lubell and Fulton, 2007; and Lubell et al., 2002).  In this case, the 
WRMSHCP interviewees talk about their individual goals and why they choose to 
participate in ITP activities.  This case study did not attempt, however, to distinguish 
between the individual parties and their incentives for participating at any detailed level.  
Further research into this case study and other HCP cases may significantly inform the 




 One conclusion from Lubell and Fulton’s (2007) work regarding policy networks’ 
role in implementing agricultural BMPs that bears further discussion is that the decisions 
of public managers at state and federal levels can directly affect the strength of local 
policy networks, and that local policy networks are crucial to efforts to solve collective 
action efforts requiring widespread change at an individual level.  The WRMSHP was 
developed using the USFWS and the State of California’s NCCP program.  However, the 
problems desired for resolution are local issues related to regional transportation 
development and economic growth.  In this context, both federal and state programs 
directly affect not only the strength of the local policy effort via funding and technical 
support, but the very existence of the local policy network in its current form.   
 Another variable from Lubell’s (2003) works is his consideration of perceived 
effectiveness of a policy action.  This concept was also central to the research strategy 
here for beginning to define measures of success.  The WRMSHCP case study built on 
the idea of perceived effectiveness when considering differing measures of success as 
discussed with interviewees.  And as Bardach suggested, much of what one perceives as 
success depends on where they are within the policy network (1977).  Comments from 
WRMSHCP case study interviews are discussed in some detail above, and support the 
idea that at least for now, the WRMSHCP policy network members perceive some level 
of effectiveness based on their continued participation in the process.  Signatories to the 
Implementing Agreement generally perceive the benefits of participating are greater than 
the costs.  Members of the network like the RCA and the Wildlife Agencies generally 
perceive the effectiveness in a more positive way based on the congruency between their 




institutions that successfully resolve conflict improve beliefs about policy effectiveness 
(2003).  There remains a fair amount of conflict within the WRMSHCP policy network 
including both formal parties to the Implementing Agreement and among stakeholders.  
Comments made by interviewees in the case suggest that resolving this conflict would go 
a long way toward improving their perceived effectiveness of the WRMSHCP effort as a 
whole.   
 The WRMSHCP also builds upon the information gathered by Weible and 
Sabatier relating to adversarial vs. collaborative policy subsystems (2009).  While this 
research effort did not delve into the 3-level belief system previously used by Weible and 
Sabatier, the context discussions providing the background for developing the 
WRMSHCP combined with comments made during the interviews by participants 
relating to deep core beliefs of individuals like their views of the importance of the 
welfare of present vs. future generations, their empirical and normative policy core 
beliefs relating to the relative priority of habitat management vs. economic development, 
and their secondary beliefs relating to the positive or negative impacts of development in 
urbanized areas or in non-urbanized areas to date suggest that the WRMSHCP is largely a 
collaborative policy subsystem at this point.  As noted in Chapter 4, interview findings 
suggest that the coalitions can roughly be described as groups prioritizing habitat 
conservation over economic development, and groups prioritizing economic development 
over habitat conservation.  Many individuals in both groups believe that both goals can 
be sought simultaneously, hence their participation in the WRMSHCP.  However, the 
comments made during the interviews suggests that these coalitions remain distinct in 




 Gruber (2010) refers to three necessary conditions for effective natural resource 
management; recognition of social values, market values, and nonmarket values.  With 
respect to the WRMSHCP, social goals are identified in the HCP documents in addition 
to biological and economic goals, but interviews suggest they are not always the primary 
focus of policy network activities.  Market values associated with the WRMSHCP may 
be considered negatively affected land prices that have resulted in some areas within the 
plan boundary.  Nonmarket values are described by Gruber as the ability of local people 
to capture payments for ecosystem services received by others.  The WRMSHCP does 
not seem to formally acknowledge or address these nonmarket values.  Finding a way to 
reflect ecosystem services is an ongoing effort by researchers globally at this point in 
time.  It would be very beneficial to formally integrate this question into future case 
studies to first identify if others are acknowledging the value of ecosystem services as 
they relate to habitat conservation activities, and if so, begin identifying how these 
services are valued as a part of HCP efforts. 
 Gruber’s work with CBNRM specifically identifies resources and equity as one 
principle associated with effective environmental management efforts (2010).  As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the WRMSHCP identified one equity issue as the perceived high 
fees being charged individual landowners to determine whether or not their land is 
affected by the WRMSHCP.  Another issue could be deflated land prices and the 
disproportionate effects of those prices upon some landowners.  These issues could be 
addressed should the policy network choose to do that.  If they do not attempt to factor 




WRMSHCP, failure to deal with this issue of concern could begin to affect political and 
public support for the WRMSHCP.    
Concluding Comments 
   One of the more common critiques of HCPs is the tension between private 
property rights and public good.  This is clearly an issue within the WRMSHCP.  
However, multiple parties and stakeholders of the WRMSHCP appear committed to 
finding ways to both preserve individual property rights and improve the quality of life 
within the geographic area of the plan.  Policy networks may assist in creatively finding 
ways to accomplish both of these goals. 
 Another critique of HCPs is whether they ultimately result in protecting species.  
In the case of the WRMSHCP, parties talk about the habitat linkages that have been 
created or maintained while still allowing development of transportation corridors.  It 
may be too early in the implementation process to ultimately answer the question about 
species protection.  However, these linkages provide hope that species protection will 
ultimately be achieved. 
One of the more written about critiques of HCPs relates to their “voluntary” 
nature.  The WRMSHCP case study suggests that the signatories to the Implementing 
Agreement, at least initially, saw the HCP as a collaborative way to move forward with 
multiple and conflicting local, social goals.  That said, the study also highlights that a 
number of individual landowners no longer perceive their ability to buy, sell, or develop 
their property as voluntary.  Many of these individuals did not choose to participate in the 
HCP, but are instead mandated to participate as a result of permittee land use decisions.  




process may go a long way toward the final determination of the success or of failure of 
the WRMSHCP, and of collaborative efforts by others to concurrently achieve 
environmental, economic, and social goals.  
 While formal policy networks are explicitly identified in negotiated agreements 
like HCPs, there are also informal networks that form to fill voids in institutional 
infrastructure.  Callihan, et al. noted that often in HCPs there is no formal mechanism to 
resolve differences between the USFWS and permittees (2009, p. 7).  Steps taken by the 
USFWS to encourage use of these mechanisms, at least in the case of the WRMSHCP, 
resulted in identification of formal conflict resolution strategies amongst signatories to 
the plan.  What this case study specifically identifies, however, is an additional level of 
conflict resolution required to bridge between HCP participants and non-HCP 
participants; between the Wildlife Agencies and permittees, and the affected 
stakeholders.  Parties in a policy network, either formal or informal, may highlight issues 
requiring resolution, and in developing innovative ways to resolve issues created during 
implementation of agreements like HCPs. 
Continued study of individual HCP cases is necessary to be able to fully 
understand the relationships between members of policy networks and their role in the 
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Habitat Conservation Plans by Generation in the State of California 
 
HCP Generations Frequency 
(HCPs) Percent 
First Generation (<=1994) 
 
18 11.0 
Second Generation (1995<x<=2001) 74 
 
45.1 
Third Generation (>2001) 
 
72 43.9 








HCP Applicant Types in California Incidental Take Permits (ITPs) – First Generation 
 
HCP Applicant Type Frequency 
(HCPs) Percent 
1 local jurisdiction 2 11.1 
2 or more local jurisdictions 3 16.7 
2 or more local jurisdictions, other 1 5.6 
Corporation 10 55.6 
Other 1 5.6 
State agency 1 5.6 








HCP Applicant Types in California ITPs – Second Generation 
 
HCP Applicant Type Frequency 
(HCPs) Percent 
1 local jurisdiction 13 17.6 
1 local jurisdiction, corporation 2 2.7 
1 local jurisdiction, corporation, private 
individual 
1 1.4 
2 or more local jurisdictions 1 1.4 
2 or more local jurisdictions, corporation, 
other 
1 1.4 
2 or more local jurisdictions, private 
individual 
1 1.4 
2 or more local jurisdictions, state agency 1 1.4 
Corporation 45 60.8 
Corporation, other 1 1.4 
Other 2 2.7 
Private individual 5 6.8 
State agency 1 1.4 








HCP Applicant Types in California ITPs – Third Generation 
 
HCP Applicant Type Frequency 
(HCPs) Percent 
1 local jurisdiction 10 13.9 
1 local jurisdiction and corporation 2 2.8 
2 or more local jurisdictions 3 4.2 
2 or more local jurisdictions, corporation 1 1.4 
2 or more local jurisdictions, non-
governmental organization, other, state 
agency 
1 1.4 
Corporation 28 38.9 
Non-governmental organization 1 1.4 
Other 5 6.9 
Other, private individual 1 1.4 
Private individual 18 25.0 
State agency 2 2.8 








Single vs. Multiple Listed Species HCPs in California ITPs – First Generation 
 
Number of Listed Species Frequency 
(HCPs) Percent 
No Listed Species 1 5.6 
Single Listed Species 10 55.6 
Multiple Listed species 7 38.9 




Single vs. Multiple Listed Species HCPs in California ITPs – Second Generation 
 
Number of Listed Species Frequency 
(HCPs) Percent 
Single Listed Species 43 58.1 
Multiple Listed species 31 41.9 








Single vs. Multiple Listed Species HCPs in California ITPs – Third Generation 
 
Number of Species Frequency 
(HCPs) Percent 
No Listed Species 1 1.4 
Single Listed Species 41 56.9 
Multiple Listed species 30 41.7 
Total 72 100.0 
 
Table A-8 
Single vs. Multiple Land Uses in California ITPs by Generation – First Generation 
 
Land Use per HCP Frequency 
(HCPs) Percent 
Single Land Use 10 55.6 
Multiple Land Use 7 38.9 
Unknown Land Use 
 
1 5.6 







Single vs. Multiple Land Uses in California ITPs by Generation – Second Generation 
Land Use per HCP Frequency 
(HCPs) Percent 
Single Land Use 56 75.7 
Multiple Land Use 18 24.3 




Single vs. Multiple Land Uses in California ITPs by Generation – Third Generation 
 
Land Use per HCP Frequency 
(HCPs) Percent 
Single Land Use 59 81.9 
Multiple Land Use 13 18.1 







Types of Land Use for HCPs in California - First Generation 
 
Land Use Description Combinations in ITPs Frequency Percent 
Agricultural, business/commercial construction, residential 
construction, utility/infrastructure 
1 5.6 
Agricultural, business/commercial construction, residential 
construction, utility/infrastructure, water activities 
1 5.6 
Business/commercial construction 1 5.6 
Business/commercial construction, residential construction 2 11.1 
Business/commercial construction, residential construction, 
utility/infrastructure 
2 11.1 
Forest management activities 1 5.6 
Gas and oil production 1 5.6 
Mining or other extraction 1 5.6 
Other 2 11.1 
Recreational activities, residential construction 2 11.1 
Residential construction 3 16.7 
Water activities 1 5.6 








Types of Land Use for HCPs in California – Second Generation 
 
Land Use Description Combinations in ITPs 
Frequency 
(HCPs) Percent 
Agricultural, business/commercial construction, mining or 
other extraction, recreational activities, residential 
construction, utility/infrastructure, water activities 
1 1.4 
Agricultural, business/commercial construction, 
recreational activities, residential construction, 
utility/infrastructure, water activities 
2 2.7 
Business/commercial construction 8 10.8 
Business/commercial construction, other, 
utility/infrastructure 
1 1.4 
Business/commercial construction, recreational activities, 
residential construction, utility/infrastructure 
1 1.4 
Business/commercial construction, recreational activities, 
residential construction, utility/infrastructure, water 
activities 
1 1.4 
Business/commercial construction, residential construction, 
utility/infrastructure 
1 1.4 
Business/commercial construction, water activities 1 1.4 
Forest management activities 1 1.4 
Forest management activities, mining or other extraction 1 1.4 
Gas and oil production 6 8.1 
Mining or other extraction 10 13.5 
Other 9 12.2 
Other, recreational activities 1 1.4 






Land Use Description Combinations in ITPs 
Frequency 
(HCPs) Percent 
Other, residential construction 1 1.4 
Recreational activities 1 1.4 
Recreational activities, residential construction 2 2.7 
Recreational activities, residential construction, 
utility/infrastructure 
1 1.4 
Recreational activities, utility/infrastructure 1 1.4 
Residential construction 14 18.9 
Residential construction, utility/infrastructure 2 2.7 
Utility/infrastructure 3 4.1 
Water activities 4 5.4 








Types of Land Use for HCPs in California – Third Generation 
 
Land Use Description Combinations in ITPs 
Frequency 
(HCPs) Percent 
Agricultural 2 2.8 
Agricultural, business/commercial construction, forest 
management activities, mining or other extraction, 
recreational activities, residential construction, 
utility/infrastructure, water activities 
1 1.4 
Agricultural, business/commercial construction, mining or 
other extraction, recreational activities, residential 
construction, utility/infrastructure 
1 1.4 
Agricultural, business/commercial construction, 
recreational activities, residential construction, 
utility/infrastructure 
2 2.8 
Agricultural, business/commercial construction, residential 
construction, utility/infrastructure, water activities 
1 1.4 
Agricultural, business/commercial construction, 
utility/infrastructure 
1 1.4 
Agricultural, forest management activities 1 1.4 
Business/commercial construction 12 16.7 
Business/commercial construction, mining or other 
extraction, recreational activities, residential construction, 
utility/infrastructure, water activities 
1 1.4 
Business/commercial construction, recreational activities, 
residential construction, utility/infrastructure, water 
activities 
1 1.4 
Business/commercial construction, residential construction 1 1.4 






Land Use Description Combinations in ITPs 
Frequency 
(HCPs) Percent 
Mining or other extraction 1 1.4 
Non-commercial 2 2.8 
Other 5 6.9 
Other, residential construction 1 1.4 
Recreational activities 4 5.6 
Residential construction 23 31.9 
Utility/infrastructure 10 13.9 
Utility/infrastructure, water activities 1 1.4 













Environmental Assessment 15 83.3 
Environmental Impact Statement 3 16.7 










Categorical Exclusion 14 18.9 
Environmental Assessment 54 73.0 
Environmental Impact Statement 6 8.1 














Categorical Exclusion 43 59.7 
Environmental Assessment 21 29.2 
Environmental Impact Statement 8 11.1 














2 3 16.7 
3 1 5.6 
5 1 5.6 
6 1 5.6 
20 3 16.7 
25 1 5.6 
30 5 27.8 
50 2 11.1 
100 1 5.6 















.5 1 1.4 
2.0 10 13.5 
3.0 5 6.8 
4.5 1 1.4 
5.0 9 12.2 
8.0 1 1.4 
10.0 11 14.9 
15.0 2 2.7 
20.0 3 4.1 
30.0 13 17.6 
50.0 13 17.6 
55.0 1 1.4 
75.0 2 2.7 
80.0 1 1.4 
100.0 1 1.4 














1 3 4.2 
2 1 1.4 
3 14 19.4 
5 17 23.6 
6 2 2.8 
10 9 12.5 
15 1 1.4 
16 1 1.4 
20 1 1.4 
25 2 2.8 
30 6 8.3 
40 1 1.4 
41 1 1.4 
50 9 12.5 
60 1 1.4 
75 3 4.2 












Table B-1.  
Proposed Factors to Consider in Successful HCP Implementation (Based on similar 
study work from Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Gruber, 2010; Lubell, 2003; Lubell et al., 
















affecting levels of social 
capital 
Identify Type of Actors 
Participating in 
addition to Permittees 
 Up-to-date monitoring plan 
and relevant metrics for other 
than biological goals  
Capacity of Participants 
to navigate regulatory, 
political, social, 
economic, and technical 
issues 
Accessibility for Actors 
other than Permittees to 
Participate (Open vs. 
Invitation Only, etc.) 
Presence of forces negatively 
affecting implementation  






 Actors have Authority 
to Implement Plans 
Overall Sense of 
Progress/Satisfaction 
 Motivation of 
Participants 
Likelihood of Implementation 





























Table B-2   
WRMSHCP Permittees 
County Agencies Cities Other 
Western Riverside County Regional 
Conservation Authority (RCA) 
Banning California Department 
of Transportation 
(CDOT) 
County of Riverside (RC) Beaumont California Department 
of Parks and 
Recreation (CDPR) 
Riverside County Flood Control and Water 
Conservation District (RCFCWCD) 
Calimesa  
Riverside County Regional Parks and Open 




Riverside County Waste Management District 
(RCWMD) 
Corona  
Riverside County Transportation Commission 
(RCTC) 
Eastvale  











 Murrieta  
 Norco  
 Perris  
 Riverside  
 San Jacinto  
 Temecula  













For Identifying the Role of Policy Networks in the Implementation of Habitat 
Conservation Plans 
 
1. What does the Western Riverside County Multiple Species Habitat Conservation 
Plan (MSHCP) Implementation network look like? 
 
2. What is your interest or that of your organization in the MSHCP?  What role does 
your organization play in implementation of the MSHCP? 
 
3. What is your view of nature of the relationship between USFWS and permittees?  
To the best of your knowledge: 
 
4. Was there a relationship between USFWS and the permittees prior to initiation of 
work on the Western Riverside MSHCP?  Does the USFWS engage with other 
stakeholders? 
 
5. What kind of working relationship has each had with the other during 
implementation? What is the nature of trust between them and their levels of 
interaction? Has that changed over time?  For example, has trust between the 
parties increased or decreased during plan implementation? 
 
6. What is the specific role of USFWS is in implementation plans? Are they meeting 
the expectations of the permittees? 
 
7. What is the specific role of the permittees in implementation plans? Are they 
meeting the expectations of the USFWS? 
 
8. Is there congruency between the objectives of USFWS and the permittee(s)?  
Again, to the best of your knowledge: 
 
9. To what extent are the USFWS objectives in synch with permittee objectives? Are 
these objectives sufficiently similar to assure both groups are moving in similar 
directions over time? Or are they tenuously related making them more vulnerable 
to political, social, or legal attack? 
 
10. What are the roles and capabilities of other actors and coalitions in plan 
implementation, e.g., development of social capital and cultural behaviors and 
norms?  
 
11. What other actors besides the USFWS and permittees play a major role in 
MSHCP implementation activities? Has that changed over time as difficulties are 
encountered in implementation? What role do those other actors play? What 
authority do they have with respect to implementation of specific MSHCP 




with changed conditions or setbacks? If so, is that a function of their 
organizational affiliation or their interpersonal skills and personal characteristics? 
 
12. How does the nature of the relationships of other active actors affect the 
relationship between USFWS and the permittee(s), or the progress of MSHCP 
activities? 
 
13. How do parties interact during implementation activities? Has the institutional 
structure envisioned at plan approval stayed the same or changed over time? If it 
changed, what prompted the reconfiguration? How do members of the group 
communicate with each other? How does the group communicate with others 
outside the core policy network? Are public outreach activities included in the 
MSHCP?  What are the characteristics of the major agencies and their role in 
implementation, e.g., state/county/federal, funding, legal support, volunteer labor, 
etc.? What are the characteristics of individual actors playing a major role in 
implementation? 
 
14. What are the barriers to MSHCP implementation from your perspective? 
 
15. In your opinion, how well is the Western Riverside County MSHCP 
implementation agreement working? Are each of the parties to the agreement 
performing the functions they are responsible for? If not, why not? (Lack of 
interest, funding, political support . . .?) 
 
16. Are the resources, especially public and private funding, sufficient to accomplish 
plan objectives? Are resources available in the timeframes anticipated? How does 
the group deal with a lack of resources like funding and political support? 
 
17. How well has the network been able to cope with changing conditions?  As 
changed conditions arise, have the USFWS, permittees, and others involved in 
implementation been able to be flexible and creative at finding ways to work with 
change? Or has the process stalled? If so, what did it take to get things moving 
forward again? 
 
18. What events are affecting MSHCP implementation, either positively or 
negatively, as a result of external political, social, or legal influences? Do these 
influences tend to be more from a local or regional level, or from a national level? 
 
19. How do you or your organization define success and at what stages in the 
process? 
 
20. In what ways has the MSHCP implementation process been successful, and when 
relative to permit duration? What is the USFWS definition of success? At what 
point in the process? What is the permittee(s) definition of success? At what point 
in the process? In what ways has the implementation process been successful, and 





21. Is it appropriate to think of success in terms of multiple interim milestones? 
 
22. Do you know how other network members and stakeholders consider success? 
How successful is the plan implementation considered by those outside the 
process who know of its existence or may be affected to specific plan activities? 
 
23. What is the overall sense of the success of the MSHCP implementation network 

































PROPERTY OWNER INTIATIED HABITAT EVALUATION AND ACQUISITION 
NEGOTIATION STRATEGY (HANS) AND EXPEDITED REVIEW PROCESS FOR 
SINGLE FAMILY HOMES OR MOBILEHOMES TO BE LOCATED ON AN 
EXISTING LOT WITHIN THE CRITERIA AREA 
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